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xABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on the behavior of the exchange rate and the currency risk premium.
The first chapter studies the problem of exchange rate disconnect from economic fundamentals
by analyzing the role of heterogeneous information among investors. The second paper examines
the relationship between currency risk premia, interest rate differentials, real exchange rates, and
external imbalances. The third chapter investigates the violation of uncovered interest rate parity,
the exchange rate, and the currency risk premium in a model where consumption growth prospects
contain a long-run risk component with the stochastic volatility.
1CHAPTER 1. HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATIONAL HORIZONS AND
THE EXCHANGE RATE DISCONNECT PUZZLE
In this chapter, I study the problem of exchange rate “disconnect” from fundamentals in a
model where investors have heterogeneous informational horizons about future fundamentals. The
disconnect between the exchange rate and the observable economic fundamental arises because of
the existence of private information across investors. The model has two types of investors. A
fraction of these investors are better informed in the sense that they are able to obtain information
about future fundamentals in advance of the remaining investors with more precise private signal
quality. There are two main findings. First, the disconnect problem is serious when a group
of investors holds different beliefs about future fundamentals, and it is even worse when they
receive information about these fundamentals at a longer period. In fact, as the fraction of better-
informed investors increases, the disconnect problem aggravates. Second, as the fundamental is
more persistent, the exchange rate is more connected with the current observable fundamental.
Furthermore, if one studies the relationship between exchange rate and economic fundamentals,
one should not miss out the role of private information which can be captured by order flow.
Numerical analysis of the model exhibits a close relationship between exchange rate and order flow.
1.1 Introduction
The mainstream macroeconomic models of exchange rate determination, for example, the flex-
ible price monetary model and the sticky price monetary model, mainly rely on public macroeco-
nomic information. These traditional models assume rational expectations under the assumption
that information is publicly shared by all agents. There is no role of private information. In
these models, exchange rates are determined by macroeconomic fundamentals, namely, interest
rate, money supply, inflation, and income. However, these models fail to explain exchange rate
2dynamics, especially at a short horizon. The weak relationship between the exchange rate and
its macroeconomic fundamental is called the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. Meese and Rogoff
(1983) conclude that a random walk model predicts exchange rates better than the models based
on macroeconomic models. Subsequent research, e.g., Mark (1995), found a better prediction of
exchange rate by fundamentals at a longer horizon.
One possible reason for this poor relationship is that traditional models do not take into account
the mechanics of the foreign exchange market, especially the role of dealers, and therefore miss out
on the role of private information and agent heterogeneity. In contrast, the market microstructure
approach incorporates the features of trading in the foreign exchange market into a model. This
approach has an advantage over its traditional counterparts because it links the information relevant
to macroeconomic fundamentals with the spot exchange rate through the trading process. More
specifically, research on foreign exchange market microstructure focuses on the role of private
information, and the heterogeneity of agents in determining exchange rates. By incorporating
these features, microstructure models have the potential to successfully explain the exchange rate
disconnect puzzle.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) introduce heterogeneous information into a dynamic mon-
etary model of exchange rate determination. In their model, a continuum of investors receive
symmetrically dispersed information about future macroeconomic fundamentals. I study the role
of information heterogeneity in explaining the exchange rate disconnect puzzle by extending their
model in the sense that a group of investors received asymmetrically private signals about fu-
ture fundamentals. In my model, investors receive private signals about future fundamentals at
different horizons. This would cause an informational advantage to the group of investors who
receive signals about future fundamentals of more periods ahead. The disconnect problem is strong
when investors receive information at different periods ahead. And, an increase in the fraction of
investors who know information at a long period intensifies the problem. When there are more
investors who know information about future fundamentals at a long period ahead, the importance
of the heterogeneity among private information is greater, and hence the unobserved components
3in the equilibrium exchange rate become more evident. The relationship between the exchange rate
and current observable fundamental deteriorates. However, when the process of the observable fun-
damental is persistent, the future fundamental highly correlates with the current one. An increase
in the fraction of investors who know more about future fundamentals would help the exchange
rate connect with the current observable fundamental. Therefore, knowing more about future fun-
damentals would not help the exchange rate to connect with the current observable fundamental
unless the process of fundamentals ft is more persistent. Moreover, the model with heterogeneous
informational horizon also exhibits the implication of private information through order flow. I
find that the observed fundamental has little explanatory power on the exchange rate. Instead, the
exchange rate is firmly related to order flow.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the idea of the effect of
private information on the exchange rate. Section 1.3 lays out the details of the model. The model
implications along with numerical results are also discussed in section 1.4. Section 1.5 provides an
analysis of the disconnect puzzle. In section 1.6, I develop another setting of information structure
that causes an informational advantage to one group of investors. In section 1.7, I present the
role of order flow on the exchange rate. Last but not least, section 1.8 provides some concluding
remarks.
1.2 Information Heterogeneity and the Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle
Information heterogeneity is key to understand dynamic in exchange rate. Rather than at-
tempting to connect macroeconomic variables to the exchange rate, the market-microstructure
approach addresses the importance of the trading foreign exchange rate process that impounds
macro information on the exchange rate. As a matter of fact, not all relevant macro information is
publicly known to investors. There exists information that is being dispersed among agents in the
economy. The spot exchange rate reflects this heterogeneous information that is available to the
dealers because it is the price of foreign currency quoted by dealers.
4One might question the existence of private information in currency market because in the
traditional macro models most economic fundamentals that link to exchange rates are believed to
be publicly known to all agents in the market. However, macroeconomic information is available
in a limited amount to agents in the economy. Private information exists in the market for various
reasons. For example, investors may receive different information about future fundamentals be-
cause they have different timing gaps when acquiring the public information. Some investors may
have better foresight about future fundamentals than others in the economy. Like in this paper,
one group of investors can infer about future fundamentals at a longer period ahead the other
group. Therefore, information about future economic fundamentals, though publicly announced,
can be dispersed among investors and dealers. Trading in the foreign exchange market is based
on the access to different information sets. Each agent’s trade in the market depends on his own
information and perception reaching to him. The dispersed information inevitably affects sales and
orders for the foreign currency of individual investor.
The market microstructure literature posits that market participants have different sets of infor-
mation. Dispersed information among agents critically impacts exchange rate dynamics. Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2006) address the exchange rate determination puzzle by introducing heteroge-
neous information into a standard monetary model of exchange rate determination. In their model,
there are two types of fundamentals, namely, f fundamental and b fundamental. A continuum of
investors differ in two respects. First, they observe ft and receive symmetrically dispersed infor-
mation about future f fundamentals. Second, they all have different exchange rate risk exposure
associated with their non-asset income. This exposure is private information and it leads to hedge
trades whose aggregation is also unobservable. The unobservable hedge trade is referred to b fun-
damental. The paper’s key result is that information heterogeneity disconnects the exchange rate
from fundamentals in the short run but allows a close relationship in the long run. In the short run,
investors do not know whether the change in the exchange rate is driven by the average private
signals about future fundamentals or the unobserved shock. They called this effect as “rational
confusion”. There is also a magnification effect on the unobserved component. The impact of an
5unobserved shock on exchange rates is big and persistent in the heterogeneous model. Therefore, in
the short run, unobserved fundamentals dominate exchange rate volatility. Rational confusion and
the persistence of unobserved shock diminish as investors learn more about future fundamentals.
The impact of the unobserved fundamentals on the exchange rate weakens in the long run. This
results in a close relationship between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals in the long
run.
In this study, I add a novel and a realistic dimension to Bacchetta and van Wincoop’s model with
information heterogeneity among investors. In particular, I introduce differences in informational
horizons across investors. In my model, there is one group of investors that receives information
about future fundamentals in advance of another group. Equivalently, there is an information lag
between two groups of investors. I find that the disconnect problem is strengthened when a group
of investors receive a relatively longer horizon signal in advance.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop’s model generates an equilibrium exchange rate that depends on
an average of higher order expectations of current and future economic fundamentals, composed
of observed and unobserved parts. Private information takes the form of a signal about future
fundamentals. At time t, investors observe all past and current fundamentals. They receive a
private signal each period about the observable fundamental T periods ahead. Each investor infers
his expectation of future fundamentals from the distribution of future fundamentals, the adjusted
exchange rate, and a signal about future fundamentals. Then the average expectation is computed
by aggregating each investor’s expectation.
For the simplest case where T = 1, the equilibrium exchange rate depends on an observed
current fundamental, a fundamental at the next period, and a current unobserved fundamental.
They compare the R2 of the model with private information and the model with common knowledge.
The result is that the R2 is lower in the heterogeneous information model, suggesting that with
private information the exchange rate disconnects from the observed fundamental.
There are two dynamic properties of the model when T > 1. First, the impact of unobservable
shocks on the exchange rate are persistent. Second, expectations of infinite order of fundamentals
6affect the exchange rate. When the unobservable shocks are persistent, it is more difficult for
investors to learn about fundamentals up to time t + T from exchange rates at time t. Hence,
deviations of the exchange rate from observed fundamentals can be very long-lasting. With the
presence of higher-order expectations, the unobserved hedge trades receive a larger weight in the
equilibrium exchange rate. On the other hand, the exchange rate depends less on unobserved
future fundamentals. Therefore, the overall effect on the connection between the exchange rate and
observed fundamentals is ambiguous.
Whereas in Bacchetta and van Wincoop’s model all investors receive symmetric information
dispersion about future fundamentals, in my study the information structure is asymmetric across
groups of investors. Specifically, one group of investors receives private signals about observable
fundamentals two periods ahead, while the other group receives only one-period ahead signals. This
model set-up is intended to replicate the observed market feature that investors are differentially
informed. I study three important scenarios. In scenario 1, all investors receive one-period ahead
private signals about future fundamentals. They can extract information only about future fun-
damentals one period ahead. In scenario 2, there is one group of investors receiving two-period
ahead private signals and another group receives one-period ahead signals. An informational ad-
vantage accrues to the investors who know the two-period ahead signals because they can directly
extract information about one- and two-period ahead of future fundamentals from the number of
signals greater than the other group who only receive one-period ahead signals. Though a group of
one-period signal investors does not receive signal about two-period ahead fundamental, they make
an inference about this fundamental through the exchange rate signal. In scenario 3, all investors
receive two-period ahead signals about future fundamentals. They all extract information up to
two-period ahead about future fundamentals.
I find that the disconnect problem is strong when there is a group of investors who are better
informed about future fundamentals. The better-informed investors are the investors who are able
to obtain information about future fundamentals in advance of the other investors with more precise
private signal quality. Even if they hold information about future fundamentals at a longer period,
7the disconnect problem is more intense. As the fraction of better-informed investors increases,
exchange rates are more disconnected with the current observable fundamental. The reason is that
an increase in the number of better-informed investors increases an existence of the unobservable
components, e.g. future fundamentals, in the model. This would bring down the R2 in the regression
of the exchange rate on the current observable fundamental. Moreover, the degree of fundamentals
persistence plays a vital role in determining the disconnect problem. When the fundamental is
more persistent, the R2 increases. As the fundamental is more persistent, the future fundamentals
would highly correlate with the current fundamental. Knowing more about future fundamentals
would help the exchange rate correlate with the current fundamental.
1.3 The Model
This model modifies the standard monetary model of exchange rate determination by intro-
ducing a heterogeneous informational horizon of private signal about future fundamentals into the
model. There is a continuum of investors who are divided into two groups. Each group receives
asymmetrically dispersed information about future fundamentals. Information asymmetry is caused
by the information lag in which one group of investors receives a signal about future fundamental
one period ahead of the other group. Under heterogeneous information, the exchange rate will
depend on the higher-order expectation of future fundamentals.
There are two economies: Home and Foreign countries, that produce the same good so that
purchasing power parity holds
pt = p
∗
t + st, (1.1)
where pt = ln(Pt), p
∗
t = ln(P
∗
t ), and st = ln(St), where Pt and P
∗
t are the local and foreign currency
prices, and St is the nominal exchange rate (home currency per unit of foreign currency).
The basic setup closely follows the monetary model with information dispersion presented by
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006). There is a continuum of investors in both countries on the
interval [0, 1]. An investor lives for two periods. There are overlapping generations in the sense
that, before dying, investor i ∈ [0, 1] passes on his private information to the next investor born
8in the following period. So at time t, investor i observes all lagged and current values of the
fundamentals. Each investor i makes only one investment decision and he chooses to invest in four
assets: money of his own country, nominal bonds of both countries (biHt, b
i
F t) with interest rates it
and i∗t , and a technology with fixed real return (r). I assume a small open-economy setting in which
Home country is large and Foreign country is very small. Bond market equilibrium is therefore
entirely determined by investors in the large Home country. Money supply in the Home country
is constant, implying a constant price level pt in equilibrium, so that it = r. Money supply in the
Foreign country is stochastic.
Investors born at time t are endowed with wit. At time t+ 1, investors receive the return from
investment plus income yit+1 from production at time t+ 1. Income depends on both the exchange
rate and the real money holding, denoted by m˜it, through the function y
i
t+1 = λ
i
tst+1− m˜it(ln(m˜it)−
1)/α, with α > 0. The benefit of having money in the production rather than utility is to avoid
making money demand a function of consumption which complicates the solution. Note that λit is
the degree of exchange rate exposure to the nonasset income of investor i. It is time varying and
known only to investor i. The budget constraint of agent i at time t is
wit = m˜
i
t + b
i
Ht + Stb
i
F t,
whereas the budget constraint of agent i at time t+ 1 is
cit+1 = m˜
i
t + (1 + it)b
i
Ht + (1 + i
∗
t )St+1b
i
F t + y
i
t+1.
Combining the two yields:
cit+1 = (1 + it)w
i
t − itm˜it + [(1 + i∗t )St+1 − (1 + it)St]biF t + yit+1.
The term in the bracket, (1 + i∗t )St+1− (1 + it)St, can be approximated as i∗t + st+1− it− st, using
the log-linearization that ln(1 + x) ≈ x and ln(z) ≈ z− 1. The term st+1− st + i∗t − it is called the
log-linearized excess return on investing abroad. Therefore, the budget constraint can be rewritten
as:
cit+1 = (1 + it)w
i
t − itm˜it + (st+1 − st + i∗t − it)biF t + yit+1. (1.2)
9Investor i maximizes his expected CARA utility, denoted by −Eite−γc
i
t+1 , subject to (1.2).
Assuming that, conditional on the information at time t of agent i, Iit , st+1|Iit ∼ N(Eit(st+1), σ2t ).
The first-order conditions with respect to money holding and investment in foreign bonds are,
respectively:
ln(m˜it) + αit = 0,
Eit(st+1 − st + i∗t − it)− γσ2t (biF t + λit) = 0. (1.3)
Combining the first-order condition for money holding with money market equilibrium in both
countries gets
mt − pt = −αit, (1.4)
m∗t − p∗t = −αi∗t (1.5)
where mt and m
∗
t are the logs of domestic and foreign nominal money supply.
The nonasset income yit+1 depends on λ
i
t, which represents the exchange rate exposure by
investor i. Let bit be the hedge against nonasset income of an investor i. This implies that investor
i needs to hedge by the amount bit =
∂yit+1
∂st+1
= λit. Hence, the hedge against non-asset income adds
to the demand for the foreign bond.
From equation (1.3), the demand for the foreign bond can be written as
biF t =
Eit(st+1)− st + i∗t − it
γσ2t
− bit. (1.6)
The first term depends on the excess return on investing in foreign bonds and the risk aversion in
the denominator. The second term is the hedging demand against exchange rate exposure in the
investor’s non-asset income.
Hedging demand caused by the exchange rate exposure, denoted by bit, is assumed to be equal
to the average term, denoted by bt, plus an idiosyncratic term:
bit = bt + ε
i
t.
Every investor observes his own exposure term, but this provides no information about the average
exposure. That is, the average hedging demand is unobservable to any of the investors. While bt
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is an unobserved fundamental in the model, the assumed autoregressive process is known by all
agents. I assumed that bt follows an AR(1) process
bt = ρbbt−1 + εbt ,
where εbt |It−1 ∼ N(0, σ2b ).
In equilibrium, bonds are in zero net supply, market equilibrium is given by
∫ 1
0 b
i
F tdi = 0.
Integrating equation (1.6) over all investors yields the interest rate arbitrage condition
E¯t[st+1]− st = it − i∗t + γσ2t bt, (1.7)
where E¯t is the average rational expectation across investors. The risk premium term, denoted
by γσ2t bt, depends on the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (γ), the conditional variance of the
exchange rate (σ2t ), and the average hedging demand (bt).
Fundamentals in the model are categorized into f fundamental and b fundamental. The ob-
servable f fundamental, denoted by ft, is the difference of the logs of domestic and foreign nominal
money supply (mt − m∗t ). The future ft’s are unobservable, but investors can infer about them
from private signals about future fundamentals they receive. The b fundamental is unobservable
and introduces noise that prevents investors from inferring the average expectation of future f fun-
damentals from the exchange rate. Equations (1.1), (1.4), and (1.5) imply that −(it − i∗t ) = ft−stα .
From equation (1.7), the equilibrium of exchange rate equation is as follows:
st =
1
1 + α
ft − α
1 + α
γσ2t bt +
α
1 + α
E¯t[st+1]. (1.8)
Substituting for the average expectation, the equilibrium exchange rate can be written as
st =
1
1 + α
∞∑
k=0
(
α
1 + α
)k
E¯kt [ft+k − αγσ2t+kbt+k], (1.9)
where E0t [xt] = xt, E¯
1
t [xt+1] = E¯t[xt+1], and higher-order expectation are defined as
E¯kt [xt+k] = E¯tE¯t+1 . . . E¯t+k−1[xt+k].
The law of iterated expectations does not apply to the average expectation, i.e. E¯tE¯t+1[st+2] 6=
E¯t[st+2] under heterogeneous information. I explain this in Appendix A.1. The equilibrium ex-
change rate equation indicates that the exchange rate at time t depends on the fundamental at
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time t, the average expectation at time t of the fundamental at time t+ 1, and the higher orders of
the average expectation of the future fundamentals at times t+ 2, t+ 3, and so on. De Grauwe and
Grimaldi (2005) critique the model of heterogeneous agents rational expectation, arguing that it
creates an infinite regress in which the exchange rate depends on the expectation of other agents’
expectations, which depends on the expectations of the expectations of other agents’ expectation
and so on. This leads to intractable mathematic problems unless some simplifying assumption are
made. However, it is unnecessary to compute all higher-order expectations. The key equation used
to find the solution for exchange rate is equation (1.8), which is derived from the interest arbitrage
condition. The signal extraction method is used to solve for the average expectation of future
fundamentals, and the method of undetermined coefficients is to compute all coefficients satisfying
the equilibrium of exchange rate.
Information Structure
In a continuum of investors, there are two groups of them. Each group {i, j} receives a different
signal about future fundamentals. Let ω ∈ [0, 1]. There are ω of investors in group i, and (1 −
ω) of investors in group j. The information received by each group differs in the timing of the
future fundamentals received. There is one group of investors who are early-informed about future
fundamentals in the sense that they receive a signal about future fundamentals one period ahead
of the other group.
At time t all investors observe all past and current fundamentals. Each period, investors in
group i receive a private signal of the two-period ahead signal about future fundamentals whereas
investors in group j receive a one-period ahead signal. That is, investors in group i receive the
private signal
vit = ft+2 + ε
vi
t , ε
vi
t ∼ N(0, σ2vi).
Investors in group j receive the private signal
vjt = ft+1 + ε
vj
t , ε
vj
t ∼ N(0, σ2vj ).
Group i investors know information about a farther period ahead of group j investors. In other
words, they are early-informed investors.
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Furthermore, it is assumed that all investors know the process of observable fundamental which
is governed by
ft = ρfft−1 + ε
f
t , ε
f
t ∼ N(0, σ2f ).
Solving the Model
The model is solved in three steps. First, I conjecture a solution for the exchange rate, which
depends on shocks to observable and unobservable fundamentals. Second, I apply signal extraction
to compute the average expectation of these shocks, and substitute them into the exchange rate
equilibrium equation (1.8). Third, I solve for coefficients in the exchange rate equilibrium equation
by the method of undetermined coefficients. Note that at time t, the average exposure bt and bt−1 is
unobservable, but bt−2 and earlier lags are known if it is assumed that the process of bt is invertible.
The invertibility of bt is discussed in Appendix A.2.
To begin with, I conjecture a solution that the exchange rate depends on current and future
observable fundamentals up to time t+ 2, and two-period lags of unobservable fundamentals up to
the current one as
st = λ0ft + λ1ft+1 + λ2ft+2 + γ−2bt−2 + γ−1bt−1 + γ0bt.
I assume that ft, and bt follow an AR process as ft = ρfft−1 + ε
f
t and bt = ρbbt−1 + εbt . Thus, the
conjectured equation becomes
st = λ˜0ft + λ˜1ε
f
t+1 + λ˜2ε
f
t+2 + γ˜−2bt−2 + γ˜−1ε
b
t−1 + γ˜0ε
b
t , (1.10)
where λ˜0 = λ0 +λ1ρf +λ2ρ
2
f , λ˜1 = λ1 +λ2ρf , λ˜2 = λ2, γ˜−2 = γ−2 +γ−1ρb+γ0ρ
2
b , γ˜−1 = γ−1 +γ0ρb,
and γ˜0 = γ0.
Next, I will compute the first-order average expectation of εft+1, denoted by E¯tε
f
t+1, which is a
weighted average of the group-i expectation at time t of εft+1, denoted by E
i
tε
f
t+1, and the group-
j expectation at time t of εft+1, denoted by E
j
t ε
f
t+1. With the same method, I compute E¯tε
f
t+2.
Finally, I substitute these computations into the exchange rate equilibrium equation.
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In order to solve the signal extraction problem, I need to gather all signals that provide infor-
mation about the unknown innovations. Group i investors extract information about εft+1 and ε
f
t+2
from four signals, while group j investors can extract information from three signals. At time t,
group i investors not only extract information about εft+1 and ε
f
t+2 from their private signals v
i
t−1
and vit, but also from the exchange rates st and st−1. Clearly, at time t the private signal vit−1 is
informative about εft+1. The private signal v
i
t is informative about ε
f
t+1 and ε
f
t+2. As such, I can
write
vit − ρ2fft = ρfεft+1 + εft+2 + εvit ,
vit−1 − ρfft = εft+1 + εvit−1.
For group j, the private signal is
vjt − ρfft = εft+1 + εvjt .
Since the exchange rate st depends on ε
f
t+1 and ε
f
t+2, the exchange rate itself becomes a source of
information about these innovations. With the same logic, st−1 is also a source of ε
f
t+1 information.
Define s˜t = st − λ˜0ft. I have two signals from the exchange rate as follows
s˜t − γ˜−2bt−2 = λ˜1εft+1 + λ˜2εft+2 + γ˜−1εbt−1 + γ˜0εbt ,
s˜t−1 − λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2 − γ˜−2bt−3 = λ˜2εft+1 + γ˜0εbt−1.
For signal extraction x = Aθ+ ε, where x is a vector of signals, θ is a vector of information, ε
is a vector of signal errors, θ ∼ N(µ,Σθ) and ε ∼ N(0,Σε) independent of θ, then
θ|x ∼ N (µ+ (Σ−1θ +A′Σ−1ε A)−1A′Σ−1ε (x−Aµ), (Σ−1θ +A′Σ−1ε A)−1). Let θ = (εft+1εft+2)′, one
can compute their conditional expectations. The derivation of Eitε
f
t+1, E
i
tε
f
t+2, E
j
t ε
f
t+1, and E
j
t ε
f
t+2
is shown in Appendix A.3, and they can be written as:
Eitε
f
t+1 = a1v
i
t + a2v
i
t−1 + a3st + a4bt−2 + a5ft + a6sˆt−1,
Eitε
f
t+2 = c1v
i
t + c2v
i
t−1 + c3st + c4bt−2 + c5ft + c6sˆt−1,
Ejt ε
f
t+1 = d1v
j
t + d3st + d4bt−2 + d5ft + d6sˆt−1,
Ejt ε
f
t+2 = e1v
j
t + e3st + e4bt−2 + e5ft + e6sˆt−1.
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I integrate the group i and j’s expectations of εft+1 and ε
f
t+2 over the continuum of investors in
order to achieve E¯tε
f
t+1 and E¯tε
f
t+2. The average expectation of the two shocks are shown in the
following equations:
E¯tε
f
t+1 = {ω(a1ρ2f + a2ρf + a5) + (1− ω)(d1ρf + d5)}ft
+{ω(a1ρf + a2 + a6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(d1 + d6λ˜2)}εft+1
+ωa1ε
f
t+2 + {ωa3 + (1− ω)d3}st
+{ωa4 + (1− ω)d4}bt−2 + {ωa6λ˜0 + (1− ω)d6λ˜0}εbt−1,
E¯tε
f
t+2 = {ω(c1ρ2f + c2ρf + c5) + (1− ω)(e1ρf + e5)}ft
+{ω(c1ρf + c2 + c6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(e1 + e6λ˜2)}εft+1
+ωc1ε
f
t+2 + {ωc3 + (1− ω)e3}st
+{ωc4 + (1− ω)e4}bt−2 + {ωc6λ˜0 + (1− ω)e6λ˜0}εbt−1.
By forwarding one period ahead the conjectured exchange rate equation and taking the average
expectation on both sides, I obtain
E¯tst+1 = λ˜0ρfft + γ˜−2ρbbt−2 + λ˜0E¯tε
f
t+1 + λ˜1E¯tε
f
t+2 + γ˜−2E¯tε
b
t−1 + γ˜−1E¯tε
b
t .
From the exchange rate equilibrium equation (1.8), I substitute for E¯tst+1, and achieve
st =
1
1 + α
[1 + αλ˜0ρf ]ft − α
1 + α
[γσ2t ρ
2
b − γ˜−2ρb]bt−2 −
α
1 + α
γσ2t ρbε
b
t−1 −
α
1 + α
γσ2t ε
b
t
+
α
1 + α
[λ˜0E¯tε
f
t+1 + λ˜1E¯tε
f
t+2 + γ˜−2E¯tε
b
t−1 + γ˜−1E¯tε
b
t ]. (1.11)
Substituting the above equation with E¯tε
f
t+1, E¯tε
f
t+2, E¯tε
b
t−1and E¯tεbt ,1 the equilibrium of the
exchange rate is shown by
1The calculations of E¯tε
b
t−1and E¯tε
b
t are shown in Appendix A.5
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st =
1
1 + α(1− ρf )ft −
αγσ2t ρ
2
b
1 + α(1− ρb)bt−2
+
α
1 + α
[
λ˜0{ω(a1ρf + a2 + a6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(d1 + d6λ˜2)}
+λ˜1{ω(c1ρf + c2 + c6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(e1 + e6λ˜2)}
+γ˜−2{ω(g1ρf + g2 + g6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(h1 + h6λ˜2)}
+ γ˜−1{ω(k1ρf + k2 + k6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(m1 +m6λ˜2)}
]
zεft+1
+
α
1 + α
[λ˜0a1 + λ˜1c1 + γ˜−2g1 + γ˜−1k1]ωzε
f
t+2
+
[ −α
1 + α
γσ2t ρb +
αγ˜0
1 + α
[
λ˜0{ωa6 + (1− ω)d6}+ λ˜1{ωc6 + (1− ω)e6}
+γ˜−2{ωg6 + (1− ω)h6}+ γ˜−1{ωk6 + (1− ω)m6}]] zεbt−1
− α
1 + α
γσ2t zε
b
t , (1.12)
where
z = 1/
[
1− α
1 + α
[λ˜0{ωa3 + (1− ω)d3}+ λ˜1{ωc3 + (1− ω)e3}+
γ˜−2{ωg3 + (1− ω)h3}+ γ˜−1{ωk3 + (1− ω)m3}]] .
From the method of undetermined coefficients, I have λ˜0 =
1
1+α(1−ρf ) , γ˜−2 = −
αγσ2t ρ
2
b
1+α(1−ρb) . The
other four coefficients can be solved by the following equations:
λ˜1 =
α
1 + α
[
λ˜0{ω(a1ρf + a2 + a6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(d1 + d6λ˜2)}
+λ˜1{ω(c1ρf + c2 + c6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(e1 + e6λ˜2)}
+γ˜−2{ω(g1ρf + g2 + g6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(h1 + h6λ˜2)}
+γ˜−1{ω(k1ρf + k2 + k6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(m1 +m6λ˜2)}
]
z,
λ˜2 =
α
1 + α
[λ˜0a1 + λ˜1c1 + γ˜−2g1 + γ˜−1k1]ωz,
γ˜−1 =
[ −α
1 + α
γσ2t ρb +
αγ˜0
1 + α
[
λ˜0{ωa6 + (1− ω)d6}+ λ˜1{ωc6 + (1− ω)e6}
+γ˜−2{ωg6 + (1− ω)h6}+ γ˜−1{ωk6 + (1− ω)m6}]] z,
γ˜0 = − α
1 + α
γσ2t z.
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1.4 Simulation Results
Since the equilibrium exchange rate equation (1.12) is non-linear in parameters λ˜1, λ˜2, γ˜−1, and
γ˜0 , its solution can be solved by computer programming as a root finding problem. I assume that
the values of parameters {σ2f , σ2vi , σ2vj , σ2b , α, γ, σ2t } are {0.01, 0.02, 0.01, 0.01, 1, 1, 1}. Here I assume
that variance of private signal of group i is greater than that of group j because the signal about
future fundamentals at a longer horizon should be less precise. I will consider many cases depending
on the AR processes of ft and bt.
1.4.1 The Coefficients of the Equilibrium Exchange Rate
Figures 1.1–1.4 display coefficients λ˜0, λ˜1, λ˜2, γ˜−2, γ˜−1, and γ˜0 as functions of the investor
proportion, ω. These coefficients also vary according to the persistence of ft and bt. The coefficient
of ft, denoted by λ˜0, and the coefficient of bt−2, denoted by γ˜−2 are constant. They depend on
the assigned parameters. In all cases, the coefficient of εft+1, denoted by λ˜1, and the coefficient of
εft+2, denoted by λ˜2, are positive. The coefficients of bt−2, denoted by γ˜−2, are negative, except for
the case ρb = 0 and ρf = 0 for which γ˜−2 is zero since there is no role of bt−2 in this case. The
coefficient of εbt−1, denoted by γ˜−1, and the coefficient of εbt , denoted by γ˜0, are also negative. As
ω → 1, λ˜1 is decreasing but λ˜2 is increasing in value since in the two-period model, εft+2 has a
significant role on the exchange rate. When ω = 0, it is the one-period horizon model. There are
no role of εft+2 in determining the exchange rate. λ˜2 will be equal to zero. The magnitude of each
coefficient affecting the exchange rate depends on the proportion of investors who hold different
information in the economy, and the autoregressive process of ft and bt.
1.4.2 The Magnification Factor
The term z in equation (1.12) is called the magnification factor. It magnifies the effect of
unobservable shocks on the exchange rate. Specifically, the direct effect of the shock εbt on st is
captured by −αγσ2t /(1 + α). Apart from this, the effect of the hedge trade shock on the exchange
rate is also amplified by the change in future macroeconomic fundamentals, through E¯tε
f
t+1, E¯tε
f
t+2,
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Figure 1.1: Coefficients, ρb = ρf = 0 Figure 1.2: Coefficients, ρb = 0.8 ρf = 0
Figure 1.3: Coefficients, ρb = ρf = 0.8 Figure 1.4: Coefficients, ρb = 0.8 ρf = 1
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E¯tε
b
t−1and E¯tεbt . Investors have rational confusion in that they do not know whether the change
in exchange rate is driven by the change in private signals about future fundamentals or from the
hedge trade. Suppose there is a change in the b-shock, the exchange rate is directly altered by the
shock. Investors also revise their average expectation of shocks as a result of a change in exchange
rate from the shock. The exchange rate is adjusted again from the impact of investors’ revision
in fundamentals. In this way, the exchange rate is therefore magnified. The rational confusion
will last for T periods. Investors will give more weight to the exchange rate in forming average
expectation of future fundamentals, until the final ft+T is observed. Until that time, the effect of
the b-shock continues to impact the exchange rate accordingly. In the long run, investors learn
more about future fundamentals by both observing them and by receiving new private signals, the
impact of the b-shock on the exchange rate recedes.
Figures 1.5–1.8 plot the values of z in response to the proportion of investors. In all cases, the
values of z exceed 1. It thus magnifies the effect of unobserved shocks on exchange rate. When the
process of ft and/or bt are more persistent, the values of z shift up. For example, when ω = 0, z
increases from 1.059 to 1.701 as ρb rises from 0 to 0.8. z also increases from 1.059 to 1.150 as ρf
rises from 0 to 0.8. The persistence of the b-shock induces difficulty for investors to learn about
future fundamentals. Then the rational confusion is more persistent so the effect on exchange rate
is magnified.
The values of z increase as ω increases. However, when ω reaches a certain value, the values of
z decrease. This is because the movement of z depends on the precision of the exchange rate signal.
When the exchange rate signal is precise, investors give more weight to the exchange rate in forming
expectations of future shocks, then z is large. However, if the private signal is imprecise, investors
put a lower weight on future fundamentals in the exchange rate. This reduces the precision of the
exchange rate signal, which decreases z.
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Figure 1.5: Magnification Factor, ρb = ρf = 0 Figure 1.6: Magnification Factor, ρb = 0.8 ρf = 0
Figure 1.7: Magnification Factor, ρb = 0 ρf = 0.8 Figure 1.8: Magnification Factor, ρb = ρf = 0.8
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1.4.3 The Effect of Fundamental Shocks on Exchange Rates
Figures 1.9, 1.11, and 1.13 shows the impact on the exchange rate in response to one-standard-
deviation shocks in observed fundamentals. An f-shock, denoted by εft+T , will have first effect on
the exchange rate at time t. Because we assume that money supply in home country is constant but
foreign money supply is stochastic, an f-shock can be caused by an increase in the foreign interest
rate. An increase in the foreign interest rate is associated with a depreciation in the home currency
and a decrease in the expected future exchange rate.
When the fundamentals are more persistent, an f-shock stimulates an increase in the level of the
exchange rate in the sense that the increase in exchange rate is highest in the case where all investors
receive two-period ahead signals (ω = 1), followed by the case where one group of investors receives
two-period ahead signals and another group receives one-period ahead signals (ω = 0.5), and the
case where all investors receive one-period ahead signals (ω = 0), respectively. Figures 1.9, 1.11,
and 1.13 depict this result. An increase in the fraction of investors who know more about future
fundamentals increases the fluctuation of the exchange rate in the market. The implication is that
to decrease the volatility of exchange rates in the market, it should have decreased a proportion of
investors who hold information about future fundamentals in advance.
The effects of a b-shock on exchange rate, shown in figures 1.10, 1.12, and 1.14, are large
in the first period, but its impact dies down with an increasing of time period. The effect of f-
and b-shocks on the exchange rate depend deeply on their stochastic processes. For example, if
ρb = ρf = 0.8, the effect of shocks on the exchange rate gradually diminishes according to time.
But when ρb = ρf = 0, the exchange rate reaches zero after it hits the highest level. Lastly, if ft
has a unit root, the exchange rate keeps constant for a certain time.
1.5 Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle in Heterogeneous Informational
Horizons Framework
The exchange rate disconnect puzzle can be explained by information heterogeneity. Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2006) show that the R2 of the regression of the exchange rate on observed
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Figure 1.9: F-Shock, ρb = ρf = 0 Figure 1.10: B-Shock, ρb = ρf = 0
Figure 1.11: F-Shock, ρb = ρf = 0.8 Figure 1.12: B-Shock, ρb = ρf = 0.8
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Figure 1.13: F-Shock, ρb = 0.8 ρf = 1 Figure 1.14: B-Shock, ρb = 0.8 ρf = 1
fundamentals in the heterogeneous model is lower than in the common knowledge model. Investors
in the economy have different beliefs about future macro fundamentals. These fundamentals are
not directly observed, investors infer about them from the private signals they receive. The private
information of investors is aggregated in the exchange rate. With unobserved shocks, they will be
preventing the average private signal from being fully revealed by the exchange rate.
There are three scenarios to study the disconnect between the exchange rate and observed
fundamentals in a heterogeneous informational setting. The first one is the case when ω = 0,
where all investors receive one-period ahead signal about future fundamentals. The second one is
when ω = 0.5. This is a heterogeneous informational horizon case in which one group of investors
receives two-period ahead signals and another group receives one-period ahead signals about future
fundamentals. And the last one is ω = 1. This is a situation where all investors only receive
two-period ahead signals.
23
To examine the disconnect between the exchange rate and the observed fundamentals of these
scenarios, I will compare the R2 of a regression of the exchange rate on observed fundamentals in
each case. The R2 is computed as follows:
R2 =
λ˜20σ
2
f/(1− ρ2f )
(λ˜21 + λ˜
2
2)σ
2
f + (γ˜
2
0 + γ˜
2−1)σ2b + λ˜
2
0σ
2
f/(1− ρ2f ) + γ˜2−2σ2b/(1− ρ2b)
.
A high value of the R2 indicates that variance of the exchange rate is mostly captured by the
variance of the current observable fundamental, implying that there is a tight relationship between
the exchange rate and the current observed fundamental (ft). When the R
2 is high, the disconnect
puzzle attenuates.
Obviously, the value of R2 depends on the precision of the private signals, whose effects are
through the coefficients of the equilibrium exchange rate, the variances of ft and bt errors, and the
persistence of ft and bt. I will focus on the effect of signal precisions and the effect of persistence
on R2, while I keep the variances of ft and bt errors equal (σ
2
f = σ
2
b = 0.01).
Figures 1.15–1.18 plot movements of R2 in response to the degree of signal precision in various
degree of fundamentals persistence. The values of R2 in these figures differ according to the degree
of the fundamentals persistence. In each figure, there are three lines. The dotted line plots the
R2 where σ2vi = 2σ
2
vj . The solid line plots the R
2 where σ2vi = σ
2
vj . The starred line plots R
2
where σ2vi = 0.5σ
2
vj . As you can see, the R
2 decreases as ω −→ 1, except the dotted lines in figures
1.15–1.16. That is, when a group of investors holds different beliefs about future fundamentals, i.e.
scenario 2, the disconnect problem is stronger than in scenario 1 in which investors hold information
about future fundamentals at the shortest horizon. Moreover, the disconnect problem is strongest
in scenario 3, where investors perceive information about future fundamentals at the longest period.
That is, the disconnect puzzle is more serious when there is a difference in informational horizon
received among investors, and that problem is even more severe when investors receive information
about future fundamentals at a long horizon.
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Figure 1.15: R2, ρb = ρf = 0 Figure 1.16: R
2, ρb = 0.8 ρf = 0
Figure 1.17: R2, ρb = 0 ρf = 0.8 Figure 1.18: R
2, ρb = ρf = 0.8
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1.5.1 The Effect of Degree of Persistence
An increase in the persistence of ft shifts the level R
2 up. This is illustrated by comparing
the R2 in figure 1.15 with figure 1.17 or figure 1.16 with figure 1.18. This is because when ft
is persistent, the past of ft also helps forecasting and giving information about future ft. The
exchange rate will be more connected to the current fundamental when future fundamentals are
more likely known.
However, the level of R2 drops when ρb increases. The evidence is shown in figures 1.15–1.16
and figures 1.17–1.18, where ρb increases from 0 to 0.8. When bt is more persistent, the impact of
the unobservable components on the exchange rate lasts longer. Also, the rational confusion will
be more persistent. This causes the disconnect between exchange rate and observed fundamental.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) find that the R2 in the heterogeneous information model is
relatively lower than in the common knowledge model. They conclude that the presence of private
information caused the disconnect between exchange rate and current observed fundamental. My
results are consistent with Bacchetta and van Wincoop’s finding that heterogeneous information
causes exchange rate to disconnect with current observed fundamentals. Moreover, I find that the
disconnect is intense when one group of investors is early informed. The problem is more serious
when a fraction of investors receiving information about these future fundamentals at a longer
period increases. An increase in a fraction of early-informed investors worsens the disconnect
problem. When there are more investors who are early informed, the unobservable components
in the model, i.e. future fundamentals ft+j , and unobserved fundamentals bt−j , become more
significant. Since the exchange rate equilibrium is composed of these unobservable parts, therefore,
the exchange rates are more disconnected from the current observable fundamental ft. The larger
the fraction of early-informed investors, the greater the influence of the unobserved components
on the exchange rate so that it dissociates with the current observable fundamental. However,
the exchange rate will have more connection with the current fundamental if the fundamental is
persistent. When the process of fundamental ft is persistent, the future fundamental ft+j highly
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correlates with the current ft. Knowing more about future fundamental would help connect the
exchange rate with the current observable fundamental.
1.5.2 The Effect of Private Signal Precision
As ω → 1, the unobservable components in the R2 are more significant. For example, ft+2 will
be more significant if there is an increase in the proportion of investors knowing information about
future fundamentals two periods ahead. This does cause a rise in λ˜2, which finally brings down the
R2. However, an increase in the proportion of investors who know more about future fundamentals
induces an increase in the proportion of investors who have private signals of bad quality. This
could interfere with the movement of R2.
The rationale of movements in R2 depends deeply on the structure of private information. Let
us consider 3 cases which are a) σ2vi = 2σ
2
vj , b) σ
2
vi = σ
2
vj , and c) σ
2
vi = 0.5σ
2
vj . In case (a), it
is ambiguous for group i investors whether they have an informational advantage over group j as
they receive information about future fundamentals earlier but with higher signal error. In cases
(b) and (c), group i investors are better informed in the sense that they obtain information about
future fundamentals in advance of the remaining investors with equal or lower signal error.
The exchange rate disconnect puzzle could be complicated by the precision of the private signal
received by investors. The conclusion that the disconnect problem worsens as ω −→ 1 could not be
displayed in figures 1.15–1.16 under the case where group i investors have higher variance of signal
error (graphed by a dotted line). Even though they are early informed about future fundamentals
by receiving information about future fundamentals at a longer period than other investors, their
signals are less precise. That is, these investors are early informed about future fundamentals,
but the signal they receive has more noise. In this case, the R2 will not decrease as ω → 1.
The conclusion about the disconnect problem is vague when it is difficult to say about who has
informational advantage. In section 1.6, I will develop a new structure of private signal and discuss
the change of results.
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1.6 A Revisit of Information Structure
In this section, the information structure is changed in order to provide an informational ad-
vantage between group of investors.
1.6.1 Revised Structure
In the previous structure, group i investors receive a private signal about two-period ahead of
fundamental f . This means at time t they receive information about ft+2. They also perceive
information about ft+1 since time t − 1 while group j just knows about ft+1 at time t. Being an
early-informed investor comes with a cost of getting higher signal error. A signal about ft+1 that
group i investors receive would have more noise than in a signal about ft+1 group j could get at
period t. The farther is period of information about future fundamentals, the higher is the variance
of the signal error. The imprecision of the signal reduces the advantage of being an early-informed
investor. These investors will not be better-informed than the others. I improve the information
structure received by group i investors such that at time t, not only they receive a signal about
future fundamental ft+2, but they also receive a signal about ft+1 with the same signal variance
as group j investors receive signal about ft+1 at time t. Investors in group i are better-informed
investors. The information structure is shown as follows:
vit = ft+2 + ε
vi
t , ε
vi
t ∼ N(0, σ2vi),
wit = ft+1 + ε
wi
t , ε
wi
t ∼ N(0, σ2wi).
Investors in group j still receive the private signal
vjt = ft+1 + ε
vj
t , ε
vj
t ∼ N(0, σ2vj ),
where σ2vi > σ
2
wi , σ
2
vj = σ
2
wi .
Group i investors receive one signal about future fundamental ft+2. This signal is denoted by
vit. They also receive two signals about future fundamental ft+1. Those two signals are v
i
t−1 and
wit. The aggregated signal about ft+1 is called y
i
t. This new signal y
i
t is a weighted average of the
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two signal about ft+1 which are v
i
t−1 and wit, where the weight is its precision of the signal.2 yit can
be written by
yit = ft+1 + ε
yi
t =
βviv
i
t−1 + βwiwit
βvi + βwi
,
where βvi = 1/σ
2
vi and βwi = 1/σ
2
wi . Since the signal y
i
t is weighted by the precision of the signal,
the signal having higher precision will be given more weight.
Let σ2yi be the variance of signal yi’s error, var(ε
yi
t ), then βyi = 1/σ
2
yi = βvi + βwi . I can find
that σ2yi < σ
2
vj . That is, the variance of signal about ft+1 error for group i investors is less than
group j investors.
The method of solving the model is similar to the previous one. I therefore have the equilibrium
of exchange rate as
st =
1
1 + α(1− ρf )ft −
αγσ2t ρ
2
b
1 + α(1− ρb)bt−2
+
α
1 + α
[
λ˜0{ω(a′1ρf + a′2 + a′7 + a6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(d1 + d6λ˜2)}
+λ˜1{ω(c′1ρf + c′2 + c′7 + c6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(e1 + e6λ˜2)}
+γ˜−2{ω(g′1ρf + g′2 + g′7 + g′6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(h1 + h6λ˜2)}
+γ˜−1{ω(k′1ρf + k′2 + k′7 + k6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(m1 +m6λ˜2)}
]
z′εft+1
+
α
1 + α
[λ˜0a
′
1 + λ˜1c
′
1 + γ˜−2g
′
1 + γ˜−1k
′
1]ωz
′εft+2
+
[ −α
1 + α
γσ2t ρb +
αγ˜0
1 + α
[
λ˜0{ωa′6 + (1− ω)d6}+ λ˜1{ωc′6 + (1− ω)e6}+ γ˜−2{ωg′6 + (1− ω)h6}
+γ˜−1{ωk′6 + (1− ω)m6}]] z′εbt−1
− α
1 + α
γσ2t z
′εbt , (1.13)
where
z′ = 1/
[
1− α
1 + α
[λ˜0{ωa′3 + (1− ω)d3}+ λ˜1{ωc′3 + (1− ω)e3}
+γ˜−2{ωg′3 + (1− ω)h3}+ γ˜−1{ωk′3 + (1− ω)m3}]
]
.
2The aggregate signal about ft+1, denoted by y
i
t, is a linear aggregation between v
i
t−1 and w
i
t as y
i
t = rv
i
t−1 + (1−
r)wit, where r is the weight chosen to minimize vart(y
i
t). The optimal weight r
∗ =
βvi
βvi+βwi
, where βvi = 1/σ
2
vi and
βwi = 1/σ
2
wi .
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From the method of undetermined coefficients, I have λ˜0 =
1
1+α(1−ρf ) , γ˜−2 = −
αγσ2t ρ
2
b
1+α(1−ρb) . The
other four coefficients can be solved by the following equation:
λ˜1 =
α
1 + α
[
λ˜0{ω(a′1ρf + a′2 + a′7 + a′6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(d1 + d6λ˜2)}
+λ˜1{ω(c′1ρf + c′2 + c′6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(e1 + e6λ˜2)}
+γ˜−2{ω(g′1ρf + g′2 + g′7 + g′6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(h1 + h6λ˜2)}
+γ˜−1{ω(k′1ρf + k′2 + k′7 + k′6λ˜2) + (1− ω)(m1 +m6λ˜2)}
]
z′,
λ˜2 =
α
1 + α
[λ˜0a
′
1 + λ˜1c
′
1 + γ˜−2g
′
1 + γ˜−1k
′
1]ωz
′,
γ˜−1 =
[ −α
1 + α
γσ2t ρb +
αγ˜0
1 + α
[
λ˜0{ωa′6 + (1− ω)d6}+ λ˜1{ωc′6 + (1− ω)e6}+ γ˜−2{ωg′6 + (1− ω)h6}
+γ˜−1{ωk′6 + (1− ω)m6}]] z′,
γ˜0 = − α
1 + α
γσ2t z
′.
In addition to the variance of one-period signal error of group i, the value of parameters are
assumed to be the same as {σ2f , σ2vi , σ2vj , σ2b , α, γ, σ2t , σ2wi} = {0.01, 0.02, 0.01, 0.01, 1, 1, 1, 0.01}. Here
I assume that the variance of one-period ahead signal of group i and group j are equal, (σ2wi =
σ2vj = 0.01). The variance of two-period private signal of group i is greater and is assigned to
σ2vi = 0.02. Coefficients λ˜0, λ˜1, λ˜2, γ˜−2, γ˜−1, and γ˜0 are graphed in Figures 1.19–1.22. The
direction of coefficients does not diverge from the the previous setting. As ω → 1, λ˜1 and λ˜2 are
increasing. Similarly, the magnitude of each coefficient affecting the exchange rate depends on
the proportion of investors who hold different information in the economy, and the autoregressive
process of ft and bt.
Figures 1.23–1.26 plot the value of z in response to the proportion of investors. Since z is a
multiplier, its value exceeds 1. The z term multiplies the effect of unobserved shocks on exchange
rate. The direction of z depends on the persistence of ft and bt. When bt is more persistent, z
is decreasing. When ft is more persistent, z is initially increasing up to a certain point then it
decreases.
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Figure 1.19: Revised Coefficients, ρb = ρf = 0 Figure 1.20: Revised Coefficients, ρb = 0.8 ρf = 0
Figure 1.21: Revised Coefficients, ρb = ρf = 0.8 Figure 1.22: Revised Coefficients, ρb = 0.8 ρf = 1
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Figure 1.23: Revised Magnification Factor, ρb =
ρf = 0
Figure 1.24: Revised Magnification Factor, ρb =
0.8 ρf = 0
Figure 1.25: Revised Magnification Factor, ρb = 0
ρf = 0.8
Figure 1.26: Revised Magnification Factor, ρb =
ρf = 0.8
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1.6.2 The Role of Heterogeneous Informational Horizons and the Exchange Rate
Disconnect with Current Observable Fundamental
With the information structure proposed in this section, an increase in the proportion of the
better-informed investors would make the exchange rate disconnect puzzle more serious, regardless
of the degree of fundamentals persistence. Figures 1.27–1.30 plot the R2 between the exchange
rate and the current observable fundamental. Each figure is differentiated by the degree of the
fundamentals’ persistence. All of these figures illustrate that the R2 diminishes as ω → 1. That is,
as investors perceive more information at a longer period ahead, the more severe is the disconnect
problem. As I mentioned earlier, when ω → 1, the unobserved components in the model, i.e.
future fundamentals, become more significance, then the R2 of the exchange rate and the current
observable fundamental is low. However, when ft is more persistent, the values of R
2 shift up. As
future fundamental highly correlates with current fundamental, the exchange rate would be more
connected with the current fundamental.
Figure 1.27: Revised R2, ρb = ρf = 0 Figure 1.28: Revised R
2, ρb = 0.8 ρf = 0
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Figure 1.29: Revised R2, ρb = 0 ρf = 0.8 Figure 1.30: Revised R
2, ρb = ρf = 0.8
The disconnect problem is more intense when investors receive signal with heterogeneous in-
formational horizon. The dotted line in figure 1.31 plots R2 of the model where all investors
symmetrically receive one-period ahead signal, and the variance of signal error equals. The R2 is
flat at 0.4814. The starred line displays R2 of the model where there are two group of investors
receiving one-period signal with unequal variance of signal error. As ω −→ 1, the proportion of
investors with lower variance of signal error increases. As seen in the figure, R2 keeps decreasing as
ω −→ 1. An increase in the proportion of investors with more precise signal makes the disconnect
worsen. When signals are more precise, investors learn more about future fundamentals clearer.
Therefore the current observable fundamental has little explanatory power about the exchange
rate. The solid line represents the R2 where one group of investors receives only one-period signal
and the other group receives both one-, and two-period signals. With different signal horizons,
the value of R2 is the lowest among the three cases. Moreover, the disconnect problem is stronger
as the proportion of investors receiving two-period ahead signal increases. In fact, the disconnect
problem is not only about the different in precision of the private signal. The introduction of the
heterogeneous informational horizon in the model would make the disconnect problem more severe.
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Figure 1.31: R2 in Heterogeneous Information Framework
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1.7 Exchange Rate and Order Flow
1.7.1 The Structure of the Foreign Exchange Market
The foreign exchange market is two-tiered. In the first tier, called “retail market”, dealers trade
with customers. The second tier concerns interdealer or interbank trades. The interdealer market
plays a vital role in the foreign exchange market since retail prices are based on information from
interdealer prices. In general, trading occurs electronically between participants. The market has
no need to be at a specific physical location and therefore trade occurs around the clock. The
posted bid-offer quotes between dealers become the benchmark for market prices. The foreign
exchange market is quote-driven in which instantaneous liquidity is provided by market makers.
Currency dealers have no obligation to provide liquidity in the market. However, in practice, failure
to provide liquidity is costly to them as they could lose reputation.
The customers in the market can be categorized into two groups, namely, financial customers
and corporate customers. All of them are institutions, unlike trading in stock markets in which
individuals can trade on their own. Financial customers are mostly asset managers including
leveraged investors such as hedge funds and commodity traders, as well as mutual funds and pension
funds. Financial customers also include non-dealing banks, central banks, and other financial
institutions. Corporate customers refer to commercial firms who demand foreign currency for their
production, investment, and international trade. Financial customers are major customers in the
market. Over 60% of foreign currency trading is from financial customers. Besides, they tend to
have larger transactions on average than corporate customers.
Interdealer trading effectively governs the spot foreign exchange market. The interdealer trading
is electronically executed by Electronic Broking Service (EBS) and Thomson Reuters where market
prices of foreign currency are based on posted bid and ask quotes. Dealers indirectly trade with
each other by placing market and limit orders to buy or sell currencies via electronic brokerages.
The system will prioritize the limit orders to match the best prices with the incoming market
orders. Interdealer quotes are constrained by position and loss limits due to dealers’ preferences
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for holding zero inventories overnight. When dealers trade with retail customers, the quote price
will be set from interdealer quotes and adjust from there. However, the customer market is not
transparent because quotes and transactions depend on private information between the customer
and the dealer. Agents supply liquidity by placing a limit order, while agents who demand liquidity
enter with a market order. At the end of a trading day, dealers will manage their inventory to be
close to zero. This is done mostly via interdealer trades. Through these trades, dealers quickly
eliminate their inventory position. For example, the half-life of an inventory in the NYSE is over a
week (Madhavan and Smidt, 1993) while the half-life of an inventory position is below five minutes
for highly active dealers and below half an hour for less active dealers (Bjønnes and Rime, 2005).
Dealers’ inventory management affects the volatility of exchange rates as they move to accommodate
inventory adjustment.
1.7.2 Understanding Order Flow
In the market microstructure approach, it is common to believe that private information is
transmitted to the market via order flow. Order flow, the net of buyer-initiated orders and seller-
initiated orders, generated by foreign exchange trade between investors and dealers can convey
information to dealers about the state of the macroeconomy. Dealers use this information to revise
their quotes price on exchange rates. The dynamics of the spot exchange rate is rather driven by
the flow of information about the economy that reaches dealers than the effect of macroeconomic
shocks. The role of order flow has been first highlighted by Evans and Lyons (2002). They find that
order flow helps determine the price of the foreign exchange because price information is aggregated
in the order flow through the trading of foreign exchange process. They also find that order flow
accounts for more than 60% of daily changes in the log deutsche mark/dollar movements, and 40%
of the change in log yen/dollar movements.
The portfolio shifts model (Evans and Lyons, 2002) is constructed to explain how order flow
drives price determination via information aggregation. In the model, there are three rounds of
trading within each day. In round 1, dealers trade with their customers. All market participants
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observe the flow of publicly available macroeconomic information. Each dealer quotes a price at
which he agrees to buy/sell any amount. He receives customer orders at his quoted price. Only a
recipient dealer can observe his customer orders. Since customer orders are not publicly observed,
they become a vital source of private information.
In round 2, each dealer trades with other dealers at his quoted price. The quotes are observable
and available to all dealers. At the end of this round, all agents observe the interdealer order
flows. Interdealer order flow is positive (negative) when a dealer initiating purchases (sells) foreign
exchange at the ask (bid) quote. In round 3, dealers trade with public customers again. The quotes
in this round are observable and available to the public. However, in the actual trading process,
dealers quote prices, receive orders, and execute their trades on a continual basis.
The price of trading is conditioned on common information. At the beginning of round 1, the
payoff increment, i.e., the change in the nominal interest differential, is common information. Order
flows are not observed until the end of round 2. The price of round 3 reflects information in both
order flows and the payoff increment. Each interdealer trading in round 2 will be proportional to
his customer orders, which are only observed by the dealer who trades with its customers in round
1, as the dealer tries to manage his inventory position close to zero. Hence, when dealers observe
(interdealer) order flows at the end of round 2, they can infer the aggregate portfolio shifts or
customer orders in round 1. This is how information about aggregate demand for foreign exchange
contained in the customer orders is transmitted to dealers and reflects in the dealers’ quoted prices.
Customer order flow received by individual dealers firstly brings dispersed information into the
market. This flow is a source of private information, and represents information heterogeneity across
dealers in the market. However, customer order flow is not a channel through which information
is inscribed into the spot exchange rate, the interdealer order flow is. Individual dealers use this
private information to trade in the interdealer market. Information from their customer orders is
aggregated into interdealer order flows, and spreads across the market. This process is known as
information aggregation. Dispersed information is embeded into dealer quotes once the process of
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information aggregation is complete. The slow pace of information aggregation may explain the
disconnect between exchange rate and fundamental over short horizons (Evans, 2005).
Evans and Lyons (2005) find evidence that the micro-based model outperforms both random
walk and the macro model. They conclude that there exists nonpublic information which helps
forecasting exchange rates. In their portfolio-shift model, not only public information, e.g., interest
differentials, but also private information as conveyed through order flows jointly determine the
exchange rate (Evans and Lyons, 2002). Other researchers have also substantiated the importance
of private information. For example, Lyons (1995) and Rime (2000) demonstrate that trading flows
associated with private information have an impact on prices.
1.7.3 Demand for Foreign Bond and Order Flow
In this section, I will firstly derive the demand for foreign bond for any investor in group i and
j. Then each group order flow and aggregate order flow are analyzed. From equation (1.6), I can
rewrite the demand for foreign bond for any investor in each group as
biF,t =
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0a1 + λ˜1c1 + γ˜−1k1 + γ˜−2g1]vit +
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0a2 + λ˜1c2 + γ˜−1k2 + γ˜−2g2]vit−1 − bit
+
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0a3 + λ˜1c3 + γ˜−1k3 + γ˜−2g3 − (1 + α)/α]st
+
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0a4 + λ˜1c4 + γ˜−1k4 + γ˜−2g4 + γ˜−2ρb]bt−2
+
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0ρf + λ˜0a5 + λ˜1c5 + γ˜−1k5 + γ˜−2g5 + (1/α)]ft
+
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0a6 + λ˜1c6 + γ˜−1k6 + γ˜−2g6]sˆt−1, (1.14)
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bjF,t =
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0d1 + λ˜1e1 + γ˜−1m1 + γ˜−2h1]v
j
t − bjt
+
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0d3 + λ˜1e3 + γ˜−1m3 + γ˜−2h3 − (1 + α)/α]st
+
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0d4 + λ˜1e4 + γ˜−1m4 + γ˜−2h4 + γ˜−2ρb]bt−2
+
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0ρf + λ˜0d5 + λ˜1e5 + γ˜−1m5 + γ˜−2h5 + (1/α)]ft
+
1
γσ2t
[λ˜0d6 + λ˜1e6 + γ˜−1m6 + γ˜−2h6]sˆt−1. (1.15)
Aggregating the demand for foreign bond for any investor over the continuum of investors in
each group, this yields the aggregate demand for foreign of group i, and j investors, denoted by
BiF,t and B
j
F,t. The following equations write the aggregate demand for foreign bond of group i and
j investors:
BiF,t =
ω
γσ2t
{
[λ˜0a1 + λ˜1c1 + γ˜−1k1 + γ˜−2g1]ft+2 + [λ˜0a2 + λ˜1c2 + γ˜−1k2 + γ˜−2g2]ft+1
+[λ˜0ρf + λ˜0a5 + λ˜1c5 + γ˜−1k5 + γ˜−2g5 + (1/α)]ft
+[λ˜0a3 + λ˜1c3 + γ˜−1k3 + γ˜−2g3 − (1 + α)/α]st
+[λ˜0a6 + λ˜1c6 + γ˜−1k6 + γ˜−2g6]sˆt−1
+[λ˜0a4 + λ˜1c4 + γ˜−1k4 + γ˜−2g4 + γ˜−2ρb]bt−2 − γσ2t bt
}
, (1.16)
BjF,t =
(1− ω)
γσ2t
{
[λ˜0d1 + λ˜1e1 + γ˜−1m1 + γ˜−2h1]ft+1
+[λ˜0ρf + λ˜0d5 + λ˜1e5 + γ˜−1m5 + γ˜−2h5 + (1/α)]ft
+[λ˜0d3 + λ˜1e3 + γ˜−1m3 + γ˜−2h3 − (1 + α)/α]st + [λ˜0d6 + λ˜1e6 + γ˜−1m6 + γ˜−2h6]sˆt−1
[λ˜0d4 + λ˜1e4 + γ˜−1m4 + γ˜−2h4 + γ˜−2ρb]bt−2 − γσ2t bt
}
. (1.17)
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Figures 1.32–1.35 display the effect of f-shock and b-shock on currency demands of different
investors.3 A positive f-shock causes an increase about 0.0038 in the aggregate foreign bond demand
for group i investor. However, the same shock causes a decrease, with the same magnitude, in the
aggregate foreign demand for group j investor. A negative b-shock decreases the aggregate foreign
bond demand for group i investors by −0.00017 while it increases that of group j investors.
Figure 1.32: F-Shock on BiF,t Figure 1.33: F-Shock on B
j
F,t
The demand for foreign bond is composed of three components which are the private infor-
mation, the public information, and the exchange rate. Order flow captures the pure private
information component in foreign bond demand. From equation (1.14) and (1.15), I aggregate the
order flow over a continuum of investors in group i and j. The aggregate order flow of each group
can be written as follows:
3This is for the case ρb = ρf = 0.8
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Figure 1.34: B-Shock on BiF,t Figure 1.35: B-Shock on B
j
F,t
∆xit =
ω
γσ2t
{
[λ˜0a1 + λ˜1c1 + γ˜−1k1 + γ˜−2g1]ft+2 + [λ˜0a2 + λ˜1c2 + γ˜−1k2 + γ˜−2g2]ft+1
−[[λ˜0a1 + λ˜1c1 + γ˜−1k1 + γ˜−2g1]ρ2f + [λ˜0a2 + λ˜1c2 + γ˜−1k2 + γ˜−2g2]ρf ]ft
−γσ2t (bt − ρ2bbt−2)−
[
[(λ˜0a1 + λ˜1c1 + γ˜−1k1 + γ˜−2g1)ρf
+(λ˜0a2 + λ˜1c2 + γ˜−1k2 + γ˜−2g2)]
λ˜2ψ
βf + λ˜
2
2ψ
− ρbβfγσ
2
t
γ˜0(βf + λ˜2
2
ψ)
]
sˆt−1
}
∆xjt =
(1− ω)
γσ2t
{
[λ˜0d1 + λ˜1e1 + γ˜−1m1 + γ˜−2h1]ft+1 − [λ˜0d1 + λ˜1e1 + γ˜−1m1 + γ˜−2h1]ρfft
− γσ2t (bt − ρ2bt−2)−
[
[λ˜0d1 + λ˜1e1 + γ˜−1m1 + γ˜−2h1]
λ˜2ψ
βf + λ˜
2
2ψ
− ρbβfγσ
2
t
γ˜0(βf + λ˜
2
2ψ)
]
sˆt−1
}
.
The aggregate order flow, denoted as ∆xt is the sum of ∆x
i
t and ∆x
j
t . The contribution in order
flow is from private information (vit, v
i
t−1, v
j
t ), hedge trade (b
i
t, b
j
t ), and exchange rate (sˆt−1). Figures
1.36 and 1.37 display the effect of f-shock and b-shock on the aggregate flow, when ρb = ρf = 0.
The impact of f-shock on the aggregate flow is transmitted through f-fundamental up to time t+ 2,
when ω = 1. When ω = 0, only the shock is through ft and ft+1. When ω = 1, the order flow is
most affected by the change in f-shock at the first period. The effect later decreases. In period 2,
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this flow has the least fluctuation. The b-shock triggers the effect on the flow not only through bt
and bt−2 but the exchange rate signal, sˆt−1. The impact of b-shock depends significantly on the
coefficient of the exchange rate signal. However, the coefficient is the same when ρb = ρf = 0.
Figure 1.36: F-Shock on Aggregate Order Flow Figure 1.37: B-Shock on Aggregate Order Flow
1.7.4 Relationship between Exchange Rate and Order Flow
Taking the aggregation of the investors’ demand for foreign bond and imposing market equilib-
rium, I can write the relationship between the exchange rate and order flow as
st = λ˜0ft + γ˜−2bt−2 +
[
τβf + ρbβf + λ˜1λ˜2ψ
βf + λ˜
2
2ψ
]
sˆt−1 − γ˜0∆xt. (1.18)
From the above equation, the exchange rate has a relationship with fundamentals ft and bt−2,
exchange rate signal sˆt−1, and order flow ∆xt. Private information about future fundamentals
reaches the market and is aggregated into exchange rate via order flow. So order flow will have an
impact on exchange rate. Until the future fundamentals are observed, there is also a link between
exchange rate and observed fundamental.
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Figures 1.38–1.41 display the R2 of the three regressions in various degree of the fundamentals
persistence. The solid line graphs the R2 of the regression of the exchange rate on the observable
fundamental. As seen in Figure 1.38 and 1.39, the R2 is small. The R2 of the regression of the
exchange rate on the order flow, plotted by the dotted line, is larger. When taking into account
of private information as proxied by the order flow, it suggests a stronger relationship between
the exchange rate and the order flow. However, when f-fundamental is more persistent, the R2 of
the regression of the exchange rate on the observable fundamental is greater than the R2 of the
regression of the exchange rate and the order flow.
The R2 of the regression of the exchange rate on both the observable fundamental and order
flow, represented by the dash-dot line, is very closed to one. This suggests that including both the
traditional fundamental and the order flow in the regression of the exchange rate will raise the R2
and lessen the disconnect problem. The exchange rate has more connection with the observable
fundamental when the order flow is included in the regression.
Figure 1.38: R2 on Order Flow, ρb = ρf = 0 Figure 1.39: R
2 on Order Flow, ρb = 0.8 ρf = 0
44
Figure 1.40: R2 on Order Flow, ρb = 0 ρf = 0.8 Figure 1.41: R
2 on Order Flow, ρb = ρf = 0.8
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I examine the role of heterogeneous informational horizons between investors in
the economy and the relationship between the exchange rate and fundamentals. The exchange rate
disconnect problem is explained by introducing information heterogeneity into a dynamic monetary
model of exchange rate determination. The model addresses the importance of the information
asymmetry among investors in the economy.
I find that a differential informational horizon across investors causes the exchange rate to dis-
connect with the current observed fundamental. The intensity of the disconnect problem is greater
when extending the model from one-period-model to differential informational horizon model, and
to two-period model. That is, the disconnect between the exchange rate and the current observable
fundamental arises as the fraction of better-informed investors increases. The reason is simple.
When there are more investors who know information about future fundamentals at a long period
ahead, the existence of the differential among private information increases, which stresses the
significance of the unobservable components in the model. Thus it deteriorates the relationship
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between the exchange rate and the current observable fundamental. Knowing more about future
fundamentals would not help the exchange rate connect with the current observable fundamental
unless the process of fundamental ft is more persistent. Besides, the heterogeneous information
also causes the exchange rate to be more volatile. An increase in the fraction of investors who
receive information about future fundamentals at a long period ahead creates the fluctuation in
the currency market. The paper also explores the relationship between the exchange rate and the
order flow. I find that the order flow can explain a variation in the exchange rate better than the
observable fundamental. The study of exchange rate determination should incorporate the order
flow as one of the variables related to exchange rate.
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CHAPTER 2. REAL EXCHANGE RATES, EXTERNAL IMBALANCES,
AND CURRENCY RISK PREMIA
The violation of uncovered interest parity suggests that interest rate differentials can predict
currency excess returns. I investigate whether there are variables other than interest rate differen-
tials explaining these excess returns. I combine a present-value model that relies on real exchange
rates to explain currency returns with a portfolio balance model that focuses on the impact of a
country’s external imbalances on excess returns. I first present a theoretical model that is then
tested with data on real exchange rates and international investment positions of a set of devel-
oped countries. I find that, apart from interest rate differentials, real exchange rates and external
imbalances are important factors in determining currency excess returns. Adding real exchange
rates alone or external imbalances alone does not statistically improve the ability of the model to
forecast currency excess returns using interest rate differentials. Both variables must be added for
the new model to outperform the traditional one.
2.1 Introduction
The uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition states that the expected return on domestic
deposits will equal the exchange rate-adjusted expected return on foreign deposits. That is, under
perfect capital mobility, investors will be indifferent to return on deposits between the two countries.
By definition, the excess return on foreign deposits is the sum of the difference between the interest
in two countries and the percentage change in the exchange rate over the period of investment.
If UIP holds, the high interest rate currency is required to depreciate to offset the interest rate
differential.
UIP is a natural equilibrium outcome in the standard models of exchange rate determination
under flexible exchange rates and perfect capital mobility. Empirically, however, exchange rates
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are found to be uncorrelated with macroeconomic variables, namely, interest rate, money supply,
and inflation. That is, these macro variables are not helpful in forecasting exchange rates. Engel
and West (2005) find that the exchange rates follow a random walk. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001)
coin the term ‘exchange rate disconnect’ to designate the lack of correlation between the exchange
rate and the relevant macro variables. More broadly, the exchange rate disconnect includes many
puzzles in international macroeconomics, e.g., the purchasing power parity puzzle, the Backus and
Smith puzzle, and the UIP puzzle. The UIP puzzle relates to the fact that exchange rates of high-
interest-rate countries depreciate insufficiently to offset interest rate differentials; on the contrary,
currencies appreciate in response to a rise in the interest rate.
The deviation from UIP, tested by Fama (1984), suggests that there are potential gains from an
increase in interest rate. That is, the currency excess returns would not be zero as predicted by the
UIP. This expected excess return can be thought of as an exchange rate risk premium. The positive
excess returns are the compensation for time-varying risks. Menkhoff et al. (2012) show that the
deviation from UIP can be accounted for a compensation for risk. In order to resolve UIP puzzle,
researchers have investigated the driving force of this positive currency return. For example, Backus
et al. (2001) relate the factors driving the foreign exchange risk premium to the stochastic discount
factors. Verdelhan (2010), Bansal and Shaliastovish (2013), and Colacito and Croce (2013) relate
a risk premium to the variances of consumption in the home and foreign countries. A positive
excess return compensates an investor for taking on consumption growth risk. However, the recent
literature is still silent about the economic determinants underlying those excess returns.
In this study, I study predictors of currency excess returns by investigating the relationship
between the currency risk premium, the interest rate differential, the real exchange rate, and the net
foreign asset position. The conceptual framework is based on the present-value of the real exchange
rate. If purchasing power parity (PPP) fails to hold in the long-run, expected excess returns are
related by the expected real interest rate differential, the real exchange rate, and macroeconomic
fundamentals that influence the long-run mean of the real exchange rate.
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Let qt ≡ st + p∗t − pt, where qt is the log real exchange rate, st is the log nominal exchange rate,
p∗t and pt are the log of the foreign and the domestic price levels, respectively. The excess returns
on foreign deposits, denoted by ρt+1 = st+1− st + i∗t − it, where it and i∗t are nominal interest rates
of the domestic and the foreign countries, respectively, can be expressed in terms of real variables
as:
ρt+1 = qt+1 − qt + (i∗t − pi∗t+1)− (it − pit+1),
where pit+1 ≡ pt+1 − pt and pi∗t+1 ≡ p∗t+1 − p∗t are the domestic and foreign inflation rates. Rewrite
the above equation in terms of the real interest rates, denoted by rt for the domestic country and
r∗t for the foreign country, iterate forward, and take conditional expectations to get
qt − lim
k→∞
Et(qt+k) =
∞∑
j=1
Et(r
∗
t+j−1 − rt+j−1)−
∞∑
j=1
Etρt+j .
When PPP is assumed to hold in the long run, the real exchange rate is stationary, and
limk→∞Et(qt+k) is the unconditional mean of the real exchange rate. Fluctuations in the real
exchange rate are mainly affected only by the infinite sum of the deviations from real rate equality
(interest differential) and the deviations from UIP (risk premium). Assuming PPP holds, Balduzzi
and Chiang (2017), and Dahlquist and Penasse (2016) show evidence that apart from the interest
rate differential, the real exchange rate is an important driver of the currency risk premium. If
PPP fails to hold, the expected currency risk premium depends on three main driving forces. The
first force captures movements of the real exchange rate. The second force captures an infinite
cumulative of real interest rate differentials. The third force includes traditional macro variables
(fundamentals) that are the driving force underlying the expectation of long-run real exchange
rates. Menkhoff et al. (2017) control for the influence of fundamentals on the long-run real ex-
change rate to sharpen the relationship between real exchange rates and currency risk premia.
Adjusting the real exchange rates for key country-specific fundamentals, namely, productivity (to
capture Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effects that countries with higher productivity in the tradable
sector experience stronger in real exchange rates), export quality (countries with higher quality of
export goods experience stronger real exchange rates), net foreign assets (currency of countries with
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net foreign asset deficits have the real exchange rate depreciated), and output gaps (central banks
follow the Taylor rule linking the real exchange rate to output gaps) better isolates information
related to the currency excess returns. Moreover, using the real exchange rates and adjusting for
the fundamentals as a portfolio signal deliver a precise measure of the currency value. As a result,
this contributes to a strong predictive power for the future currency returns.
The present-value perspective relates currency excess returns with interest rate differentials, real
exchange rates, and fundamentals that evolve with time and influence in the long-run real exchange
rate. In this chapter, I study determinants of currency excess returns by proposing another two
factors, in addition to interest rate differentials, for expected currency returns. I focus on the
role of real exchange rates as well as external imbalances in influencing currency risk. I consider
external imbalances, measured by a country’s net foreign assets, to be a proxy for fundamentals
relevant to the long-run real exchange rate. I find evidence of UIP violations where high interest
rate currencies provide positive currency excess returns. In addition, both real exchange rates and
external imbalances are also important factors in determining currency returns. When the real
exchange rate is high, the excess return on foreign deposits will be low because the foreign currency
is expensive relative to the home currency. Besides, a country with negative external imbalances
will offer positive currency excess returns. A net debtor country provides a positive currency risk
premium in order to compensate investors who are willing to finance negative external imbalances.
Moreover, the best model for forecasting future currency excess returns is the model with both real
exchange rates and external imbalances, together with interest rate differentials.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a literature review about
the UIP puzzle, and the link of currency returns with real exchange rates and external imbalances.
The theoretical model is proposed in section 2.3. In section 2.4, I discuss the method of estimation,
the data used in the study, and empirical results. Model forecasting is also shown in this section.
Lastly, the conclusions of the study are provided in section 2.5.
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2.2 The Link between the Real Exchange Rates and External Imbalances, and
the UIP Puzzle
In this section, I explain the theory behind the relations between the deviation from UIP and
the real exchange rates, and the relations between the external imbalances and the currency excess
returns.
2.2.1 The UIP Puzzle
Let St be the exchange rate in terms of home currency per one unit of foreign currency. The
return on a home deposit with an investment of 1 unit of home currency is 1 + it. The return on
a foreign deposit with the same amount of money invested is (1 + i∗t )
St+1
St
. Under log-linearization,
the UIP condition can be expressed as
Et(st+1 − st + i∗t − it) = 0.
This states that the nominal exchange rate is expected to move in order to compensate for any
difference in the interest rate, and the currency risk premium should be zero.
The expected excess return on foreign deposits is defined as Etρt+1 ≡ Et(st+1− st + i∗t − it). A
deviation from UIP implies that Etρt+1 6= 0. Fama (1984) tested the validity of UIP by estimating
the following regression:
st+1 − st = a+ b˜(it − i∗t ) + ut+1.
Under the null hypothesis of UIP, the regression coefficients should be a = 0 and b˜ = 1. Using the
definition for currency risk premia, we can rewrite this regression as
ρt+1 = a+ b(i
∗
t − it) + ut+1,
where b = 1 − b˜. If UIP holds, then Et(ρt+1) = 0 and cov(ρt+1, xt) = 0 for any variable xt,
e.g. (i∗t − it). Hence, there should be no variable that can forecast excess returns. However, the
estimation results are such that the estimated value of b is greater than zero.1 There is a positive
1A body of empirical works has found the estimation of b˜ to be less than one, usually less than zero. This leads to
the violation of UIP, and implies that the currency with high interest rate tends to appreciate, which contrasts with
the UIP prediction that the high interest rate currency will depreciate.
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covariance between the excess return on foreign deposits and the foreign-home interest differential,
cov(ρt+1, i
∗
t − it) > 0. Hence, the high interest rate currency is expected to have a positive excess
return.2
Since a currency risk premia exists, investors earn profits by arbitraging the difference between
exchange rates and interest rates in those countries. Investors may follow the investment rule
called carry trade by taking a long position in the currency with the higher interest rate. If foreign
interest rates are higher than home interest rates, then foreign deposits have excess returns over
home deposits, and vice versa. Many studies, for example, Burnside et al. (2008, 2011), Lustig
and Verdelhan (2007), Brunnermeier et al. (2009), and Lustig et al. (2011) have found evidence
of carry trade. There is a high return with a low standard deviation in taking long positions in
high-interest rate countries and short positions in low-interest rate countries.
Engel (2016) and Valchev (2015), however, find that the relationship between currency excess
returns and interest rate differentials changes over long horizons. At a short horizon, high interest
rates predict positive currency excess returns, which is cov(Etρt+1, i
∗
t − it) > 0. But at longer
horizons, high interest rates tend to predict negative excess returns, cov(Etρt+j , i
∗
t − it) < 0 for
some j > 0. Valchev (2015) finds that the currency with high interest rate today forecasts positive
currency excess returns at horizons of up to 3 years, but it forecasts negative excess returns at
horizons of 4 to 7 years. This finding on longer horizons also violates the UIP but in the opposite
direction. Engel (2016) reasons that there is excess comovement in the level of the exchange rate
and the interest differential. The covariance of the stationary component of the exchange rate
with the foreign-home interest differential is more negative than would hold under interest parity:
cov(Et
∑∞
j=0 ρt+j+1, i
∗
t −it) < 0. Since we have cov(Etρt+1, i∗t −it) > 0 and cov(Et
∑∞
j=0 ρt+j+1, i
∗
t −
it) < 0, there must be the case that cov(Etρt+j , i
∗
t − it) < 0 for some j > 0.
2See, for example, Fama (1984), Engel (1996), Froot and Thaler (2001), and Burnside et al. (2006)
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2.2.2 Currency Risk Premia and Real Exchange Rates
The reverse relationship between interest rate differentials and currency risk premia over time
suggests that interest rate differentials alone cannot describe the time variation in currency risk
premia. Dahlquist and Penasse (2016) argue that currency excess returns depending only on interest
differentials cannot explain the fluctuations in real exchange rates. To quantitatively match the
movements of real exchange rates in the data, the currency risk premia must be very volatile and
depend on an additional component which is related to the real exchange rate. While UIP violations
link interest rate differentials to currency returns, PPP relates the real exchange rate to the infinite
sum of future currency returns.
Assume that limk→∞Et(qt+k) = µq. If currency risk premia are well described by the Fama
regression, with the additional assumptions that the interest differential follows an AR(1) process
and the inflation differential is unpredictable, the real exchange rate will be negatively correlated
with the current interest rate differential, qt−µq = b˜ i
∗
t−it−µi
1−ρi where µi and ρi are AR(1) parameters;
and b˜ is the estimate coefficient from the Fama regression which tends to be negative, and the R2
should be high. However, they find that the coefficients of the regression of the real exchange
rates on interest rate differentials for many currencies in the sample are positive, suggesting that
real exchange rates appreciate with interest rate differentials, and R2 values are small. Therefore,
the simple model in which the risk premium depends only on the difference between foreign and
domestic interest rates might not be correct.
Dahlquist and Penasse (2016) hypothesize a two-factor structure for the expected currency
returns. The first factor is the interest rate differential. The second factor relates to the long run
relationship of real exchange rate. Thus, the Fama regression is augmented as:
ρt+1 = a+ b(i
∗
t − it) + ηt + ut+1.
They derive an additional component, ηt = (1 − ρη)
[
β
i∗t−it−µi
1−ρi − (qt − µq)
]
, related to the real
exchange rate, where ρη is the persistence of η, and ρi and µi relate to the dynamics of the
interest rates. Hence, the currency return predictions should incorporate not only the interest rate
differential but also the real exchange rate. Including the real exchange rate, the R2 in predictive
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regressions for monthly returns increases by 30%. The predictability holds out-of-sample and
increases over long horizons. Their model also accounts for the relation that the real exchange
rates appreciate with the interest rate differentials, as well as the flip nature of the currency return
and interest rate differential at long horizons. In addition, Balduzzi and Chiang (2017) find that the
real exchange rate indeed predicts negative excess returns. They also highlight the predictive power
of the real exchange rate for the currency risk premia. The real exchange rate has the strongest
predictive power, followed by the interest rate differential.
2.2.3 Currency Risk Premia and External Imbalances
An increase in international financial integration has led to a shift in the composition of coun-
tries’ asset and liability positions. The dynamic adjustment of a country’s external balance is of
central interest to international economists. The movement of wealth transfers across countries
also affects fluctuations in exchange rates, which can lead to imbalances in trade and capital flows,
and eventually contribute to the causes and consequences of financial crises. Understanding what
determines the fluctuations in exchange rates and the adjustment process of a country’s external
imbalance has drawn attention to policymakers and investors in currency markets. Gourinchas
and Ray (2007) show that a country’s external constraint holds when today’s external imbalances
predict either future net export growth or future movements in net foreign asset portfolio returns,
or both. The adjustment in negative external accounts implies a surplus in future net exports
through the trade channel, and an increase in expected net foreign portfolio returns through the
valuation channel. The exchange rate plays a vital role in this adjustment. In the short run, a
depreciation raises the value of foreign assets held by the home country, causing an adjustment via
the valuation channel. In the longer run, home currency depreciation favors trade surpluses, con-
tributing to a trade channel adjustment. The international financial adjustment affects exchange
rate predictability. Gourinchas and Ray (2007) empirically find that external imbalances have a
strong predictive power for exchange rates, and that a deficit in external imbalances predicts a
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depreciation of the domestic currency. The results hold for out-of-sample forecast and the model
outperforms the random walk at all horizons between 1 and 16 quarters.
Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) propose a model of exchange rate determination based on capital
flows in imperfect financial markets, called Gamma model. This kind of portfolio balance model
proposes that exchange rates are determined by external imbalances and financiers’ risk-bearing
capacity. In their model, there are two countries. Each country borrows or lends in its own currency.
Global financial firms—called financiers—absorb countries’ trade imbalances. They are long in the
debtor country and short in the creditor country. However, they have financial constraints that
limit their ability to take positions, based on their risk-bearing capacities and existing balance sheet
risks. Financiers are unable to intermediate currency mismatches, even though there are excess
returns, because they face limits in their risk bearing capacity. An important feature of the model
is that a country’s imbalance is a driver of the currency risk premia. Define the returns of the
carry trade as Rc ≡ R∗R S1S0 − 1, where R and R∗ are return on domestic and foreign assets, St is
the nominal exchange rate in period t = 0, 1. They derive the expected currency excess returns as
follows:
E(Rc) = Γ
R∗
R E(imp1)− imp0
(R∗ + Γ)imp0 + R
∗
R E(imp1)
,
where Γ represents risk-bearing capacity of financiers, impt is the home import value in terms of
home currency at time t, with exports normalized to unity. Substituting the equilibrium exchange
rate, E(imp1) − imp0 can be derived in the model as the home country’s net exports. In a two-
country, two-period model, there is a positive relation between the evolution of net exports and net
foreign assets. The currency risk premia will be higher when (i) the return differential is larger, (ii)
the funding country is a net foreign creditor, and (iii) finance is more imperfect (higher Γ).
The intuition of the influence of external imbalances on currency risk premia is that investors
require a risk premium in order to hold the currency of net debtor countries. Della Corte et
al. (2016) find evidence that a global imbalance risk factor has pricing power in currency risk
premia. In addition to interest rate differentials, currency excess returns are driven by the external
debt and its currency denomination. The debtor country is considered riskier, and is likely to
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issue liabilities in foreign currency due to, for instance, its political instability and inflation risk.
Hence, currency excess returns are higher for net debtor countries with higher propensity to issue
liabilities in foreign currency. Moreover, they also show that net foreign asset positions contain
related but not identical information to interest differentials in the cross-section of currencies. The
riskiest countries in terms of net foreign asset positions are not necessarily the highest interest rates
countries; hence, the impact of net foreign asset positions on currency risk premia differ from the
interest rate channel.
In this study, the two ideas of the role of real exchange rates and external imbalances in affecting
currency risk premia are blended together. I develop a benchmark model and estimate its various
versions for predicting currency premia. More specifically, I consider a standard Fama regression
model, a regression with interest rate differentials and real exchange rates, and a regression that
includes the previous factors and in addition accounts for external imbalances. The currency risk
premia model that I develop below utilizes a version of the model developed by Itskhoki and Mukhin
(2017). The theoretical model is discussed in the next section.
2.3 The Model
In this section, I firstly present a theoretical model that explains the importance of the real
exchange rate and the external imbalance on currency risk premium. Then, a model for estimation
is derived from the theoretical part. The model closely follows Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017). They
propose a dynamic general equilibrium model of exchange rate disconnect in which the disconnect
is generated by an exogenous shock to international asset demend (or a financial shock). In their
model, the deviation from UIP depends on a country’s net foreign position and a financial shock.
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2.3.1 The Theoretical Model
There are two countries: home and foreign (foreign country variables are denoted with a ∗). Each
country offers a bond in its own currency. Home and foreign households trade goods internationally.
The distinct feature of the model is that all international transactions are intermediated by the
financial sector. A country can have a trade imbalance, and the financial sector absorbs this
imbalance by taking a long position in the debtor country and a short position in the creditor
country.
Consider the international financial market, which is driven by three types of agents: home and
foreign households, noise traders, and arbitrageurs. Home and foreign households hold only their
local-currency bond, and take net foreign positions Bt+1 and B
∗
t+1, respectively. There are n noise
traders taking a zero-capital position. For example, they long N∗t+1 in foreign-currency bonds and
short Nt+1 = −N∗t+1St in home-currency bonds, and vice versa when N∗t+1 < 0. Noise traders have
imperfect knowledge about the market. They rely on nonfundamental-based trading techniques.
The demand for foreign bonds by noise traders is affected only by noise that is unrelated to economic
fundamentals. In the paper, the noise is the financial shock (ψ). The presence of noise trading
creates volatility in the market. Informed traders or competitive arbitrageurs are knowledgeable
about the market. They make their decisions based on rational expectations about the future. Also,
there are m arbitrageurs that take a zero-capital position long D∗t+1 in foreign-currency bonds and
short Dt+1 = −D∗t+1St home-currency bonds, and vice versa when D∗t+1 < 0.
Households: A representative home household maximizes the discounted expected utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
1
1− σC
1−σ
t −
1
1 + 1/ν
L
1+1/ν
t
)
subject to the constraint:
PtCt +Bt+1 = Rt−1Bt +WtLt + Πt, (2.1)
where Ct is the home country’s composite consumption of home goods and foreign goods, household
expenditure between home and foreign goods is PtCt = PHtCHt+PFtCFt, Lt is home labor supply,
σ is the relative risk aversion parameter and ν is the elasticity of labor supply, Pt is the consumer
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price index, Bt+1 is nominal value of home bond purchased at time t and paying RtBt+1 units of
home currency at time t+ 1, Wt is the wage rate, and Πt are firms’ profits.
The households’ optimal labor supply is
Cσt L
1/ν
t =
Wt
Pt
. (2.2)
Home households can trade only the home currency bond. Their optimal saving choice gives rise
to
1 = RtEtβ
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ Pt
Pt+1
. (2.3)
Firms: There are two inputs used in production: labor Lt, and intermediate input Xt. Output
is produced by the production function:
Yt = L
1−φ
t X
φ
t ,
where φ is the elasticity of output with respect to intermediate inputs.
Intermediate inputs are the same bundle as consumption, hence their price index is given by
Pt. The marginal cost is given by :
MCt =
(
Wt
1− φ
)1−φ(Pt
φ
)φ
. (2.4)
Firms optimally allocate expenditure between labor and intermediates. Their optimal demands for
labor and intermediate inputs are
WtLt = (1− φ)MCtYt and PtXt = φMCtYt. (2.5)
The expenditure on Xt consists of the domestic and foreign varieties, XHt and XFt. The profits of
the domestic firms consists of the profits from selling home-produced goods in domestic and foreign
markets: Πt = (PHt −MCt)YHt + (P ∗HtSt −MCt)Y ∗Ht, where total output is allocated between the
home and the foreign market, Yt = YHt + Y
∗
Ht.
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Substitution of firms profits and labor demand in the household budget constraint, equation
(2.1), yields the home country budget constraint:
Bt+1 −Rt−1Bt = NXt, 3 (2.6)
where NXt = StP
∗
HtY
∗
Ht − PFtYFt is the home currency net exports.
Foreign Country: The foreign households are symmetric. The bond demand by foreign
households is given by:
1 = R∗tEtβ
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ P ∗t
P ∗t+1
. (2.7)
Foreign firms are also symmetric. The foreign inputs demand and prices are symmetric with their
home country counterparts.
Financial Sector: For noise traders, I assume that the noise traders’ demand for foreign-
currency bonds is only affected by the currency demand shock, denoted by ψt, and given by:
N∗t+1 = n(e
ψt − 1). (2.8)
Arbitrageurs are informed traders. They know about fundamentals in the economy. They
use this knowledge in their trading decision. For example, arbitrageurs know that returns are
log-normally distributed. They use this information in maximizing their mean-variance utility of
excess returns.
Each arbitrageur j = 1, ...,m chooses to invest d∗jt+1 in foreign-currency bonds to maximize the
expected utility of his total wealth. The maximization problem is
max
d∗jt+1
−Ete−ωW˜
j
t+1 ,
where ω is the risk aversion parameter. The wealth of arbitrageur j, denoted by W˜ jt+1 is given by
W˜ jt+1 = R˜t+1d
∗j
t+1, where R˜t ≡ R∗t−1 − Rt−1 St−1St is the excess return on the foreign investment in
terms of foreign currency.
3The derivation uses the fact that PtCt = PHtCHt + PFtCFt, PtXt = PHtXHt + PFtXFt, and Yt = Ct +Xt
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I also assume that R˜ is normally distributed. The above maximization problem is equivalent to
maximizing the mean-variance utility of excess returns:
max
d∗jt+1
EtR˜t+1d
∗j
t+1 −
ω
2
vart(R˜t+1)(d
∗j
t+1)
2.
The arbitrageur individual demand for foreign-currency bonds is
d∗jt+1 =
EtR˜t+1
ωvart(R˜t+1)
.
Therefore, total demand for foreign bonds by arbitrageurs is given by:
D∗t+1 = m
EtR˜t+1
ωvart(R˜t+1)
. (2.9)
For concreteness, I assume that the profits and losses of the noise traders and arbitrageurs are
transferred to the foreign households. Thus, the foreign budget constraint differs from the home
constraint in that it adds a term R˜t(N
∗
t +D
∗
t ) into the equation. Thus, the foreign constraint can
be written as:
B∗t+1 −R∗t−1B∗t = NX∗t + R˜t(N∗t +D∗t ). (2.10)
Equilibrium System: The model is in equilibrium in the asset, goods, labor markets, and the
condition of a country budget constraint. The labor market clears when labor demand in equation
(2.5) equates labor supply in equation (2.2) with marginal cost in (2.4), and also its symmetric
foreign counterpart. The goods markets in home and foreign country clearing require Yt = YHt+Y
∗
Ht
and Y ∗t = YFt + Y ∗Ft, where
YHt = CHt +XHt = (1− γ)h
(
PFt
Pt
)
[Ct +Xt],
Y ∗Ht = C
∗
Ht +X
∗
Ht = γh
(
P ∗Ht
P ∗t
)
[C∗t +X
∗
t ],
YFt = γh
(
PFt
Pt
)
[Ct +Xt],
Y ∗Ft = (1− γ)h
(
P ∗Ft
P ∗t
)
[C∗t +X
∗
t ].
61
Goods are produced to satisfy goods demand given the price index Pt = (PHtCHt+PFtCFt)/Ct
and the foreign counterpart P ∗, where (PHt, P ∗Ht, PFt, P
∗
Ft) are given by
PHt = MC
1−α
t P
α
t ,
P ∗Ht =
(
MCt
St
)1−α
(P ∗t )
α,
PFt = (MC
∗
t St)
1−αPαt ,
P ∗Ft = (MC
∗
t )
1−α(P ∗t )
α.
Asset demands in equation (2.3), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9) satisfy the financial market clearing condi-
tions, which require Bt+1 +Nt+1 +Dt+1 = 0 and B
∗
t+1 +N
∗
t+1 +D
∗
t+1 = 0. Lastly, the system also
requires that the home budget constraint in (2.6) and foreign counterpart in (2.10) be met.
Log-Linearized System: I consider the equilibrium system that is log-linearized around the
symmetric steady state.4 Define a small letter as the log deviation of that variable from its steady
state, for example ct = logCt − log C¯, pt = logPt − log P¯ , and it = logRt − log R¯, except for
bt+1 ≡ R¯Bt+1/P¯ Y¯ and nxt ≡ NXt/P¯ Y¯ . Since the steady state of Bt+1 and NXt are zero, I define
bt+1 as a linear deviation of the net foreign asset from it steady state B¯ = 0, and nxt as the linear
deviation of net exports from steady state NX = 0. The steady state exchange rate is S¯ = 1 and
the steady state return is R¯ = 1/β.
Real Exchange Rates and Prices: The log-linear approximation for the price index Pt is
pt = (1 − γ)pHt + γpFt, where γ is the home bias parameter. Also, the log linearization of P ∗ is
p∗t = γp∗Ht + (1− γ)p∗Ft. The log linearization of (PHt, P ∗Ht, PFt, P ∗Ft) prices are:
pHt = (1− α)(1− φ)(wt − pt) + pt,
p∗Ht = (1− α)(1− φ)(wt − pt) + (1− α)pt + αp∗t ,
pFt = (1− α)(1− φ)(w∗t − p∗t ) + p∗t ,
p∗Ft = (1− α)(1− φ)(w∗t − p∗t ) + (1− α)p∗t + αpt.
4The derivation of the log-linearized system is shown in the Appendix B.1.
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Substitute for the prices, the log real exchange rate can be expressed in terms of the log nominal
exchange rate as follows
qt =
1
1 + 11−φ
2γ
1−2γ
st. (2.11)
Real Exchange Rates and Quantities: Starting from the labor supply and labor demand
equations, one can derive the relationship between the consumption differential and the real ex-
change rate, and the relationship between the output differential and the real exchange rate as
follows:
ct − c∗t = −γκcqqt,
yt − y∗t = γκyqqt, (2.12)
where κcq =
2θ(1−α)(1−γ)
1−2γ +ν+
ν+φ
1−φ
2γ
1−2γ
1+σν[1+ 1
1−φ
2γ
1−2γ ]
1
1−φ
2
1−2γ and κ
y
q = σνκcq − ν+φ1−φ 21−2γ .
Interest Rates and Countries’ Constraint: The log-linearization of the home and foreign
budget constraint, the demand for home-currency bond, and the demand for foreign-currency bond
are shown as:
βbt+1 − bt = nxt, (2.13)
it = Et[σ∆ct+1 + ∆pt+1],
βb∗t+1 − b∗t = nx∗t ,
i∗t = Et[σ∆c
∗
t+1 + ∆p
∗
t+1]. (2.14)
Replacing c∗t+1− ct+1 = γκcqqt+1 and p∗t+1−pt+1 = − 21−φ γ1−2γ qt+1, one can express the interest rate
differential in terms of the expected exchange rate return:
i∗t − it = γλ1Et∆st+1, (2.15)
where λ1 =
σκcq− 11−φ 21−2γ
1+ 1
1−φ
2γ
1−2γ
. The home budget constraint relates with the exchange rate as:
βbt+1 − bt = γλ2st, (2.16)
where λ2 =
κnxq
1+ 1
1−φ
2γ
1−2γ
, κnxq =
[
2θ(1− α) 1−γ1−2γ + 2(1− γ)α− 1− γκyq
]
1
1−2γ , and κ
y
q = σνκcq −
ν+φ
1−φ
2
1−2γ . The equation states that the change in net foreign position over time is related to the
exchange rate.
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UIP Condition: The financial market clearing conditions require Bt+1 + Nt+1 + Dt+1 = 0
and B∗t+1 +N∗t+1 +D∗t+1 = 0. Given that noise traders and arbitrageurs hold zero-capital position,
Nt+1 = −StN∗t+1 and Dt+1 = −StD∗t+1, the net foreign assets of the home country equal the net
liabilities of foreign: Bt+1 = −StB∗t+1. Replacing the demand by noise traders, equation (2.8),
and the demand by arbitrageurs, equation (2.9), and using Bt+1 = −StB∗t+1, I have the following
market clearing condition:
Bt+1
St
= n(eψt − 1) + mEtR˜t+1
ωvartR˜t+1
.
From this equation, I can derive for the UIP condition as follows:5
i∗t − it + Et∆st+1 = χ1bt+1 − χ2ψt, (2.17)
where χ1 =
P¯ Y¯
m/(ωσ2e)
, χ2 =
n/β
m/(ωσ2e)
.
In the model with no financial sector, the deviation from UIP is only driven by the financial
shock (ψt). In the model with financial sector, the deviation from the UIP not only comes from
the financial shock, but also the demand for home currency bonds. This introduces a country’s net
foreign asset position as one of the determinants of the currency risk premium. Equation (2.17)
states that the excess return on foreign deposits depends on two forces. The first one is an exogenous
shock on the demand for foreign bonds, ψt. The second one is an endogenous force through a state
variable in the model known as the net foreign asset position of the home households, bt+1, reflecting
the demand for home currency bonds. The excess return on foreign deposits is decreasing with the
financial shock, but increasing with a positive net foreign asset position of the home country.
5The derivation is shown in Appendix B.2
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2.3.2 The Estimation Model
I develop the model for estimation from the finding of equation (2.17) where I can relate the
variables of interest, namely, the interest rate differential, the real exchange rate and the net
foreign asset, and blend them together in an estimation model. First, I substitute for the interest
differential, equation (2.15), in the UIP equation (2.17) to derive:
Et∆st+1 =
χ1
1 + γλ1
bt+1 − χ2
1 + γλ1
ψt. (2.18)
Define the expected excess return on foreign bonds or the risk premium as Etρt+1 = i
∗
t − it +
Et∆st+1. Equation (2.16) relates the net foreign asset position and the exchange rate, and (2.11)
connects the relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the real exchange. Combining
together with (2.18), I can derive Etρt+1 as follows:
Etρt+1 = (i
∗
t − it) +
χ1
1 + γλ1
κnxq
β
qt +
χ1
1 + γλ1
1
β
bt − χ2
1 + γλ1
ψt. (2.19)
The currency risk premium thus depends on the interest rate differential, the real exchange rate,
the net foreign asset position of the home country, and the demand for the foreign asset shock. Let
t+1 = ρt+1 − Etρt+1, equation (2.19) leads to the estimation equation as:
ρt+1 = α+ β0(i
∗
t − it) + β1qt + β2bt + εt+1, (2.20)
where εt+1 = − χ21+γλ2ψt + t+1.
2.4 Empirical Estimation
In this section, I explain about data used in the study. Then, the method of estimation is
discussed. Lastly, I show and analyze the empirical results.
2.4.1 Data Analysis
The data used in this study is quarterly and spans in 1980Q1–2016Q3. The sample covers
7 countries (currencies): Australia (AUD), Canada (CAD), Japan (JPY), New Zealand (NZD),
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Norway (NOK), Switzerland (CHF), and United Kingdom (GBP). I assume that all these individual
countries are home countries and the United States is the foreign country. Exchange rates are end-
of-quarter values. All exchange rates are expressed as the home currency per unit of USD. An
increase in the exchange rate means that the home currency is depreciating (the foreign currency
is appreciating). I obtain data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS), provided by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This data covers exchange rates, price indexes, interest rates,
and gross domestic products. For the nominal interest rate, I use the three months treasury bill
interest rates.
2.4.1.1 A Measure of External Imbalances
The log-linearized of demand for home currency bonds in the theoretical model, denoted by bt,
will be captured by a country’s net foreign asset position (NFA). The NFA position of a country
measures the difference in the value of foreign assets that the country owns and the value of domestic
assets owned by foreigners. If a country has positive (negative) NFA, it is a creditor (debtor) to
the rest of the world. NFA can be calculated as the sum of foreign assets held by a country less its
foreign liabilities. As in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007), NFA is computed by:
NFA = (Foreign Direct Investment Assets-Foreign Direct Investment Liabilities)
+(Portfolio Equity and Debt Assets-Portfolio Equity and Debt Liabilities)
+(Foreign Reserves).
The accumulation identity for NFA between periods t and t+ 1 is:
NFAt+1 ≡ Rt+1(NFAt +NXt),
where NFAt is the difference between gross external assets At and gross external liabilities Lt; NXt
is net exports which is defined as exports Xt minus imports Mt of goods and services; and Rt+1 is
the return on the NFA portfolio. A country’s NFA improves with positive net exports. Also, part
of the adjustment of the external imbalances occurs through the return on the NFA portfolio.
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The actual data of NFA/GDP for each country, shown in Figure 2.1–2.8, has either upward or
downward trends. To exploit this data in the estimation, we need to remove the trend component,
and focus on its stationary part. Gourinchas and Rey (2007) study the log-linearization of the
external constraint and separate the data into the trend component and the stationary component.
The approximation of the external constraint around its trend satisfies
nfat+1 ≈ 1
ρ
nfat + rt+1 + ∆nxt+1, (2.21)
where
nfat ≡ |µa|at − |µl|lt + |µx|xt − |µm|mt , (2.22)
∆nxt+1 ≡ |µx|∆xt+1 − |µm|∆mt+1 − ∆wt+1,
rt+1 ≡ µ
a
|µa| rˆt+1,
ρ ≡ 1 + X¯ − M¯
A¯− L¯ .
Define Zt ∈ {At, Lt, Xt,Mt}. The stationary component is defined as zt ≡ ln(Zˆt/Z¯t), where
Zˆt = Zt/Wt, Z¯t is the equilibrium value of Zt/Wt, and Wt is a wealth at time t. The term nfat
in equation (2.22) is a measure of cyclical external imbalances. It is a linear combination of the
stationary components of (log) assets, liabilities, exports, and imports to wealth ratios. They are
denoted by at , 
l
t, 
x
t , and 
m
t , respectively. These stationary components are multiplied by the
weight µz. The term µa denotes the share of assets in the net foreign assets, and is calculated by
A¯
A¯−L¯ , while µ
l = µa − 1. The term µx represents the (trend) share of exports in the trade balance,
µx = X¯
X¯−M¯ , and µ
m = µx − 1.
I will use nfa defined above as a proxy for a country’s external imbalances. The data used in
this calculation is taken from IMF’s Balance of Payments (BOP) Statistics, which reports the data
by BOP components and the international investment position (IIP). To construct variables in the
stationary components, I apply the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to remove trend component out
of the data. For example, to construct at , I first calculate ln(At/GDPt), and then I apply the HP
filter to this ratio. The cycle component from the HP filter is the stationary component of the log
of the ratio of assets to wealth.
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Figure 2.1: Australia Figure 2.2: Canada Figure 2.3: Japan
Figure 2.4: New Zealand Figure 2.5: Norway Figure 2.6: Switzerland
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Figure 2.7: United Kingdom Figure 2.8: Unites States
2.4.1.2 Summary Statistics
The summary statistics are reported in Table 2.1. In this table, means, standard deviations,
minimum and maximum values of currency excess returns, interest rate differentials, real exchange
rates, and external imbalances of each country in the sample are reported. The average of the
currency excess return in the sample is quite low and negative. Most of currencies give negative
excess return except for the excess return between JPY/USD and CHF/USD. The standard devi-
ation of the currency excess return ranges between 0.0390 and 0.0635. Return volatilities are quite
high. The interest rate differentials (i∗t − it) are negative, suggesting that each country has a higher
interest rate than the US. However, the interest rates in Japan and Switzerland are lower than in
the US.
2.4.2 Estimation Method
Since the data observed are the same cross section units (countries) at different points in time,
I apply this data set with panel estimation method. In panel data analysis, an unobserved, time-
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Statistic AUS CAD JPY NZD NOK CHF GBP ALL
ρt+1 Mean −0.0189 −0.0114 0.0221 −0.0373 −0.0084 0.0049 −0.0214 −0.0098
Std.Dev. 0.0605 0.0390 0.0619 0.0598 0.0601 0.0635 0.0549 0.0601
Min −0.1808 −0.0987 −0.1292 −0.2465 −0.1811 −0.1644 −0.1724 −0.2465
Max 0.1607 0.1383 0.1927 0.1312 0.1752 0.1361 0.1763 0.1927
i∗t − it Mean −0.0195 −0.0112 0.0290 −0.0354 −0.0074 0.0123 −0.0204 −0.0072
Std.Dev. 0.0148 0.0156 0.0113 0.0233 0.0180 0.0193 0.0202 0.0267
Min −0.0674 −0.0583 0.0061 −0.1557 −0.0646 −0.0521 −0.0714 −0.1557
Max −0.0004 0.0210 0.0503 0.0021 0.0167 0.0399 0.0050 0.0503
qt Mean 0.3254 0.1749 4.5150 0.4581 1.8946 0.1350 −0.5098 1.0046
Std.Dev. 0.1901 0.1262 0.1667 0.1803 0.1323 0.1455 0.0943 1.6014
Min −0.0693 −0.0331 4.0658 0.1442 1.6556 −0.1569 −0.7324 −0.7324
Max 0.7623 0.4353 4.9414 0.9401 2.2171 0.6486 −0.2093 4.9414
nfat Mean −0.0080 −0.0511 0.0317 1.28e− 9 −0.0020 0.0013 0.0294 0.0002
Std.Dev. 0.9006 1.0742 0.7657 1.0138 0.3190 0.2750 1.1914 0.8556
Min −1.7359 −2.3765 −1.9458 −2.9096 −1.0042 −1.2105 −3.1201 −3.1201
Max 2.0535 2.6767 2.2806 2.5085 1.0432 0.6887 3.2624 3.2624
constant variable is called an unobserved effect. This unobserved effect captures features of an
individual country characteristics that are given and do not change over time. I adopt the fixed effect
framework as it allows for arbitrary dependence between the unobserved effect and the observed
explanatory variables. In this way, the fixed effect analysis is more robust than random effect
analysis.
Bilateral External Imbalances and Instrumental Variables: The definition of nfa men-
tioned before is actually called the global nfa since it measures a country’s net foreign assets and
liabilities against the rest of the world. However, what is actually desired in this study is an nfa
between two countries of interest (home and foreign), called a bilateral nfa, because the study is
framed on a two-country basis. Unfortunately, a bilateral measure of nfa is not directly observable
because data on a bilateral basis are not available. If global nfa is used in a regression for currency
excess returns between two countries, it would cause a measurement error, leading to inconsistent
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least squares estimates.6 I apply the instrument variable (IV) technique.7 The IV requires a set
of instruments that contain information of bilateral nfa that is correlated with (home) global nfa
but uncorrelated with the measurement error.
Della Corte et al. (2012) study the ability of external imbalances to predict exchange rates.
In the context of their paper, the bilateral nfa is used to predict bilateral exchange rates. Since
they can only obtain data on global external imbalances, not bilateral ones, they propose two
instruments. The first one is the global nfa for foreign country. In my study, it refers to the global
nfa of the US. The global nfa of the US is composed of two parts: the bilateral nfa between US
and home country, and the nfa between US and the rest of the world. Thus the global nfa of the
US contains information of the bilateral nfa between home and US, and also correlates with home
country global nfa. The second instrument is the bilateral detrended net exports between home
country and the US, denoted by nxit. It is constructed as a linear combination of the stationary
components of (log) bilateral exports and imports to GDP ratios. According to the identity equation
of the NFA and (2.22), the bilateral net exports should relate to the bilateral nfa.
2.4.3 Estimation Results
To investigate the influence of interest rates, real exchange rates, and external imbalances, I
study 4 models. The first model is the Fama regression, in which the currency risk premium is
described by the interest rate differential. The second model is augmented from the first one by
adding the real exchange rate as an explanatory variable. The third model regresses the currency
risk premia on interest rate differential and the external imbalance, measured by nfa. The last
regression includes all three explanatory variables: the interest rate differential, the real exchange
rate, and the external imbalance. Model 4 is a model that I propose in this study. The four models
are summarized below.
6For example, if the true model is y = xβ + u, E(u|x) = 0 implying that cov(x, u) = 0. x is unobserved, instead
we observed x∗ = x + ε. This is called measurement error. If we run an OLS regression of y = x∗β + v where
v = (u− βε), we will have endogeneity problem because cov(x∗, v) 6= 0.
7Suppose IV is x∗∗ = x+ η where η is some error. I apply the estimation method using IV, called two-stage least
square (2SLS). In the first stage regression, I regress x∗ = x∗∗γ + δ which could predict the estimate of x∗ as xˆ∗. In
the second stage, I regress y = xˆ∗β + v which would yield βˆ2SLS that is a consistent estimate of β.
71
Model 1: ρj,t+1 = β0 + β1(i
∗
t − ij,t) + j,t+1.
Model 2: ρj,t+1 = β0 + β1(i
∗
t − ij,t) + β2qj,t + j,t+1.
Model 3: ρj,t+1 = β0 + β1(i
∗
t − ij,t) + β2nfaj,t + j,t+1.
Model 4: ρj,t+1 = β0 + β1(i
∗
t − ij,t) + β2qj,t + β3nfaj,t + j,t+1.
The results of panel estimation of the four models are reported in Table 2.2. In this study,
I attempt to address the importance of the panel analysis that allows for differences in country
characteristics. Most of the previous literature consists of studies using a time series framework.
The results from the Fama regression, or Model 1, are reported in the second column. As usually
found in the literature, the estimates of β1 are positive and statistically significant. This is also
true for models 2, 3, and 4, for which the coefficients of i∗t − it are significantly positive. The
result implies that high interest rate currencies earn high returns. This finding also highlights the
well-known UIP puzzle that a higher interest rate currency tends to appreciate in value.
Dahlquist and Penasse (2016) argue that the Fama regression may be affected by an omitted
variable bias and suggest to include the real exchange rate in the regression, as appearing in Model
2. When the regression incorporates the real exchange rate, qt, I find that the coefficient of qt
is negatively significant. When the real exchange rate is high (the foreign currency is expensive
relative to the home currency), the excess return on foreign deposits tend to be lower. This finding
is consistent with Dahlquist and Penasse (2016) and Balduzzi and Chiang (2017) that real exchange
rate does predict currency returns. Furthermore, adding the real exchange rate in the regression
increases the adjusted R2 from 14.58% in the Fama model to 17.22%, an 18% increase.
In model 3, the Fama regression is augmented by nfat. While the coefficient of i
∗
t −it is positive
and statistically significant, the coefficient of nfat has no statistical significance. The adjusted R
2
values worsen in comparison to models 1 and 2. Thus, the model of currency risk premia with
interest rate differential and external imbalance does not seem to work well. It is perhaps not the
best model.
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In model 4, all three variables of interest are included in the regression. This estimation model
is directly derived from the theoretical framework. Similarly to previous results, coefficient of
i∗t − it is positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient of qt is significantly negative. The
coefficient of nfat is positive and statistically significant. It implies that currency risk premium
increases when the funding currency (home currency) is a net foreign creditor (investment currency
is a net debtor). The result supports the finding of Della Corte et al. (2016) that net debtor country
offers a currency risk premium to compensate investors who finance negative external imbalances.
The Hausman test for endogeneity rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity. I then apply the IV
method to correct for the endogeneity problem. The validity of the two instrument variables, the
global nfa of foreign country and the bilateral net exports, is tested by the Hansen test. The
Hansen J statistic suggests that both IVs are valid.
Table 2.2: Estimation Results
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.0007∗∗ 0.0665∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0938∗∗∗
(s.e) (0.0002) (0.0106) (0.0004) (0.0223)
i∗t − it 1.2000∗∗∗ 1.3266∗∗∗ 1.0318∗∗∗ 1.1004∗∗∗
(s.e) (0.0376) (0.0716) (0.0513) (0.0578)
qt −0.0635∗∗ −0.0953∗∗∗
(s.e) (0.0100) (0.0220)
nfat 0.0129 0.0283
∗∗∗
(s.e) (0.0090) (0.0068)
Adj R2 0.1458 0.1722 0.0486 0.0317
Hausman Test 4.8759∗ 8.7802∗∗
p-val [0.0873] [0.0324]
Hansen Statistic 0.003 1.996
p-val [0.9596] [0.1577]
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote significance at level 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
Cochrane (2011) finds that interest rate differentials mostly capture information about short-
term currency returns. I also investigate the long-horizon prediction of the currency excess returns
to study whether the real exchange rates and the external imbalances capture long-term currency
returns. Table 2.3 displays the results for cumulative excess return predictability over long-horizons.
For example, the cumulative excess returns is ρt,t+j =
∑j
k=1 ρt+k. The R
2 values are increasing
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with t + k horizon in every model. Moreover, the R2 of the long-horizon prediction increases the
most in model 4, from about 3% in the one-quarter horizon to about 47% in the eight-quarter
horizon. This implies that the real exchange rates, and the external imbalances strengthen the
excess return predictability over the investment horizon, and hence they can capture information
on long-term currency returns.
Table 2.3: Long Horizon Prediction
Model Variable ρt,t+1 ρt,t+2 ρt,t+4 ρt,t+8
Model 1 i∗t − it 1.2000∗∗∗ 2.2500∗∗∗ 3.9841∗∗∗ 6.0196∗∗∗
(s.e) (0.0376) (0.1085) (0.3042) (0.7057)
R2 0.1458 0.2203 0.2893 0.2655
Model 2 i∗t − it 1.3266∗∗∗ 2.5299∗∗∗ 4.5669∗∗∗ 7.2713∗∗∗
(s.e) (0.0716) (0.1692) (0.4082) (0.9303)
qt −0.0635∗∗ −0.1401∗∗∗ −0.2919∗∗∗ −0.6212∗∗∗
(s.e) (0.0100) (0.0217) (0.0421) (0.0793)
R2 0.1722 0.2744 0.3871 0.4402
Model 3 i∗t − it 1.0318∗∗∗ 2.0636∗∗∗ 4.1145∗∗∗ 6.7405∗∗∗
(s.e) (0.0513) (0.1117) (0.3092) (0.7021)
nfat 0.0129 −0.0029 −0.0579 −0.1273
(s.e) (0.0090) (0.0209) (0.0411) (0.0685)
R2 0.0486 0.1799 0.2403 0.1482
Model 4 i∗t − it 1.1004∗∗∗ 2.1790∗∗∗ 4.2745∗∗∗ 7.0539∗∗∗
(s.e) (0.0578) (0.0905) (0.2521) (0.6193)
qt −0.0953∗∗∗ −0.1867∗∗∗ −0.3321∗∗∗ −0.6722∗∗∗
(s.e) (0.0220) (0.0446) (0.0655) (0.1164)
nfat 0.0283
∗∗∗ 0.0313∗ 0.0109 0.0117
(s.e) (0.0068) (0.0179) (0.0232) (0.0552)
R2 0.0317 0.0983 0.3738 0.4736
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote significance at level 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
2.4.4 Forecasting
So far the results show that, apart from interest rate differentials, real exchange rates and
external imbalances are significant factors in determining currency excess returns. Now, I try to
answer which of the four models is the best in forecasting currency excess returns. In this section,
I will gauge the best model by its ability to forecast the currency excess returns out-of-sample.
First, I keep the data from 1980Q1–2001Q4 as sample periods. I run regressions for each model
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and predict currency returns recursively over an expanding window from 2002Q1 onwards. Then,
I evaluate the forecast by comparing the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) for each model.
The model with lower MSPE is best.
Furthermore, I assess the statistical significance of the MSPE using the Clark and West (2007)
method. The idea is to use the point estimate of the difference between the MSPEs of the two
models, adjusting for the noise associated with the nested model’s forecast. Forecast evaluation
compares the MSPE of the parsimonious model (or the benchmark model) with a larger alternative
that nests the parsimonious model. Under the null hypothesis that additional parameters in the
alternative model are not useful for prediction, the MSPE of the parsimonious model should be
smaller than that of the alternative model.
Let model 0 be the parsimonious model and model a be the larger model that nests model 0.
Model a is nested in model 0 if model a reduces to model 0 when some parameters in model a are
set to zero. I am interested in forecasting excess returns 1-step ahead. The period t forecasts of yt+1
from the two models are yˆ0t,t+1 and yˆ
a
t,t+1. The forecasting errors are yt+1− yˆ0t,t+1 and yt+1− yˆat,t+1.
The statistic for difference MSPE-adjusted defines as:
fˆt+1 = (yt+1 − yˆ0t,t+1)2 − [(yt+1 − yˆat,t+1)2 − (yˆ0t,t+1 − yˆat,t+1)2].
The null hypothesis is that the MSPE of the benchmark model is lower than or equal to the MSPE
of model a. The alternative is that model a has smaller MSPE. I test this hypothesis using t-test
on the average of fˆt+1.
Many studies of stock return predictability show that predictive regressions of stock returns
performed poorly out-of-sample. Welch and Goyal (2008) find that the historical average excess
stock return forecasts future excess returns better than regressions of excess returns on predictor
variables, i.e. dividend-price ratio, earning-price ratio, and book-to-market ratio. I test the ability
of the historical average against models 1–4 in forecasting currency excess returns. Table 2.4 reports
the t-statistics and p-values in testing significance of difference MSPE-adjusted. The null hypothesis
is that the historical average model has lower or equal MSPE to each individual model 1–4. There
is statistical significance that models 1, 2, 3, and 4 beat the historical average currency returns in
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Norway, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Only models 2 and 4 perform better than the historical
average model in Canada. The results show that models 1–4 cannot beat the historical average
for Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. The equally weighted portfolio of the seven currencies
is referred as “Portfolio”. As seen, judging from the portfolio, models 2 and 4 perform better in
forecasting currency returns than the historical average. Adding the real exchange rates to interest
rate differentials, and adding both real exchange rates and external imbalances to interest rate
differentials would help forecasting currency excess returns out-of-sample better than using the
historical average of currency excess returns to forecast its future.
Table 2.4: Testing Historical Averages Against Models 1–4
Historical Average against AUD CAD JPY NZD NOK CHF GBP Portfolio
Model 1 -0.2666 0.7010 0.0139 -1.1501 2.2774∗∗ 1.5838∗ 2.9711∗∗ 0.3279
p-value 0.6051 0.2416 0.4945 0.8749 0.0114 0.0566 0.0015 0.3715
Model 2 1.0554 1.5924∗ 0.7175 0.7560 2.7742∗∗ 2.1209∗∗ 3.7549∗∗∗ 1.8580∗∗
p-value 0.1456 0.0556 0.2365 0.2248 0.0028 0.0170 0.0000 0.0326
Model 3 -1.5295 0.1650 -0.4537 0.0007 2.3074∗∗ 1.6722∗∗ 2.2629∗∗ -0.0669
p-value 0.9369 0.4345 0.6750 0.4997 0.0105 0.0472 0.0118 0.5267
Model 4 0.0976 2.5518∗∗ -0.1338 0.2498 3.0794∗∗ 1.9476∗∗ 2.5554∗∗ 1.8574∗∗
p-value 0.4611 0.0054 0.5532 0.4014 0.0010 0.0257 0.0053 0.0316
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote significance at level 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
Since models 2, 3, and 4 are nested in model 1, I also test for the ability of the out-of-sample
currency returns forecast of model 1 against these nested models. This is to determine whether
adding variables, e.g. real exchange rates, and external imbalances, together with interest rate
differentials help forecast currency excess returns better than using interest rate differentials alone.
The results are shown in Table 2.5. Adding real exchange rates into the model of currency returns
with interest rate differentials increases the forecasting ability of the portfolio at the 10% level
of significance. But adding external imbalances alone is not statistically significantly better than
model 1. For each individual country, only Switzerland exhibits statistical significance that model
2 performs better than model 1. That is, only considering the whole portfolio and Switzerland
individually, the model addition with real exchange rates performs better in forecasting currency
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returns using interest rate differentials alone. Model 3 is not significantly better than model 1 for
all countries, including the portfolio. These results suggest that adding external imbalances does
not help improve the ability to forecast currency excess return. However, model 4 beats model 1
for 3 countries: Canada, Norway, and Switzerland, including the portfolio of seven currencies. This
implies that to increase the ability to forecast future currency excess returns, it is necessary to add
both real exchange rates and external imbalances to interest rate differentials.
Table 2.5: Testing Model 1 Against Models 2–4
Model 1 against AUD CAD JPY NZD NOK CHF GBP Portfolio
Model 2 1.0704 0.8852 0.7091 1.2640 1.0649 1.6466∗∗ 0.7850 1.4570∗
p-value 0.1422 0.1880 0.2391 0.1031 0.1435 0.0498 0.2161 0.0726
Model 3 -0.9151 0.6802 -1.205 1.2017 0.9890 0.5023 0.4162 0.2689
p-value 0.8199 0.2482 0.8859 0.1147 0.1613 0.3077 0.3386 0.3940
Model 4 0.0114 2.4763∗∗ -1.0086 0.0136 1.9517∗∗ 1.7875∗∗ 0.7561 1.5367∗
p-value 0.4954 0.0066 0.8434 0.4946 0.0255 0.0369 0.2248 0.0622
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote significance at level 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
With interest rate differentials, does adding both real exchange rates and external imbalances
increase excess return predictability over the models that only add either real exchange rates or
external imbalances? To answer this question, I perform a test by adjusting the MSPE of model
2 against model 4, and model 3 against model 4. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 report these results. I find
that the null hypothesis is rejected only for Canada and Norway. That is, model 4 is better than
model 2. So it is the case for Canada and Norway that the model adding both real exchange
rates and external imbalances to interest rate differentials outperforms the model with interest rate
differentials adding real exchange rates alone. For other countries that do not reject the null, these
results imply that the model adding both variables does not perform better than the model adding
real exchange rates alone in forecasting currency returns. In comparison with model 3 and 4, I find
that adding both variables to interest rate differentials outperforms the model with interest rate
differentials adding external imbalances alone for Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and the portfolio
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of seven currencies. Model 4, adding both variables, does not perform better in forecasting currency
returns than model 3 (with external imbalances) for the rest of the countries.
In conclusion, model 4 outperforms model 1, suggesting that, apart from interest rate differen-
tials, we should add both real exchange rates and external imbalances in predicting currency excess
returns. Models 2 and 3 are not statistically better than model 1. However, there is no strong
evidence that adding both real exchange rates and external imbalances to the model of currency
excess returns with interest rate differentials would perform better than the one with interest rate
differentials and real exchange rates. Model 4 is better than model 2 for only two out of seven
countries. It is also true for three countries and the overall portfolio that the model adding for
both real exchange rates and external imbalances would be better than the model of currency excess
returns with interest rate differentials and external imbalances. Therefore, adding only one more
factor to interest rate differentials does not help improve forecasting. To forecast currency excess
returns, it would be best to have all three variables: interest rate differentials, real exchange rates,
and external imbalances together with.
Table 2.6: Testing Model 2 Against Model 4
Model 2 against AUD CAD JPY NZD NOK CHF GBP Portfolio
Model 4 -1.3642 2.2364∗∗ -2.6910 -2.1275 2.1753∗∗ 0.9830 0.6653 0.8126
p-value 0.9137 0.0127 0.9964 0.9833 0.0148 0.1628 0.2529 0.2082
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote significance at level 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
Table 2.7: Testing Model 3 Against Model 4
Model 3 against AUD CAD JPY NZD NOK CHF GBP Portfolio
Model 4 0.3381 1.9094∗∗ -0.9598 -0.5921 1.7839∗∗ 1.6899∗∗ 0.3458 1.6753∗∗
p-value 0.3677 0.0281 0.8314 0.7231 0.0372 0.0455 0.3647 0.0469
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ denote significance at level 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
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2.5 Conclusion
The violation of UIP suggests that interest rate differentials have a positive relationship with
currency excess returns. The high interest rate currency offers high excess returns. In this chapter, I
study the role of economic variables other than interest rate differentials on currency excess returns.
I focus on the role of real exchange rates and country’s external imbalances. I draw attention to the
importance of these two variables by means of a dynamic general equilibrium model of exchange
rate determination proposed by Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017). I then develop estimation models
and assess their ability to forecast future currency excess returns.
I find that real exchange rates and external imbalances are important factors in explaining
variation in currency excess returns. Real exchange rates are negative related to currency excess
returns. When real exchange rates are high, excess returns on foreign deposits are low because the
foreign currency is expensive compared to the home currency. Net debtor countries provide high
currency risk premia because investors need to be compensated to be willing to finance negative
external imbalances. In terms of future excess returns forecasting, I find that the model that incor-
porates both real exchange rates and external imbalances to interest rate differentials outperforms
the model that forecasting currency excess returns using interest rate differentials alone. Adding
only real exchange rates or only external imbalances does not help forecasting ability that much. It
would be best for a model predicting currency excess returns to involve interest rate differentials,
real exchange rates, and external imbalances. Not one or two factors, but all these three variables
together with would produce the best model for currency excess returns determination.
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CHAPTER 3. EXCHANGE RATE AND UNCOVERED INTEREST RATE
PARITY PUZZLE IN A LONG-RUN RISK MODEL
This study employs the idea that consumption growth prospects contain a long-run risk compo-
nent with stochastic volatility in order to explain the exchange rate and deviations from uncovered
interest rate parity (UIP). The model relates exchange rate, interest rate, and risk premium with
a stochastic discount factor. I show that theoretically the stochastic volatility of both short-run
and long-run shocks account for a negative UIP coefficient, which suggests the UIP violation. I
incorporate monetary policy into the model by specifying the interest rate to contain long-run risk
through the Taylor rule. Then I study the effect of both level and volatility shocks, on exchange
rate and currency risk premium. I find that the specification of the interest rate rule matters for
a magnitude change of the variables of interest in response to shocks but it does not matter for a
directional change of these variables. The impact of changes in level shocks and volatility shocks
on the exchange rate and the risk premium are different. A decrease in short- and long-run con-
sumption growth level shocks, and an increase in short- and long-run consumption growth volatility
shocks lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate. An increase in consumption volatility shock
would also raise the excess return on foreign deposits. In terms of monetary policy, an increase in
the policy shock leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate and a deviation from UIP in the
form of positive excess returns on foreign currency.
3.1 Introduction
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) relates short-term interest rates and currency depreciation rates
in the sense that, when investors are risk neutral, any cross-country differences in interest rates are
associated with the expected exchange rate depreciation. The standard asset-pricing model usually
assumes that UIP holds, and an investor is indifferent to return on deposits between two countries.
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However, many literature find that the model is unable to demonstrate the UIP condition, as
the exchange rates of high interest rate countries do not depreciate enough to offset interest rate
differentials. The seminal work by Fama (1984) evidences the violation of UIP. He actually suggests
that currency appreciates in response to a rise in interest rate. The UIP puzzle has led researchers,
for example, Backus et al. (2001), Alvarez et al. (2009), Verdelhan (2010), Colacito and Croce
(2011, 2013), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013), to model this deviation through a risk premium that
causes a wedge between interest rate differentials and the expected depreciation of exchange rates.
This risk premium is paid for a time-varying risk in the sense that high interest rate currencies pay
positive premiums.
The deviation from UIP can be accounted for in terms of compensation for risk. Investors
require a premium in order to hold a risky asset. So there will be an excess return for holding this
risky asset relatively to other assets. To be more concrete, a domestic investor chooses to invest in
bonds denominated in home or foreign currency. For this investor, the return on the foreign bond
in terms of domestic currency is risky because exchange rate in the next period is not known today.
The currency risk premium compensates the investor who holds the foreign bond for taking on the
exchange rate risk. It is interesting to examine how variation in risk over time affects exchange rate
movements and hence currency risk premium. Alvarez et al. (2009) find that risk premium varies
over time because the degree of asset market segmentation varies over time in response to stochastic
shocks. Benigno et al. (2001) examines the role of nominal and real stochastic volatilities (risks) for
the behavior of exchange rate. They find that volatility shocks are essential for the equilibrium of
exchange rate and interest rate. First, they empirically show that an increase in nominal volatility,
e.g. volatility of monetary policy shocks and volatility of inflation target shocks, would induce the
exchange rate to appreciate. The intuition is that if a currency is a good hedge for a particular
risk, the demand for this currency rises in response to an increase in this risk. Then its exchange
rate appreciates. However, an increase in real risk, e.g. productivity shock volatility, would induce
an exchange rate depreciation. From the UIP perspective, an increase in nominal volatility leads to
an increase in the excess return of foreign short-term bonds. Then they develop a New Keynesian
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model that allows for a general specification of preferences as in Epstein and Zin (1989); nominal
price rigidities as in Calvo’s (1983) model, and stochastic volatility in the exogenous processes of
the economy to support their findings. The important part is the specification of monetary policy
through interest rate rules and the presence of a stochastic volatility term that play a vital role to
create a negative coefficient in an UIP regression.
Bansal and Yaron (2004) introduce risk in the long-run - a highly persistent variation in expected
consumption growth - to explain puzzles in financial markets. The economic channels that drive
financial markets are fluctuations in the long-run growth prospects of the economy and economic
uncertainty through consumption volatility. These dynamics, together with Epstein and Zin’s pref-
erences, successfully explain key asset markets phenomena, namely, equity premium puzzle, asset
price volatility puzzle, and return predictability. In the model, financial markets dislike economic
uncertainty and better long-run growth prospects raise asset prices. In the foreign exchange mar-
ket, Colacito and Croce (2011, 2013), and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) extend the long-run risk
model to a two-country setup. The model is also successful to explain issues in the international
financial markets, e.g. the UIP puzzle, and the Backus and Smith anomaly concerning the low
correlation between consumption differentials and exchange rates.
Based on the success of the long-run risk model in explaining UIP puzzle, I employ the model
as in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013)’s long-run risk model to study
the behavior of the exchange rate and the risk premium. The distinction of the model is that
the consumption process is specified to contain a small persistence component (long-run risk) with
stochastic volatility. Then I study the effect of the stochastic volatilities or risks on the exchange
rate and the currency risk premium. Risks in the model are, for example, short- and long-run
consumption risk, and monetary policy risk.
Fluctuations in nominal interest rate differentials primarily account for fluctuations in time-
varying risk premium. If the nominal interest rate is driven by monetary policy, it calls for the
theory of how the policy changes affect the risk premium. Therefore, unlike previous literature on
the long-run risk, I address the specification of monetary policy through interest rate in terms of
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the Taylor rule. This allows me to investigate how each of the policy specifications could affect the
exchange rate and the risk premium. I focus on three rules. The first one is the standard Taylor
rule that the nominal interest rate is described by inflation and long-run risk. I called it “Basic
Rule”. The second one augments the first one by adding the lag of interest rate so that the interest
rate depends also on the past value. This is an “Interest Rate Smoothing Rule”. The last one is the
basic rule expanded to add the exchange rate. The “Exchange Rate Rule” is a modified Taylor rule
incorporating the exchange rate to account for an open-economy context. The impulse-response
analysis reveals that the specification of the interest rate rule matters for a magnitude change of
the variables of interest in response to shocks in the model but it does matter for a directional
change of these variables.
I follow Backus et al. (2010) procedure to relate the stochastic discount factor to the exchange
rate, the interest rate, and the risk premium. I firstly derive an analytic expression for the exchange
rate depreciation, interest rate and risk premium; and show that the model can produce a negative
UIP coefficient which suggests a deviation from UIP. Theoretically, violation of UIP is explained by
the presence of the stochastic volatility of short-run, long-run consumption, and monetary-policy
shock volatility.
According to the impulse-response analysis, I find that a short-run shock could deviate a depre-
ciation rate and risk premium for a short period of time, whereas a long-run shock would have more
persistent impact on those variables. The responses to changes in level shocks and volatility shocks
are different. A decrease in short- and long-run consumption growth level shocks, and an increase
in short- and long-run consumption growth volatility shocks induce the exchange rate to appreciate.
Regarding the currency risk premium, a change in level shock in short- and long-run consumption
growth has no impact on the excess return on foreign deposits. This is possible because the effect
of shocks on the exchange rate depreciation and the interest rate differential is cancelling out. A
consumption growth level shock alters the depreciation rate, while the interest rate differential
automatically adjusts according to the interest rate rule. However, an increase in a volatility shock
would raise the excess return on foreign deposits. An agent is risk-averse and dislikes a fall in
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economic growth or an increase in uncertainty as they reduce the equilibrium consumption and
asset prices. This so contributes to a decrease in price of the foreign currency, inducing the home
currency to appreciate. Also, it requires a positive premium to hold a risky currency to compensate
high consumption growth risk in the markets. In terms of monetary policy, an increase in policy
shock causes an appreciation of the exchange rate and a deviation from UIP in the form of positive
currency risk premium.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, I document related literature
about long-run risk. Then I discuss monetary policy as represented by the Taylor rules, and
the relationship between the stochastic discount factor, the exchange rate, and the currency risk
premium. In section (3.3), I detail the economic model, then present the solution of the model and
discuss its theoretical result in regards to the UIP puzzle. Section (3.4) explains the calibration
method and the parameterization of the model. I also show the ability of the model to replicate
the population moments of the main variables. The analysis of the impulse-response is performed
in this section. I also discuss how the main variables are affected by the shocks. Lastly, conclusions
are laid out in section (3.5).
3.2 Related Literature
3.2.1 Long-Run Risk Literature
There are many features in the asset markets that are puzzling from a theoretical perspective.
For example, the equity premium puzzle by Mehra and Prescott (1985) finds it is hard to justify
a large risk premium with a low risk-free rate. The literature on variance bounds, Shiller (1981),
also encounters a problem justifying an excessive market volatility. In the foreign exchange market,
Fama (1984) shows evidence of the violation of UIP. Given these difficulties, researchers have
attempted to solve the puzzles.
The studies concerned with risk premium can be categorized into two branches. Research
in the first branch, e.g. Alvarez and Jermann (2001), and Alvarez et al. (2009), examines a
limited-participation model in which the consumption of the marginal investor is variable while the
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aggregate consumption is essentially constant. Since the aggregate consumption is constant, it has
no role in determining pricing risk. The risk is then priced by the marginal investor. Variation
in risk over time is important to investigate movements in asset prices. In their model, the asset
market is segmented in the sense that only a fraction of the model’s agents choose to participate
in the market. The risk premium is varying over time because the degree of market segmentation
varies over time and responses endogenously to stochastic shocks. The other branch of research
plays with utility functions that produce the marginal utility of consumption to be sensitive to
small variations in consumption. Since the actual consumption data contains only small variation,
a representative agent in a model with standard utility functions cannot account for large and
variable risk premiums. The work of Bansal and Yaron (2004) employs Epstein and Zin (1989)
preferences in the long-run risk model to explain key asset market phenomena. Their model can
justify the equity premium puzzle, high asset price volatility, and return predictability. Verdelhan
(2010) applies the consumption model with external habit formation to explain the counter-cyclical
risk premium, and the model simulation results provide successful match with key stylized facts in
the asset market. My paper is a part of the second branch, and the model is developed based on
the long-run risk model that adopts the Epstein and Zin preferences, which is more like the seminal
work of Bansal and Yaron (2004) (hereafter BY).
The idea of the long-run risk model begins from the observation that the drift in log consump-
tion growth is itself a highly persistent stationary process with low conditional volatility but high
unconditional volatility. BY call this component long-run risk. In the model, they represent this
risk by the conditional mean of consumption growth because it is not constant but volatile over
time. BY mimic the specification for consumption to be consistent with observed consumption
data. In their model the main economic channels that drive financial markets are fluctuations in
the long-run growth prospects of the economy, i.e. consumption growth and dividend growth rates,
and the level of economic uncertainty, i.e. consumption volatility.
In the first channel, consumption growth is specified to contain a small persistent expected con-
sumption growth rate component (long-run risk component). This component captures long-run
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risk because current shocks to expected growth change expectations about future economic growth
not only for short horizons but also for the very long run. The persistence in the expected growth
is important as it affects the volatility of asset prices and also determines the risk premium. To
account for a large risk premium and volatility of asset prices, BY show that the persistence in
expected growth rate has to be large, close to 0.98. The second channel involves time varying
economic uncertainty. If consumption growth residuals were i.i.d., the scaled long run variance
of consumption or the variance ratio would be flat across different horizon. Instead, BY show
that the variance ratio of realized consumption increases with time horizon. That is, agents face
a larger aggregate consumption volatility at longer horizons. This increase in aggregate consump-
tion volatility requires a sizeable compensation if the agents prefer early resolution of uncertainty
about the consumption path. To allow for time-varying risk premia, the conditional volatility of
consumption is modeled to be stochastic, which is distinct from models where growth rates are
i.i.d. Fluctuations in the conditional volatility of consumption directly affect asset prices. Since a
rise in uncertainty leads to a fall in asset prices, shocks to consumption volatility involve a positive
risk premium. According to this specification of the economy growth rate, agents dislike a decrease
in the long-run growth or an increase in volatility components that will lower consumption, wealth
and asset prices. This makes holding equity quite risky. Therefore, it needs to have high risk
compensation in equity market. They also show that their specification for consumption growth,
which incorporates the high persistent component and whose conditional volatility is time-varying,
generates results that are consistent with the real world data and helps justifying many puzzling
aspects in the asset market.
Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences play a critical role in the model. While in standard utility
functions, there is a one-to-one relationship between the degree of risk aversion and the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution (IES), Epstein and Zin preferences disentangle those two parameters.
In the BY model, agents prefer an early resolution of uncertainty; that is, the risk aversion is larger
than the reciprocal of the IES. Specifically, the degree of risk aversion is around 10 and the IES are
larger than 1. For a large degree of risk aversion, agents dislike shocks in the long-run and require a
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large premium for bearing those risks. An IES greater than 1 is critical for capturing the observed
negative correlation between consumption volatility and price-dividend ratios, and are required for
the long run and volatility risks to carry to a positive risk premium.
There is controversy about the existence of the long-run risk component in consumption growth.
Observed consumption growth seems to be i.i.d.. This implies that any predictable variation
component is small and difficult to detect. However, BY believe that only a small component is
enough. And it can be shown that the long-run consumption risk can have quantitatively important
implication on asset prices if investors have recursive preferences.
Many studies employ different techniques to show for the existence of a long-run component in
consumption. BY choose parameters to match the annual moments of consumption and dividend
growth. They characterize the equilibrium stochastic discount factor, the short- and long-run
market prices, and volatility risks. The model matches the low risk-free rate, and explains the equity
premium puzzle and the high asset price volatility. They also show that consumption volatility is
an important source of systematic risk that relates to a time-varying risk premium. Bansal et
al. (2005) also find that the negative relation between consumption volatility and asset prices (an
increase in consumption volatility lowers price-dividend ratios) is robust, which is highlighted by
the IES greater than 1 in the model. They also confirm that consumption volatility is an important
risk channel. Bansal et al. (2007) test the model using the efficient and generalized method of
moments, and find the support of the long-run risk model. Bansal et al. (2012) apply a vector
autoregression (VAR) to show that consumption growth is highly predictable at both short- and
long-horizons in the long-run risk model. Their results support the view that there is a small long-
run predictable component in consumption growth, and consumption volatility is time-varying.
Besides, the long-run risk model can account for key properties in the asset market. The work
by Hansen et al. (2008) demonstrates how long-run risks are priced in cash flows valuation. A
VAR model is used to identify the macroeconomic shocks to be priced. Hansen and Sargent (2007)
show that the posterior distribution of a representative consumer behave in a way that supports a
long-run risk model, not an i.i.d. consumption model.
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In a one-country model, consumption growth is not volatile enough to explain the excess re-
turns. In a two-country model, consumption growths do not covary enough to capture returns
and exchange rate movements. Colacito and Croce (2011) extend the long-run risks model to a
two-country setup to explain international risk sharing and exchange rate volatility. With cross-
country-correlated long-run risks and Epstein and Zin preferences, there is a link between long-run
growth prospects and exchange rate movements. The way exchange rate enters the model is through
a relationship where the growth rate of exchange rate would equal the difference of the log stochas-
tic discount factors for foreign and home currency. Ultimately, the dynamics of the exchange rate is
driven by the short- and long-run shocks to international consumption. In the economy, agents fear
about uncertainty in the long-run perspective of the economy because shocks to future consump-
tion growth affect their marginal utility of consumption today. They also find that the long-run
components of consumption growth are highly persistent and highly correlated across countries.
Their correlation increases over time as the volatility of exchange rate growth decreases. The
model successfully explains international finance puzzles, for instance, the high correlation across
international stock markets despite the lack of correlation of fundamentals.
Colacito and Croce (2013) extend the model into general equilibrium with a two-country, two-
good economy with Epstein and Zin preferences and correlated long-run growth prospects. They
show that the model can account for the Backus–Smith anomaly, that there is a low correlation
between consumption differentials and the exchange rate, and the forward premium anomaly in
which the high interest rate currency tends to appreciate. Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) also
develop two-country long-run risks model with time-varying volatilities of expected growth and
inflation. The model can capture the violation of the uncovered interest rate parity. In their
model, risk premium is driven by the volatilities of expected growth and expected inflation. In high
volatility periods, interest rates are low and the risk premium on foreign bonds is high. Due to
the volatility channel, exchange rates are predicted by the interest rate differentials, in that high
interest rate currency is expected to appreciate.
90
Colacito et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence that there is strong heterogeneous exposure
to global growth news shocks. They developed the model under a framework of multiple countries,
and multiple consumption goods whose supplies relate both global and local short- and long-run
shocks. They find that Colacito and Croce (2013)’s model fails to replicate the risk premium in the
cross section of interest rate–sorted currencies when the long-run shocks are homogeneous exposure
to global shock. Thus, they introduce heterogeneous exposure to growth news shocks in the cross
section of countries in a way that is consistent with their empirical evidence. These heterogenous
shocks capture a mix of fundamental differences across countries such as size, commodity intensity,
monetary policy rules, and financial development. However, none of the long-run risk literature
relates monetary policy and the deviation from UIP.
3.2.2 Monetary Policy Represented by Interest Rate Rules
Backus et al. (2010) investigate how monetary policy affects the stochastic discount factor, and
how the exchange rate derived from the stochastic discount factor explains the UIP puzzle. The
specification of the Taylor rule they considered is
it = τ + τpipit + τxxt,
i∗t = τ
∗ + τ∗pipi
∗
t + τ
∗
xx
∗
t ,
where τ, τpi, τx, τ
∗, τ∗pi , τ∗x are policy parameters,1 it is nominal interest rate, pit is inflation rate, and
xt is consumption growth. Variables with asterisk are for the foreign counterparts. They find
that when foreign monetary policy is relatively procyclical, as τx < τ
∗
x ; and foreign policy being
relatively accommodative to inflation, as τpi > τ
∗
pi , the foreign currency is risky and it needs to
compensate the risk by having positive expected excess returns.
The authors show that the UIP violation, indicated by a negative UIP coefficient, relies on the
Epstein and Zin preferences parameters in which agents prefer early resolution of uncertainty (the
coefficient of risk aversion is greater than 1 and is larger than the reciprocal of the IES). They claim
that, however, this conclusion is not a general feature of this Taylor rule. The conclusion about
1τpi, τx, τ
∗
pi , and τ
∗
x are positive. τ and τ
∗ can be either positive or negative.
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the UIP coefficient also depends on the rule implied in the model. For example, for a Taylor rule
with interest rate smoothing, in which the interest rate depends on both current and past values, a
negative UIP coefficient can be achieved if volatility of the policy shock is less autocorrelated than
the value of interest rate smoothing policy parameter. They elaborate that some form of the Taylor
rule cannot deliver the UIP coefficient to be negative. In their paper, they use a simple setting rule
where the nominal interest rate relates to the inflation and consumption growth to articulate their
main point about monetary policy and risk premium. Benigno et al. (2012) also point out that
the rule depending solely on the inflation gap cannot deliver a negative UIP coefficient; however,
the rule with interest rate smoothing can. This is because the negative dependence on the lagged
interest rate would reduce the UIP coefficient, and finally turns it negative.
The simple Taylor rule, i.e., that the central bank adjusts interest rates in response to deviations
in inflation from its target and to fluctuations in the output gap, is often used to implement
monetary policy in closed economies. In an open economies context, the exchange rate is an
important part in the monetary policy transmission. For instance, the exchange rate relates to
the interest rate by UIP condition. Changes in the exchange rate affect the relative price between
domestic and foreign goods and the flow of exports and imports. They also affect the price of
foreign goods sold in another country and pass through domestic prices. However, the equilibrium
exchange rate is difficult to observe by the central bank. It is challenging for policymakers to
implement a policy that is reasonably robust to the specification of the exchange rate model. In
this study, I would like to examine the role of the exchange rate in the monetary policy rule. I
hence consider the simple Taylor rule that incorporates the exchange rate, and study how the policy
accounts for the currency risk premium.
There are several works that study the Taylor rule including the exchange rate. Yet there is
controversy about the performance of adding exchange rate to the simple Taylor rule in order to
improve economic stability. Ball (1999) studies the Taylor rule that accounts for exchange rate, and
finds that an appreciation of the exchange rate would call for monetary policy easing. The rule leads
to a better performance measured in terms of the size of real GDP fluctuations around potential
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GDP and the size of inflation fluctuations around the target. Considering a similar rule, Svensson
(2000) finds that such rule only reduces the inflation variance from 2.1% to 1.8% but increases the
output variance from 1.7% to 1.8%. The work of Benigno and Benigno (2001), Batini et al. (2003),
and Leitemo and So¨derstro¨m (2005) also find very small improvements from including exchange
rate in the Taylor rule. Taylor (2001) points out that the simple Taylor rule does have an indirect
effect of interest rate to the exchange rate since inflation and output are strongly affected by the
exchange rate. A separate response of the exchange rate will cause only marginal improvements.
Nevertheless, Froyen and Guender (2016) argue that the view that including the exchange rate has
either small or negative performance should be re-assessed since an increase in the instability in
world financial market would induce the central bank to add exchange rate stability to the list of
policy goals. They find that a small weight on real exchange rate stability in the loss function is
sufficient to improve the Taylor rule performance relative to the optimal policy. A central bank that
values real exchange rate stability and follows the Taylor rule should response to the real exchange
rate because it helps reducing relative losses.
3.2.3 Stochastic Discount Factor, Exchange Rate and Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
One of the most distinct theorems in asset pricing states that in the absence of arbitrage
opportunities, there exists a stochastic discount factor, Nt+1 such that the rate of return on any
asset j denominated in units of home currency, denoted by Rj,t, satisfies Et(Nt+1Rj,t+1) = 1.
Similarly, Et(N
∗
t+1R
∗
j,t+1) = 1 for all foreign-currency denominated returns. The returns of foreign
asset expressed in units of home currency satisfy Et(Nt+1
St+1
St
R∗j,t+1) = 1, where St is the level of
(nominal) spot exchange rate expressed in units of home currency per unit of foreign currency.
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Assuming that asset markets are complete, the log growth rate of exchange rate can be expressed
in terms of the difference between log of foreign and log of home stochastic discount factors
∆st+1 = n
∗
t+1 − nt+1, (3.1)
where the small letters st, n
∗
t+1, and nt+1 is the logarithm of St, N
∗
t+1, and Nt+1, respectively.
DefineNt+1 as a nominal stochastic discount factor andMt+1 as a real stochastic discount factor.
The nominal stochastic discount factor is defined as Nt+1 = Mt+1 exp(−pit+1). The relationship
between nominal and real variables can be expressed in terms of exchange rate depreciation as
follows:
∆st+1 = n
∗
t+1 − nt+1 = (m∗t+1 −mt+1)− (pi∗t+1 − pit+1), (3.2)
where mt+1 = log(Mt+1), and pi is the home inflation. The nominal risk-free interest rate relates
the stochastic discount factor as follows:
it = − logEtNt+1. (3.3)
The UIP states that the return on a home deposit will equal to the return on a foreign deposit
adjusted for the exchange rate. This implies that st+1 − st = it − i∗t . Fama’s (1984) regression
represents the UIP by
st+1 − st = a+ b(it − i∗t ) + t+1,
where t is the regression residual. The UIP coefficient, denoted by b, can be written in terms of
b =
cov(∆st+1, it − i∗t )
var(it − i∗t )
. (3.4)
If UIP holds, the estimated slope coefficient, b, should equal to 1. Nevertheless, the estimated
slope coefficient is found to be negative which implies the violation of UIP. This suggests that high
interest rate currency tends to appreciate.
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The expected excess return on the foreign deposits or the risk premium, denoted by ρt =
Et∆st+1 − it + i∗t , can be written as follows
ρt =
1
2
[vart(logNt+1)− vart(logN∗t+1)]. (3.5)
ρt captures the deviation from UIP, which would happen if an investor is risk averse and demands a
premium to hold foreign currency. With a positive risk premium, high interest rate currencies tend
to appreciate over time. Equation (3.5) says that the country with low variability of the stochastic
discount factor or the pricing kernel has a relatively risky currency.
3.3 Model Specification
In this section, I present a model in which the risk in the long-run and monetary policy volatility
affect the deviation from UIP. The long-run risk model is based on Bansal and Yaron (2004). The
distinct feature of the model is that the consumption growth path is specified exogenously to contain
(1) a small long-run component, and (2) fluctuating economic uncertainty (consumption volatility).
In this way, the consumption prospect is defined to fit the observed consumption facts. As common
in the long-run risk literature, I employ Epstein and Zin preferences with the specification of an early
resolution of uncertainty. The deviation from the UIP can be generated by the presence of both
consumption stochastic volatility and the Epstein and Zin preferences. I follow Backus et al. (2010)
to account for the monetary policy in the model. Inflation is determined by a central bank that
uses the nominal interest rate as its instrument. I work with an endowment economy in which each
country receives a stochastic endowment at each point in time. In equilibrium, the consumption
demand equals the given supply. Since the consumption path is specified exogenously, the model
is silent about international trade that gives rise to such consumption allocations. However, the
advantage of working with an the endowment economy is that I can derive an analytical formula
for the risk premium, the UIP coefficient, and the exchange rate depreciation.
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3.3.1 The Model
3.3.1.1 Preferences and Stochastic Discount Factor
There are two countries: home and foreign. A home country representative consumer maximizes
a utility function with the Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences given by
Ut = [(1− β)cρt + βµt(Ut+1)ρ]1/ρ, (3.6)
where β is time preference, and 1/(1− ρ) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). The
certainty equivalence of random future utility is
µt(Ut+1) = Et[U
α
t+1]
1/α, (3.7)
where 1−α is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The magnitudes of α and ρ determine whether
agent prefers early (α < ρ) or late resolution of uncertainty (α > ρ). Standard CRRA preference
characterizes α = ρ. At each date t, the agent trades a complete set of N assets in the market.
The budget constraint is
ct +
N∑
i=1
PitAi,t+1 =
N∑
i=1
ditAit, (3.8)
where Ait is the quantity of asset i that the representative agent holds at time t, Pit is the price of
1 unit of asset i at time t, and dit is the payoff per 1 unit of asset i at time t.
The marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, denoted by Mt+1, is defined as
Mt+1 = β
(
ct+1
ct
)ρ−1( Ut+1
µt(Ut+1)
)α−ρ
. (3.9)
Mt+1 is referred as a real stochastic discount factor or a real pricing kernel. If the utility maxi-
mization problem is formulated in nominal term, the nominal stochastic discount factor is Nt+1.
And, it can be expressed as follows
Nt+1 = Mt+1 exp(−pit+1), (3.10)
where pit+1 is the rate of inflation. The foreign country representative agent has preferences and
budget constraint defined analogously with the asterisks sign denoting foreign variables.
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International financial markets are assumed to be complete. Agents have access to a complete
set of contingent securities that are traded internationally. With complete markets, the stochastic
discount factor is unique and satisfies the following expression:
St+1
St
=
N∗t+1
Nt+1
=
M∗t+1 exp(−pi∗t+1)
Mt+1 exp(−pit+1) . (3.11)
3.3.1.2 Consumption Prospects
Define domestic consumption growth as xt+1 ≡ log(ct+1/ct). The consumption growth process
is exogenously modeled to contain a small and persistent long-run component with stochastic
volatility. The process is defined as follows:
xt+1 = µ+ zt +
√
utε
x
t+1, (3.12)
where µ is the mean of consumption growth, ut is the conditional volatility of consumption growth,
and εxt+1 is a standard normal shock. The term
√
utε
x
t+1 is called the short-run shock, so that ut
can be called the variance of the short-run shock.
zt is the small long-run component in the expected of consumption growth. The dynamics of
zt is governed by
zt+1 = ϕzzt +
√
wtε
z
t+1, (3.13)
where ϕz is a parameter representing the persistence of expected consumption growth, wt is the
conditional volatility of the expected consumption growth, and εzt+1 is a standard normal shock.
The term
√
wtε
z
t+1 is called the long-run shock. zt captures small, persistent time variation in the
conditional expectation of consumption growth as Et(xt+1) = µ + zt. It is called long-run risk
because it captures the long-run variation in expected consumption growth. Since zt is AR(1), I
can write zt in terms of the sum of all long-run shocks (zt = (1 +ϕzL+ϕ
2
zL
2 + ...)
√
wt−1εzt ), where
L is a lag operator.
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The volatility of consumption growth, and the volatility of the expected consumption growth
are modeled to be stochastic. The stochastic volatilities of ut and wt are defined in the following
way:2
ut+1 = (1− ϕu)θu + ϕuut + σuεut+1, (3.14)
wt+1 = (1− ϕw)θw + ϕwwt + σwεwt+1, (3.15)
where ϕu is the autocorrelation of short-run volatility, ϕw is the autocorrelation of long-run volatil-
ity, θu is the mean of short-run volatility, θw is the mean of long-run volatility, σu is the volatility of
short-run volatility, and σw is the volatility of long-run volatility. The volatility shocks are assumed
to be multivariate normal and independent within-country (εx, εz, εu, εw) ∼ NID(0, I), but allowed
for correlation across countries: ηj ≡ corr(εj , εj∗), for j = (x, z, u, w).
The main idea of the long-run risk model is that current shocks to expected consumption growth
alter expectations about future economic growth not only for short horizons but also for the very
long run. Moreover, the conditional volatility of consumption is time-varying. Fluctuations in
consumption volatility contribute to time variation in the risk premium. The model accounts for
three sources of risks that determine the risk premium which are short-run risk, long-run risk,
and consumption volatility risk. Agents fear movements in the long-run growth and volatility
components because they affect the equilibrium consumption and asset prices. Thus, agents demand
compensation for holding risky assets.
On the supply side, each country receives a stochastic endowment yt at each point in time. The
feasibility constraint of each country satisfies ct = yt. In this endowment economy, consumption
prospects are defined exogenously but in equilibrium consumption demand equates to the given
supply.
2Volatilities ut and wt must be positive but stochastic volatilities defined in this way can give negative values.
When I solve the model numerically, I ensure that these volatilities are positive by replacing negative realizations
with zeros. This happens for about 5% of the realizations. For example, this is done by choosing σ2u, given values of
θu and ϕu, to be as large as possible subject to the constraint that the probability of observing a negative realization
of ut does not exceed 5%. This specification of volatilities are standard in the long-run risk literature. Moreover,
assuming this form allows to solve for the closed-form solutions of the interest rate differential, the exchange rate
depreciation, and the currency risk premium.
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3.3.1.3 Monetary Policy
In this section, I will focus on the interest rate rule that depends on inflation, expected con-
sumption growth, and exchange rate. The nominal interest rates in the home and foreign countries
follow the Taylor rule of the form:3
it = τ + τpipit + τzzt + τs∆st + vt, (3.16)
i∗t = τ
∗ + τ∗pipi
∗
t + τ
∗
z z
∗
t + τ
∗
s∆s
∗
t + v
∗
t , (3.17)
where vt and v
∗
t are policy shocks, and τ, τpi, τz, τs, τ
∗, τ∗pi , τ∗z , τ∗s are policy parameters. The policy
shocks are assumed to be stochastic in the following way:
vt+1 = ϕvvt +
√
etε
v
t+1, (3.18)
et+1 = (1− ϕe)θe + ϕeet + σeεet+1, (3.19)
v∗t+1 = ϕ
∗
vv
∗
t +
√
e∗t ε
v∗
t+1, (3.20)
e∗t+1 = (1− ϕ∗e)θ∗e + ϕ∗ee∗t + σ∗eεe
∗
t+1, (3.21)
where ϕv and ϕ
∗
v are the autocorrelation of policy shocks. et and e
∗
t are stochastic volatilities of
policy shocks, with autocorrelation ϕe and ϕ
∗
e, and mean θe and θ
∗
e .
The Taylor rules in equations (3.16) and (3.17) are extended from the basic specification. First,
the nominal interest rates are determined by the expected consumption growth, instead of the
output gap as in typical rules. The distinction is insignificant because the model has no friction
that can give rise to a gap. Second, the rules have included exchange rates and policy shocks so
that I could study how policy shocks and exchange rates affect the risk premium.
3.3.2 Solving the Model
To derive an analytical solution for the risk premium, I follow the Backus et al. (2010) procedure.
I firstly find the linear approximation of the real stochastic discount factor (sdf) or the pricing kernel.
3For parsimony, I use the expected consumption growth zt instead of its current level xt as in standard literature.
Doing so reduces the number of state variable by one variable.
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Then I find the approximation for the nominal parts. The approximation of the log of real sdf in
equation (3.9) is4
−mt+1 = δr + γrzzt + γruut + γrwwt + λrx
√
utε
x
t+1 + λ
r
z
√
wtε
z
t+1 + λ
r
uσuε
u
t+1 + λ
r
wσwε
w
t+1, (3.22)
where δr = [− log(β)+(1−ρ)µ+ α2 (α−ρ)], γrz = 1−ρ, γru = α2 (α−ρ), γrw = α2 (α−ρ)ω2z , λrx = 1−α,
λrz = −(α − ρ)ωz, λru = −(α − ρ)ωu, λrw = −(α − ρ)ωw. The real sdf depends on the expected
consumption growth, the stochastic volatilities, the short- and long-run shocks, and the stochastic
volatility shocks.
Consider the Taylor rules in equations (3.16) and (3.17), the implied inflation equations are
pit =
1
τpi
[it − τ − τzzt − τs∆st − vt], (3.23)
pi∗t =
1
τ∗pi
[i∗t − τ∗ − τ∗z z∗t − τ∗s∆s∗t − v∗t ]. (3.24)
I conjecture the inflation solution in these forms:
pit = a+ a1zt + a2z
∗
t + a3ut + a4u
∗
t + a5wt + a6w
∗
t + a7vt + a8v
∗
t + a9et + a10e
∗
t , (3.25)
pi∗t = a
∗ + a∗1zt + a
∗
2z
∗
t + a
∗
3ut + a
∗
4u
∗
t + a
∗
5wt + a
∗
6w
∗
t + a
∗
7vt + a
∗
8v
∗
t + a
∗
9et + a
∗
10e
∗
t . (3.26)
Using the fact that the nominal interest rate relates to the nominal sdf in the following way:
it = − logEt(Nt+1)
= − logEt(exp(logMt+1 − pit+1)). (3.27)
Collecting terms for logMt+1 and pit+1, I can derive for the nominal interest rate. Then I substitute
the nominal interest rate into equation (3.23), and solve for the aj coefficients by matching up the
results with the conjecture solution for inflation. The process for foreign country is done in the
same way. The expressions for the aj and a
∗
j coefficients are shown in Appendix C.2.
Next, I derive for the expression of the nominal sdf. The linearized nominal sdf is
−nt+1 = δ + γzzt + γz∗z∗t + γuut + γu∗u∗t + γwwt + γw∗w∗t + γvvt + γv∗v∗t + γeet + γe∗e∗t +
λx
√
utε
x
t+1 + λz
√
wtε
z
t+1 + λz∗
√
w∗t ε
∗z
t+1 + λuσuε
u
t+1 + λu∗σ
∗
uε
∗u
t+1 + λwσwε
w
t+1 +
λw∗σ
∗
wε
∗w
t+1 + λv
√
etε
v
t+1 + λv∗
√
e∗t ε
∗v
t+1 + λeσeε
e
t+1 + λe∗σ
∗
eε
∗e
t+1, (3.28)
4The calculation is shown in Appendix C.1
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where δ = δr+a+a3(1−ϕu)θu+a4(1−ϕ∗u)θ∗u+a5(1−ϕw)θw+a6(1−ϕ∗w)θ∗w+a7(1−ϕv)θv+a8(1−
ϕ∗v)θ∗v + a9(1 − ϕe)θe + a10(1 − ϕ∗e)θ∗e , γz = γrz + a1ϕz, γz∗ = a2ϕ∗z, γu = γru + a3ϕu, γu∗ = a4ϕ∗u,
γw = γ
r
w+a5ϕw, γw∗ = a6ϕ
∗
w, γv = a7ϕv, γv∗ = a8ϕ
∗
v, γe = a9ϕe, γe∗ = a10ϕ
∗
e, λx = λ
r
x, λz = λ
r
z+a1,
λz∗ = a2, λu = λ
r
u + a3, λu∗ = a4, λw = λ
r
w + a5, λw∗ = a6, λv = a7, λv∗ = a8, λe = a9, λe∗ = a10.
The nominal sdf for the foreign country can be written as:
−n∗t+1 = δ∗ + γ∗zzt + γ∗z∗z∗t + γ∗uut + γ∗u∗u∗t + γ∗wwt + γ∗w∗w∗t + γ∗vvt + γ∗v∗v∗t + γ∗eet + γ∗e∗e∗t +
λ∗x
√
u∗t ε
∗x
t+1 + λ
∗
z
√
wtε
z
t+1 + λ
∗
z∗
√
w∗t ε
∗z
t+1 + λ
∗
uσuε
u
t+1 + λ
∗
u∗σ
∗
uε
∗u
t+1 + λ
∗
wσwε
w
t+1 +
λ∗w∗σ
∗
wε
∗w
t+1 + λ
∗
v
√
etε
v
t+1 + λ
∗
v∗
√
e∗t ε
∗v
t+1 + λ
∗
eσeε
e
t+1 + λ
∗
e∗σ
∗
eε
∗e
t+1, (3.29)
where δ = δ∗r+a∗+a∗3(1−ϕu)θu+a∗4(1−ϕ∗u)θ∗u+a∗5(1−ϕw)θw+a∗6(1−ϕ∗w)θ∗w+a∗7(1−ϕv)θv+a∗8(1−
ϕ∗v)θ∗v + a∗9(1− ϕe)θe + a∗10(1− ϕ∗e)θ∗e , γ∗z = a∗1ϕz, γ∗z∗ = γ∗rz + a∗2ϕ∗z, γ∗u = a∗3ϕu, γ∗u∗ = γ∗ru + a∗4ϕ∗u,
γ∗w = a∗5ϕw, γ∗w∗ = γ∗rw + a∗6ϕ∗w, γ∗v = a∗7ϕv, γ∗v∗ = a∗8ϕ∗v, γ∗e = a∗9ϕe, γ∗e∗ = a∗10ϕ∗e, λ∗x = λ∗rx , λ∗z = a∗1,
λ∗z∗ = λ∗rz + a∗2, λ∗u = a∗3, λ∗u∗ = λ∗ru + a∗4, λ∗w = a∗5, λ∗w∗ = λ∗rw + a∗6, λ∗v = a∗7, λ∗v∗ = a∗8, λ∗e = a∗9,
λ∗e∗ = a∗10.
Therefore, the home and foreign nominal interest rates can be written as:
it = ι+ γzzt + γz∗z
∗
t + (γu − (λrx)2/2)ut + γu∗u∗t + (γw − (λrz + a1)2/2)wt +
(γw∗ − (a2)2/2)w∗t + γvvt + γv∗v∗t + (γe − (a7)2/2)et + (γe∗ − (a8)2/2)e∗t , (3.30)
i∗t = ι
∗ + γ∗zzt + γ
∗
z∗z
∗
t + γu∗ut + (γ
∗
u∗ − (λ∗rx )2/2)u∗t + (γ∗w − (a∗1)2/2)wt +
(γ∗w∗ − (λ∗rz + a∗2)2/2)w∗t + γ∗vvt + γ∗v∗v∗t + (γ∗e − (a∗7)2/2)et + (γ∗e∗ − (a∗8)2/2)e∗t (3.31)
where ι = δ− [(λru+a3)2σ2u+(λrw+a5)2σ2w+(a4)2(σ∗u)2 +(a6)2(σ∗w)2 +(a9)2σ2e +(a10)2(σ∗e)2]/2, and
ι∗ = δ∗− [(λ∗ru + a∗4)2(σ∗u)2 + (λ∗rw + a∗6)2(σ∗w)2 + (a∗3)2(σu)2 + (a∗5)2(σw)2 + (a∗9)2σ2e + (a∗10)2(σ∗e)2]/2.
In the next section, I will make use of these equations to derive for the relationship of the exchange
rate and the interest rate.
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3.3.3 Model Solutions of Exchange Rate and Currency Risk Premium
In this section, I derive the expression for the expected depreciation, the nominal interest rate
differential, and the risk premium. Then, I find the UIP coefficient. These expressions can be
written as functions of the state variables zt, ut, wt, vt, et, and these variables with asterisk for the
foreign counterparts.
The exchange rate depreciation is the difference between the nominal sdf of the foreign and
home countries. The expected depreciation can be derived as follows
Et∆st+1 = (δ − δ∗) + (γz − γ∗z )zt + (γz∗ − γ∗z∗)z∗t + (γu − γ∗u)ut + (γu∗ − γ∗u∗)u∗t + (γw − γ∗w)wt
+(γw∗ − γ∗w∗)w∗t + (γv − γ∗v)vt + (γv∗ − γ∗v∗)v∗t + (γe − γ∗e )et + (γe∗ − γ∗e∗)e∗t . (3.32)
The nominal interest rate differential is:
it − i∗t = (ι− ι∗) + (γz − γ∗z )zt + (γz∗ − γ∗z∗)z∗t + (γu − (λrx)2/2− γ∗u)ut +
(γu∗ − γ∗u∗ + (λ∗rx )2/2)u∗t + (γw − (λrz + a1)2/2− γ∗w + (a∗1)2/2)wt +
(γw∗ − (a2)2/2− γ∗w∗ + (λ∗rz + a∗2)2/2)w∗t +
(γv − γ∗v)vt + (γv∗ − γ∗v∗)v∗t + (γe − (a7)2/2− γ∗e + (a∗7)2/2)et +
(γe∗ − (a8)2/2− γ∗e∗ + (a∗8)2/2)e∗t . (3.33)
Therefore, the risk premium on the foreign currency is:
ρt = [λ
2
xut − (λ∗x)2u∗t + (λ2z − (λ∗z)2)wt + (λ2z∗ − (λ∗z∗)2)w∗t + (λ2v − (λ∗v)2)et + (λ2v∗ − (λ∗v∗)2)e∗t +
(λ2u − (λ∗u)2)σ2u + (λ2u∗ − (λ∗u∗)2)(σ∗u)2 + (λ2w − (λ∗w)2)σ2w + (λ2w∗ − (λ∗w∗)2)(σ∗w)2 +
(λ2e − (λ∗e)2)σ2e + (λ2e∗ − (λ∗e∗)2)(σ∗e)2]/2. (3.34)
Given the stochastic volatilities, denoted by ut, wt, et and its foreign counterpart with asterisk
terms. The time variation in currency risk premium, reflects the time-varying compensations for
the expected consumption growth risk, is driven by the stochastic volatility of consumption growth
(ut), the stochastic volatility of expected consumption growth (wt), and the stochastic volatility of
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monetary policy shock (et). If these volatilities are constant, the excess return on foreign deposit
are constant too.
The nominal UIP coefficient can be formulated as:5
b =
cov(∆st+1, it − i∗t )
var(it − i∗t )
=

(γz − γ∗z )2var(zt − z∗t ) + (γv − γ∗v)2var(vt − v∗t )+
(γu − γ∗u)(γu − γ∗u − (λrx)2/2)var(ut − u∗t )+
(γw − γ∗w)(γw − γ∗w − [(λrz + a1)2 − (a∗1)2]/2)var(wt − w∗t )+
(γe − γ∗e )(γe − γ∗e − [(a7)2 − (a∗7)2]/2)var(et − e∗t )


(γz − γ∗z )2var(zt − z∗t ) + (γv − γ∗v)2var(vt − v∗t )+
(γu − γ∗u − (λrx)2/2)var(ut − u∗t ) + (γw − γ∗w − (λrz + a1)2/2 + (a∗1)2]/2)var(wt − w∗t )+
(γe − γ∗e − [(a7)2 − (a∗7)2]/2)var(et − e∗t )

(3.35)
Without the stochastic volatility, denoted by ut, wt, et and its foreign counterpart with asterisk
terms, the UIP coefficient will equal to one, which implies the UIP holds. With the presence
of these stochastic volatilities, the model can produce negative UIP coefficient. Examining the
above expression, the UIP coefficient is to be negative if the numerator is negative. The necessary
condition is that there is at least one term of coefficients of the variance of stochastic volatility
var(ut−u∗t ), var(wt−w∗t ), and var(et− e∗t ) is negative. That is, in each coefficient of the variance
of stochastic volatility, the two terms in parenthesis have opposite signs. For example, the sufficient
condition that the coefficient of var(ut − u∗t ) is negative requires the early preference of resolution
(α < ρ) and the degree of risk aversion is greater than 1. Lastly, the sum of the negative term(s)
should be greater than the sum of the positive terms.
3.4 Quantitative Results
In this section, I firstly discuss values of calibrated model parameters, then I focus on the
ability of the model accounting for a set of sample moments of consumption growth, inflation,
5The calculation is based on the assumption that all parameters are symmetric across countries.
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exchange rate and interest rate to replicate the actual data. I employ the financial data between
two countries: the United Kingdom, and the United States. Data used in the study covers the series
of consumption, inflation, short-term interest rate, and exchange rate. The data are quarterly and
span from 1970 through 2017. All data series are from the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OEACD). Last but not least, I demonstrate how the risks affect these important
variables by means of impulse response analysis.
3.4.1 Calibration of Parameter Values
To begin with, I categorize the parameters into 3 groups: preference parameters, consumption
prospect parameters, and interest rate rule parameters. Preference and consumption parameters
are for calculated values and moments for the real side of the model, e.g. consumption, real
interest rate and real exchange rate. I impose symmetry in preference and consumption process
parameters across the two countries, so that the parameter values and real moments are the same
across countries even though the shocks are not. These real parameters are to match U.S. data
on consumption, U.K. real interest rate, and the real exchange rate between U.K. and U.S. Taylor
rule parameters are to match nominal data from the U.K. and U.S.
For preference parameters, I firstly set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES, (1 −
ρ)−1) to 1.5 as suggested in Bansal and Yaron (2004). The relative risk aversion (1− α) is chosen
to match the variance of real depreciation rate while the discount factor (β) matches with the mean
of the U.K. quarterly real interest rates. The discount factor is around 0.997, and the relative risk
aversion is 5.8175.
Given the series of the Unites States’ consumption data, I calculate the mean of consumption
growth (µ). According to equation (3.12), I apply Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to term (xt+1−µ) to
separate trend and cycle components. From the trend component, I take its series as zt. The cycle
component would approximate to
√
utε
x
t+1. I then apply HP filter again to the term log(
√
utε
x
t+1)
2
to get trend component as log(ut), and cycle component. From this point, I could calculate the
mean of short-run volatility (θu) and autocorrelation of short-run volatility (ϕu). Since I have the
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zt series estimated from the first filter, I can estimate the autocorrelation of long-run risk (ϕz).
Then from equation (3.13), I can figure for
√
wt−1εzt . I use HP filter on log(
√
wt−1εzt )2 to compute
wt series. Then I compute for the mean and autocorrelation of long-run volatility (θw and ϕw,
respectively). Applying the same approach to the policy shock (vt) and policy shock volatility (et),
I obtain value of parameters relevant to policy shock.
Given values of θu and ϕu, the conditional variance of short-run volatility, σu is chosen to be
as large as possible subject to the constraint the probability of observing a negative realization of
ut at 5%. The same logic applies to the values of σw and σe in that these conditional variance of
volatilities are chosen to observe a negative realization of wt and et at 5%.
When I do a simulation, I generate data for 292 observations including 100 burn-in periods.
I will have 192 observations of each time series as the actual data. The 100-period burn-in will
ensure that the simulated data is approaching the steady state. Moreover, each time series has
been generated 10,000 rounds. I calculate the sample moments of each round, then average them
over 10,000 replications. This will ensure the accuracy of sample moments. Table (3.1) reports
preferences and consumption parameters.
For Taylor rule parameters, I consider three different rules. The first one is to examine how
interest rate responds to inflation and mean of consumption growth. The second rule is the Taylor
rule with interest rate smoothing. The interest rate gradually moves so that it depends on its
past value. The third rule consists of augmenting the first one with the exchange rate. In each
rule, there are two alternatives of the calibration procedure. The first calibration is targeting to
match the model with domestic and foreign inflation - interest rate. The second one is targeting
the variance of nominal exchange rate depreciation and the UIP coefficient.
Table (3.2) summarizes how nominal parameters are calibrated, and Table (3.3) displays the
values of calibrated nominal parameters. The intercept parameters are negative while the coefficient
of Taylor rule parameters are all positive as they should be. It is interesting that the inflation
coefficients, τpi, of any rule are very high when matching with exchange rate volatility and UIP
slope. Especially for the rule that depends on exchange rate, τ∗s is tiny and almost zero. This may
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Table 3.1: Calibrated Real Parameter Values
Description Parameter Value
Preferences:
IES (1− ρ)−1 1.5
Relative risk aversion 1− α 5.8175
Discount factor β 0.9970
Consumption prospect:
Mean of consumption growth µ 0.0074
Autocorrelation of long-run risk ϕz 0.9978
Volatility of consumption growth:
Mean of short-run volatility θu 3.6003× 10−5
Autocorrelation of short-run volatility ϕu 0.9939
Volatility of short-run volatility σu 9.6821× 10−7
Mean of long-run volatility θw 1.3831× 10−8
Autocorrelation of long-run volatility ϕw 0.9995
Volatility of long-run volatility σw 2.3354× 10−10
Monetary policy shock:
Autocorrelation of policy shock ϕv 0.8053
Mean of policy shock volatility θe 7.8646× 10−5
Autocorrelation of policy shock volatility ϕe 0.9856
Volatility of policy shock volatility σe 3.0665× 10−6
suggest to the asymmetric Taylor rules that the U.S. does not react to the depreciation rate while
the U.K. does.
3.4.2 Simulated Moments of the Model
The purpose of this work is to show the ability of the model accounting for a set of sample
moments of exchange rate and interest rates in replicating as much as possible of the actual data.
Ultimately, the model should produce a negative UIP coefficient and currency risk premium. Table
(3.4) reports actual data and sample moments of the real economy. In terms of the real variables,
the model replicates the actual data fairly well. The mean and variance of consumption growth,
real interest rate and real depreciation of the model are reasonably close to the actual data. The
autocorrelation of consumption is quite low. The cross country correlation in consumption growth
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Table 3.2: Taylor Rules Parameters and Matching Moments
Taylor Rules Parameter Matching Moment: A Matching Moment: B
Basic Rule
it = τ + τpipit + τzzt + v τ, τ
∗, E(pit), E(pi∗t ), var(∆st+1), βUIP ,
i∗t = τ
∗ + τ∗pipi
∗
t + τ
∗
z z
∗
t + v
∗ τpi, τ∗pi , τz, τ
∗
z var(pit), var(pi
∗
t ), E(pit), E(pi
∗
t ),
var(it), var(i
∗
t ) var(pit), var(pi
∗
t )
Interest Rate Smoothing
it = τ + τpipit + τzzt + τiit−1 + v τ, τ∗, τpi, τ∗pi , E(pit), E(pi
∗
t ), var(∆st+1), βUIP ,
i∗t = τ
∗ + τ∗pipi
∗
t + τ
∗
z z
∗
t + τ
∗
i i
∗
t−1 + v
∗ τz, τ∗z , τi, τ
∗
i var(pit), var(pi
∗
t ), E(pit), E(pi
∗
t ),
var(it), var(i
∗
t ), var(pit), var(pi
∗
t ),
cov(it, pit), cov(i
∗
t , pi
∗
t ) var(it), var(i
∗
t )
With Exchange Rate
it = τ + τpipit + τzzt + τs∆st + v τ, τ
∗, τpi, τ∗pi , E(pit), E(pi
∗
t ), var(∆st+1), βUIP ,
i∗t = τ
∗ + τ∗pipi
∗
t + τ
∗
z z
∗
t + τ
∗
s∆s
∗
t + v
∗ τz, τ∗z , τs, τ
∗
s var(pit), var(pi
∗
t ), E(pit), E(pi
∗
t ),
var(it), var(i
∗
t ), var(pit), var(pi
∗
t ),
cov(it, i
∗
t ), cov(pit, pi
∗
t ) var(it), var(i
∗
t )
is even lower than in the data. The calibration of the model emphasizes highly autocorrelated of
real interest rate, and also highly cross-country correlation. The real UIP coefficient is negative as
in the data, but the magnitude is much bigger.
Table (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7) display actual data and sample moments of the nominal variables,
namely, inflation, nominal interest rate, nominal depreciation and UIP coefficient, according to the
type of Taylor rules: basic rule, interest rate smoothing, and rule with exchange rate, respectively.
The model from the three rules perform quite well to replicate the actual data of inflation and
nominal interest rate, when matching with inflation-interest rate relation (Model A). The sample
moments of inflation and the sample moment of nominal interest rate are pretty closed to the data.
In terms of nominal exchange rate, the models deliver almost exact mean and variance of nominal
depreciation rate as in the data.
Regarding UIP coefficient, it would be best to have a model that delivers a negative UIP
coefficient. Unfortunately, the result from the three models with matching method A cannot deliver
a negative UIP coefficient. However, these models produce UIP coefficients that are less than one,
suggesting a deviation of UIP. Turning the model to match Taylor rule parameters with exchange
rate volatility and UIP coefficient (Model B), the models perform well to deliver a negative UIP
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Table 3.3: Value of Calibrated Nominal Parameters
Parameter Basic Rule Interest Rate Lag Rule Exchange Rate Rule
Match A Match B Match A Match B Match A Match B
τ −0.0037 −0.1935 −0.0163 −0.2019 −0.0039 −0.2114
τpi 1.8482 16.3479 1.2487 16.1551 1.9129 17.7126
τz 2.2919 1.0359 0.1835 1.8661 1.5294× 10−4 2.4914
τi 0.9999 0.5322
τs 0.4750 0.0161
τ∗ −0.0056 −0.1413 −0.0065 −0.1504 −0.0057 −0.1460
τ∗pi 2.3210 16.1640 2.4065 15.6278 2.4517 16.6402
τ∗z 0.9403 1.3655 0.0002 1.9801 4.4855× 10−5 2.8193
τ∗i 0.0009 0.8353
τ∗s 0.1536 1.6060× 10−6
coefficient, which is about −0.0782. However, the models still struggle to replicate a risk premium
on GBP currency. The data has shown the excess return on GBP currency about 0.0040. This
amount is positive but quite small. Although the risk premium generated by the model is positive,
its amount is minuscule and far less than that of the data.
In short, some of the model’s key moments are very different from observed moments. For the
real variables calibration, the model moments of the autocorrelation of consumption growth and
the autocorrelation of real interest rate are quite different from the actual data because I do not
perform the calibration to match with these autocorrelations. It is difficult that the model will
produce the (unmatched) moments close to the data. For the nominal variables calibration, there
are two calibration procedures. The first way targets to match the model with domestic and foreign
inflation-interest rate (Model A). It turns out that the model results in the moments of inflation,
and interest rate that are very close to the actual data, but it cannot produce a negative UIP
coefficient. The model has a limitation to match UIP coefficient with the actual data in the sense
of matching the model with inflation-interest rate relation. The second method targets to match
the model with the variance of nominal exchange rate depreciation and UIP coefficient (Model B).
Although the inflation and the interest rate moments are not close to the actual data as well as in
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Table 3.4: Real Variables
Moment Data Model
Consumption Growth (US)
Mean 0.0074 0.0074
Variance 4.1763× 10−5 3.6458× 10−5
Autocorrelation 0.3323 0.0052
Cross-Country Correlation 0.5453 0.1852
Real Interest Rate (UK)
Mean 0.0074 0.0074
Variance 9.520× 10−5 1.7238× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.4524 0.9699
Cross-Country Correlation 0.5858 0.9961
Real Depreciation Rate
Mean −1.6684× 10−4 −3.9935× 10−6
Variance 0.0020 0.0020
Real UIP Coefficient −0.1479 −11.5984
Model A, it appears that the model can produce a negative UIP coefficient, which is the objective
in the study. However, the model is still unable to account for a sizable risk premium. This is a
limitation of the model.
3.4.3 Responses to Shocks
In this section, I study dynamic responses of the main variables in the model: exchange rate
depreciation rate, risk premium, consumption growth, inflation and interest rate to the shocks.
This analysis is performed based on parameter values derived from matching the model with the
variance of nominal exchange rate depreciation and UIP coefficient. I consider the impact of
short-run consumption shock, long-run shock, and monetary policy shock both in level shock and
volatility shock. The impulse responses are shown in figures (3.1) through (3.6).
Nominal Depreciation Rate: According to the impulse-response analysis, an increase in both
short-run consumption growth level shock (εxt ) and long-run consumption level shock (ε
z
t ) induce
the exchange rate to depreciate. However, the exchange rate would appreciate in response to a rise
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Table 3.5: Nominal Variables (Basic Rule)
Moment Data Model A Model B
Inflation
Domestic: U.K.
Mean 0.0131 0.0131 0.0131
Variance 2.1520× 10−4 1.9862× 10−4 8.8808× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.6121 0.7881 0.7868
Foreign: U.S.
Mean 0.0098 0.0098 0.0098
Variance 7.3363× 10−5 9.3116× 10−5 9.0747× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.6602 0.7868 0.7869
Nominal Interest Rate
Domestic: U.K.
Mean 0.0138 0.0204 0.0205
Variance 1.0294× 10−4 1.2850× 10−4 7.3607× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.9876 0.7877 0.8231
Foreign: U.S.
Mean 0.0135 0.0172 0.0172
Variance 9.0930× 10−5 6.0465× 10−5 7.3793× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.9676 0.7870 0.8209
Nominal Depreciation Rate and UIP
Mean 0.0031 0.0033 0.0033
Variance 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020
Autocorrelation 0.2650 0.0044 −0.0051
UIP Coefficient −0.0782 0.9711 −0.0782
Risk Premium on GBP 0.0040 1.0750× 10−5 5.7017× 10−6
in short-run consumption volatility shock (εut ), and a long-run volatility shock (ε
w
t ). A decrease in
the consumption growth of the economy and an increase in volatility component would lead to a
reduce in consumption equilibrium and asset prices. The exchange rate as a price of the foreign
currency drops, leading to an appreciation of the home currency. The impact of the short-run
shock dies at time t = 2 onward. But the impact of the long-run shock is very persistent. The
depreciation rates do not go to exactly zero for a long period of time. In terms of the monetary
policy shock, an increase in the monetary policy level shock (εvt ) and the policy volatility shock
(εet ) immediately appreciates the exchange rate, then gradually depreciates the exchange rate.
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Nominal Currency Risk Premium: Given the value of parameters generated in the model, a
change in both short-run and long-run consumption growth level shocks has no impact on the
excess return on foreign deposits. A shock in consumption growth impacts the depreciation rate
while the interest rate differential adjusts according to the Taylor rule. The effect of shocks to
change in the depreciation rate is cancelling out with the change in the interest rate differential.
Nevertheless, increases in both short- and long-run consumption growth volatility shocks contribute
to a rise in these excess returns. This is because a rise in uncertainty in the economy, as a result
of an increase in volatility shocks, requires a positive excess return for an agent to hold risky
assets. This supports the finding from Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) that higher foreign interest
rates predict higher excess returns for a domestic investor in the foreign currency markets, and
these excess returns compensate the domestic investor for taking on more domestic consumption
growth risk. Besides, the currency risk premium also increases in response to an increase in the
monetary-policy volatility shock. This is consistent with Eichenbaum and Evan (1995) that an
increase in monetary policy shock produces an appreciation of the exchange rate and a deviation
from UIP in the form of positive currency risk premium.
Consumption Growth: Consumption growth rate is only altered by short- and and long-run
consumption shocks. Other shocks have no impact on consumption growth at all. An increase in a
short-run consumption shock leads to an increase in consumption growth. The effect is short and
down to zero from period t = 2 onward. An increase in long-run consumption shock also contribute
to a rise in consumption growth rate, and then the consumption growth gradually diminishes. The
difference between these two shocks is a time period that the shock would affect. As by its name,
the short-run consumption shock only hits the consumption growth to grow for only one period
and then the effect dies down. However, the long-run shock has very persistent impact on the
consumption growth.
Inflation: Response of inflation to a change in short- and long-run both level and volatility
shocks is ambiguous. The consequence also depends on what type of the Taylor rules model relied
on. An increase in short- and long-run consumption growth level shock causes inflation rate to
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fall. The magnitude of the reduction varies according to the specification of the policy rule. For
example, in response to a long-run consumption growth level shock, εzt , the inflation derived from
the exchange rate rule has a largest drop because εzt has both direct impact on inflation itself, and
indirect impact through the consumption processes. So the effect of εzt on inflation is larger than
the other two rules.
An increase in short- and long-run consumption volatility shock lowers inflation rate from the
model derived from the basic rule and interest rate smoothing rule. But in the model with exchange
rate rule, inflation increases in the first period of the shock and later inflation decreases.
Nominal Interest Rate: Regarding the nominal interest rate, fluctuations in monetary-policy
level shock (εvt ) and also a monetary-policy volatility shock (ε
e
t ) have both direct and indirect effects
on the interest rate. An increase in policy level shock and policy volatility shock directly induce
a rise in the interest rate. These shocks also have an indirect effect through the inflation. Policy
shocks could alter the inflation which indirectly have an impact on the interest rate. This effect
possibly causes a decrease in the interest rate. The effect of policy shocks on interest rate weighs
on these forces.
A short-run consumption shock has no impact on the nominal interest rate while a long-run
shock induces an increase in the interest rate. On the contrary, the interest rate declines in response
to a rise in short- and long-run volatility shocks. This is due to a set-up of the model that the
Taylor rule does not depend on the consumption growth but the long-run component in expected
consumption growth. The implied inflation and hence the interest rate is a function of the long-run
consumption shock, short- and long-run volatility shocks.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study the behavior of exchange rate and currency risk premium in the con-
text of long-run risk model. The idea is to model consumption growth containing a small and
persistent component with stochastic volatility. I show that the presence of stochastic volatility of
consumption growth influence the UIP violation.
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The idea of this study is initiated from Backus et al. (2010) that remark the difficulties of the
long-run risk model incorporating monetary policy through Taylor rule to simultaneously account
for a negative UIP coefficient and a sizeable currency risk premium. The adjustment from their
work is that I allow for a richer specification of the Taylor rule and expect the model to do better in
explaining deviation from UIP. My model replicates the actual data fairly well. However, it is still
difficult to match nominal variables with actual data in the sense of inflation-interest rate relation
and delivers a negative UIP coefficient. Only I have to target to match these nominal variables
with UIP coefficient and volatility of exchange rate depreciation rate, then the model could deliver
a negative UIP coefficient. But the model still has a problem to cope with a currency risk premium.
This is a limitation of the model.
I study how risks in the model affect the exchange rate and currency risk premium. I find that
a decrease in short- and long-run consumption growth level shocks, and an increase in short- and
long-run consumption growth volatility shocks lead to an appreciation of exchange rate. And, an
increase in consumption growth volatility shock raises the excess return on foreign currency.
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Table 3.6: Nominal Variables (Smoothing Interest Rate Rule)
Moment Data Model A Model B
Inflation
Domestic: U.K.
Mean 0.0131 0.0131 0.0131
Variance 2.1520× 10−4 1.8646× 10−4 8.7455× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.6121 0.5507 0.7776
Foreign: U.S.
Mean 0.0098 0.0098 0.0098
Variance 7.3363× 10−5 8.3431× 10−5 9.1235× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.6602 0.7868 0.7717
Nominal Interest Rate
Domestic: U.K.
Mean 0.0138 0.0204 0.0205
Variance 1.0294× 10−4 6.6878× 10−5 6.7689× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.9876 0.7870 0.8179
Covariance (it, pit) 2.7447× 10−5 1.0674× 10−4
Foreign: U.S.
Mean 0.0135 0.0172 0.0172
Variance 9.0930× 10−5 5.4538× 10−5 6.8203× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.9676 0.7883 0.8156
Covariance (i∗t , pi∗t ) 5.0440× 10−5 6.7317× 10−5
Nominal Depreciation Rate and UIP
Mean 0.0031 0.0032 0.0033
Variance 0.0020 0.0021 0.0020
Autocorrelation 0.2605 −0.0024 −0.0051
UIP Coefficient −0.0782 0.9196 −0.0782
Risk Premium on GBP 0.0040 −3.6544× 10−5 5.8553× 10−6
116
Table 3.7: Nominal Variables (Exchange Rate Rule)
Moment Data Model A Model B
Inflation
Domestic: U.K.
Mean 0.0131 0.0131 0.0131
Variance 2.1520× 10−4 2.1612× 10−4 7.5671× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.6121 0.5165 0.7861
Covariance (pit, pi
∗
t ) 0.6603 0.6469 0.9911
Foreign: U.S.
Mean 0.0098 0.0098 0.0098
Variance 7.3363× 10−5 8.8179× 10−5 8.6024× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.6602 0.7432 0.7883
Nominal Interest Rate
Domestic: U.K.
Mean 0.0138 0.0227 0.0205
Variance 1.0294× 10−4 9.3687× 10−5 6.0780× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.9876 0.7882 0.8202
Covariance (it, i
∗
t ) 0.8944 0.9959 0.9910
Foreign: U.S.
Mean 0.0135 0.0178 0.0172
Variance 9.0930× 10−5 5.4659× 10−5 6.6287× 10−7
Autocorrelation 0.9676 0.7884 0.8148
Nominal Depreciation Rate and UIP
Mean 0.0031 0.0033 0.0033
Variance 0.0020 0.0012 0.0020
Autocorrelation 0.2605 0.0012 −0.0051
UIP Coefficient −0.0782 0.7457 −0.0782
Risk Premium on GBP 0.0040 0.0016 1.9217× 10−5
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Figure 3.1: Dynamic Responses to the Short-Run Consumption Level Shock, εxt
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Figure 3.2: Dynamic Responses to the Long-Run Consumption Level Shock, εzt
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Figure 3.3: Dynamic Responses to the Monetary Policy Level Shock, εvt
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Figure 3.4: Dynamic Responses to the Short-Run Consumption Volatility Shock, εut
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Figure 3.5: Dynamic Responses to the Long-Run Consumption Volatility Shock, εwt
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Figure 3.6: Dynamic Responses to the Monetary Policy Volatility Shock, εet
123
APPENDIX A. CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX
A.1 Higher-Order Iterated Expectation
Allen et al. (2006) explain this situation by considering the case where there is no learning over
time. Suppose θ is distributed normally with mean y and variance 1α . Each agent i in a continuum
observes a signal xi = θ + εi, where εi is distributed in the population with mean 0 and variance
1
β . Suppose that this is all the information available at all dates. Then we may drop the date
subscripts.
Since θ ∼ N(y, 1α) and xi|θ ∼ N(θ, 1β ), so
f(θ, xi) = f(xi|θ)fθ(θ) = 1√
2pi/β
exp
(
− 1
2/β
(xi − θ)2
)
1√
2pi/α
exp
(
− 1
2/α
(θ − y)2
)
=
1
2pi/
√
αβ
exp
(
−1
2
(
β(xi − θ)2 + α(θ − y)2
))
.
Since xi ∼ N(y, 1α + 1β ), hence
f(θ|xi) = f(θ, xi)
fxi(xi)
=
1
2pi/
√
αβ
exp
(−12 (β(xi − θ)2 + α(θ − y)2))
1√
2pi( 1
α
+ 1
β
)
exp
(
− 1
2( 1
α
+ 1
β
)
(xi − y)2
)
=
1√
2pi/(α+ β)
exp
(
−1
2
(
β(xi − θ)2 + α(θ − y)2 − αβ
α+ β
(xi − y)2
))
=
1√
2pi/(α+ β)
exp
(
−1
2
(
(α+ β)2θ2 − 2(α+ β)(αy + βxi)θ + (αy + βxi)2
α+ β
))
=
1√
2pi/(α+ β)
exp
(
−1
2
(
[(α+ β)θ − (αy + βxi)]2
α+ β
))
=
1√
2pi/(α+ β)
exp
(
− 1
2/(α+ β)
(
θ − αy + βxi
α+ β
)2)
Therefore, θ|xi ∼ N
(
αy+βxi
α+β ,
1
α+β
)
. One may rearrange the mean to be
1
β
y+ 1
α
x
1
α
+ 1
β
and variance to be
1
α
· 1
β
1
α
+ 1
β
. Thus
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Ei[θ] =
αy + βxi
α+ β
E¯[θ] =
αy + βθ
α+ β
Ei[E¯[θ]] =
αy + βEi[θ]
α+ β
=
αy + β αy+βxiα+β
α+ β
=
(
1−
(
β
α+ β
)2)
y +
(
β
α+ β
)2
xi
E¯[E¯[θ]] =
(
1−
(
β
α+ β
)2)
y +
(
β
α+ β
)2
θ
Iterate this operation, one can show that
E¯k[θ] =
(
1−
(
β
α+ β
)k)
y +
(
β
α+ β
)k
θ
Putting back the time subscripts, we have
E¯t[E¯t+1[θ]] =
(
1−
(
β
α+ β
)2)
y +
(
β
α+ β
)2
θ 6= αy + βθ
α+ β
= E¯t[θ]
and
E¯t[E¯t+1[· · · E¯T−2[E¯T−1[θ]]]] =
(
1−
(
β
α+ β
)T−t)
y +
(
β
α+ β
)T−t
θ
A.2 Invertibility of bt
From the conjectured solution st = λ0ft+λ1ft+1 +λ2ft+2 +γ−2bt−2 +γ−1bt−1 +γ0bt, I rearrange
the equation to be (γ0 + γ−1L+ γ−2L2)bt = st − λ0ft − λ1ft+1 − λ2ft+2
Case 1: if γ−2 = 0, the process bt is invertible if and only if root of polynomial γ0 + γ−1z = 0
lies outside unit circle. That is,
∣∣∣γ−1γ0 ∣∣∣ < 1.
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If bt is invertible, then
bt =
1
(γ0 + γ−1L)
[st − λ0ft − λ1ft+1 − λ2ft+2]
=
1
γ0
(
1 + γ−1Lγ0
) [st − λ0ft − λ1ft+1 − λ2ft+2]
=
1−
(
γ−1
γ0
)
L+
(
γ−1
γ0
)2
L2 −
(
γ−1
γ0
)3
L3 + . . .
γ0
[st − λ0ft − λ1ft+1 − λ2ft+2]
=
1
γ0
{(
st −
(
γ−1
γ0
)
st−1 +
(
γ−1
γ0
)2
st−2 − . . .
)
−λ0
(
ft −
(
γ−1
γ0
)
ft−1 +
(
γ−1
γ0
)2
ft−2 − . . .
)
−λ1
(
ft+1 −
(
γ−1
γ0
)
ft +
(
γ−1
γ0
)2
ft−1 − . . .
)
−λ2
(
ft+2 −
(
γ−1
γ0
)
ft+1 +
(
γ−1
γ0
)2
ft − . . .
)}
.
Case 2: if γ−2 6= 0, the process bt is invertible if and only if root of polynomial γ0+γ−1z+γ−2z2 =
0 lies outside unit circle. That is, |z1| =
∣∣∣∣γ−1+√γ2−1−4γ0γ−22γ−2
∣∣∣∣ > 1 and |z2| = ∣∣∣∣γ−1−√γ2−1−4γ0γ−22γ−2
∣∣∣∣ > 1.
If bt is invertible, then
bt =
1
(γ0 + γ−1L+ γ−2L2)
[st − λ0ft − λ1ft+1 − λ2ft+2]
=
1
γ0
(
1 + γ−1Lγ0 +
γ−2L
γ0
) [st − λ0ft − λ1ft+1 − λ2ft+2]
=
1
γ0
(
1− 1z1L
)(
1− 1z2L
) [st − λ0ft − λ1ft+1 − λ2ft+2]
=
1
γ0
{(
1 +
1
z1
L+
1
z21
L2 + . . .
)(
1 +
1
z2
L+
1
z22
L2 + . . .
)}
[st − λ0ft − λ1ft+1 − λ2ft+2]
=
1
γ0
{
1 + c1L+ c2L
2 + . . .
}
[st − λ0ft − λ1ft+1 − λ2ft+2]
=
1
γ0
{(st + c1st−1 + c2st−2 − . . .)− λ0 (ft + c1ft−1 + c2ft−2 − . . .)
−λ1 (ft+1 + c1ft + c2ft−1 − . . .)− λ2 (ft+2 + c1ft+1 + c2ft − . . .)} ,
where cn =
∑n
i=0
(
1
z1
)i (
1
z2
)n−i
, n = 1, 2, . . .. At time t, bt is unknown to the investor because
bt depends on future fundamental ft+1 and ft+2. bt−1 is also unknown because it depends on
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ft+1. However, from bt−2 onward depends on current and past fundamentals and exchange rates.
Therefore, every investor knows about bt−2 and the lags before.
A.3 Signal Extraction
A k × 1 random vector of information θ =
(
θ1 · · · θk
)′
∼ N(µ,Σθ), where µ is a k × 1
vector of means of θ and Σθ is a k × k symmetric positive definite variance-covariance matrix
of θ, is transmitted through n channels. Each channel i = 1, . . . , n, there is a random noises εi
which are independent of the information vector θ. Let ε =
(
ε1 · · · εn
)′
be an n × 1 vector
of random noises and assume that ε ∼ N(0,Σε), where 0 is an n× 1 vector of zeros and Σε is an
n× n symmetric positive definite variance-covariance matrix of ε. The recipient receives n signals,
x1, . . . , xn. Let x =
(
x1 · · · xn
)′
denote the n×1 vector of signals. The signals are generated
by a linear process x = Aθ + ε, where A is an n × k matrix with rank(A) = k. Given the signal
x, the recipient wants to find out about the information θ.
Since x = Aθ + ε and we know that ε ∼ N(0,Σε) and θ ∼ N(µ,Σθ), then x|θ ∼ N(Aθ,Σε)
and x ∼ N(Aµ,AΣθA′ + Σε). The conditional pdf of θ given x is
f(θ|x) = f(θ,x)
f(x)
=
f(x|θ)f(θ)
f(x)
=
(2pi)−
n
2 |Σε|− 12 exp[− 12 (x−Aθ)′Σ−1ε (x−Aθ)](2pi)−
k
2 |Σθ|− 12 exp[− 12 (θ − µ)′Σ−1θ (θ − µ)]
(2pi)−
n
2 |AΣθA′ + Σε|− 12 exp[− 12 (x−Aµ)′(AΣθA′ + Σε)−1(x−Aµ)]
=
(2pi)−
k
2 |Σε|− 12 |Σθ|− 12
|AΣθA′ + Σε|− 12
exp
[
−1
2
(
(x−Aθ)′Σ−1ε (x−Aθ) + (θ − µ)′Σ−1θ (θ − µ)−
(x−Aµ)′(AΣθA′ + Σε)−1(x−Aµ)
)]
To simplify the notation, define y = x −Aµ, z = θ − µ, and B = Σ−1θ +A′Σ−1ε A. Hence,
x−Aθ = x−Aµ+Aµ−Aθ = y −Az. Using Sherman-Morrison formula (one can see proof in
appendix A (equation (A-66b)) from Greene (2012)) that
(K ±LML′−1 = K−1 ∓K−1L(M−1 ±L′K−1L)−1L′K−1,
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where K and M are symmetric invertible matrices and L is a matrix, the term (AΣθA
′ + Σε)−1
can be simplified as Σ−1ε −Σ−1ε A(Σ−1θ +A′Σ−1ε A)−1A′Σ−1ε .
Rearranging the terms in the exponent.
(x−Aθ)′Σ−1ε (x−Aθ) + (θ − µ)′Σ−1θ (θ − µ)− (x−Aµ)′(AΣθA′ + Σε)−1(x−Aµ)
= (y −Az)′Σ−1ε (y −Az) + z′Σ−1θ z − y′(Σ−1ε −Σ−1ε A(Σ−1θ +A′Σ−1ε A)−1A′Σ−1ε )y
= y′Σ−1ε y − y′Σ−1ε Az − z′A′Σ−1ε y + z′A′Σ−1ε Az + z′Σ−1θ z − y′Σ−1ε y
+y′Σ−1ε A(Σ
−1
θ +A
′Σ−1ε A)
−1A′Σ−1ε y
= −y′Σ−1ε Az − z′A′Σ−1ε y + z′(A′Σ−1ε A+ Σ−1θ )z + y′Σ−1ε A(Σ−1θ +A′Σ−1ε A)−1A′Σ−1ε y
= −y′Σ−1ε Az − z′A′Σ−1ε y + z′Bz + y′Σ−1ε AB−1A′Σ−1ε y
= z′Bz − y′Σ−1ε AB−1Bz − z′−1A′Σ−1ε y + y′Σ−1ε AB−1BB−1A′Σ−1ε y
= (z −B−1A′Σ−1ε y)′B(z −B−1A′Σ−1ε y)
Hence, the pdf of θ given x is
f(θ|x) = (2pi)
− k
2 |Σε|− 12 |Σθ|− 12
|AΣθA′ + Σε|− 12
exp
[
−1
2
[
(z −B−1A′Σ−1ε y)′B(z −B−1A′Σ−1ε y)
]]
=
(2pi)−
k
2 |Σε|− 12 |Σθ|− 12
|AΣθA′ + Σε|− 12
exp
[
−1
2
[
((θ − µ)−B−1A′Σ−1ε (x−Aµ))′B((θ − µ)−B−1A′Σ−1ε (x−Aµ))
]]
We can say that θ|x ∼N(µ+B−1A′Σ−1ε (x−Aµ),B−1). Let µ˜ = µ+B−1A′Σ−1ε (x−Aµ). If
θ|x is distributed as normal with mean µ+B−1A′Σ−1ε (x−Aµ) and variance B−1, then∫
Rk
(2pi)−
k
2 |B−1|− 12 exp
(
−1
2
(θ − µ˜)′B(θ − µ˜)
)
dθ = 1∫
Rk
exp
(
−1
2
(θ − µ˜)′B(θ − µ˜)
)
dθ = (2pi)
k
2 |B−1| 12
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If pdf f(θ|x) is a normal pdf, then∫
Rk
(2pi)−
k
2 |Σε|− 12 |Σθ|− 12
|AΣθA′ + Σε|− 12
exp
[
−1
2
(θ − µ˜)′B(θ − µ˜)
]
= 1
(2pi)−
k
2 |Σε|− 12 |Σθ|− 12
|AΣθA′ + Σε|− 12
∫
Rk
exp
[
−1
2
(θ − µ˜)′B(θ − µ˜)
]
dθ = 1
(2pi)−
k
2 |Σε|− 12 |Σθ|− 12
|AΣθA′ + Σε|− 12
(2pi)
k
2 |B−1| 12 = 1
Therefore, |Σε|
− 12 |Σθ|−
1
2
|AΣθA′+Σε|−
1
2
= |B−1|− 12
For signal extraction x = Aθ + ε, where θ ∼ N(µ,Σθ) and ε ∼ N(0,Σε) independent of θ,
then θ|x ∼ N (µ+ (Σ−1θ +A′Σ−1ε A)−1A′Σ−1ε (x−Aµ), (Σ−1θ +A′Σ−1ε A)−1).
A.4 Expectation of εft+1 and ε
f
t+2 of Group i and j
Investors in group i can extract information about εft+1 and ε
f
t+2 from four signals; namely,
vit − ρ2fft, vit−1 − ρfft, s˜t − γ˜−2bt−2, and s˜t−1 − λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2 − γ˜−2bt−3.
Define
x =

vit − ρ2fft
vit−1 − ρfft
s˜t − γ˜−2bt−2
s˜t−1 − λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2 − γ˜−2bt−3

,A =

ρf 1
1 0
λ˜1 λ˜2
λ˜2 0

and
θ =
 εft+1
εft+2
 , ε =

εvit
εvit−1
γ˜−1εbt−1 + γ˜0εbt
γ˜0ε
b
t−1

.
Then
Σθ =
 σ2f 0
0 σ2f
 , and Σε =

σ2vi 0 0 0
0 σ2vi 0 0
0 0 γ˜2−1σ2b + γ˜
2
0σ
2
b γ˜−1γ˜0σ
2
b
0 0 γ˜−1γ˜0σ2b γ˜
2
0σ
2
b

.
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Also let βvi =
1
σ2vi
, βf =
1
σ2f
, ψ = 1
γ˜20σ
2
b
, τ˜ = γ˜−1γ˜0 , A = βf + βvi + λ˜
2
2ψ, and B = [βf + ρ
2
fβvi +
βvi + λ˜1ψ(λ˜1− λ˜2τ˜) + λ˜2ψ(λ˜2(1 + τ˜2)− λ˜1τ˜)][βf +βvi + λ˜22ψ]− [ρfβvi + λ˜2ψ(λ˜1− λ˜2τ˜)]2. This leads
to
Eitε
f
t+1 =
1
B
{
[Aρf − ρfβvi − λ˜2ψ(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ)]βvi(vit − ρ2fft) +Aβvi(vit−1 − ρfft)
+[(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)(A− λ˜22ψ)ψ − λ˜2ψρfβvi ][s˜t − γ˜−2bt−2]
+ [(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)(λ˜22ψ −A)ψτ˜ +Aψλ˜2 + ρfβvi λ˜2τ˜ψ][s˜t−1 − λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2 − γ˜−2bt−3]
}
,
and
Eitε
f
t+2 =
1
B
{
[[−ρfβvi − λ˜2ψ(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ)]ρf +A+ ρ2fβvi + (λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)2ψ]βvi(vit − ρ2fft)
+[−ρfβvi − λ˜2ψ(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)]βvi(vit−1 − ρfft)
+[−ψ(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)ρfβvi + (A+ ρ2fβvi)λ˜2ψ][s˜t − γ˜−2bt−2]
+[ρfβviψ[τ˜(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)− λ˜2]−Aλ˜2τ˜ψ − λ˜22ψ2(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)− ρ2fβvi λ˜2τ˜ψ]×
[s˜t−1 − λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2 − γ˜−2bt−3]
}
Group j investors receive three signals from vjt −ρfft, s˜t− γ˜−2bt−2, and s˜t−1− λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2−
γ˜−2bt−3. With these signals, they extract information about ε
f
t+1 and ε
f
t+2. Although investors j
do not receive any private signal about εft+2, they will know about it from the exchange rate signal.
Now let
x =

vjt − ρfft
s˜t − γ˜−2bt−2
s˜t−1 − λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2 − γ˜−2bt−3
 ,A =

1 0
λ˜1 λ˜2
λ˜2 0
 ,
and
θ =
 εft+1
εft+2
 , ε =

ε
vj
t
γ˜−1εbt−1 + γ˜0εbt
γ˜0ε
b
t−1
 .
Then
Σθ =
 σ2f 0
0 σ2f
 ,Σε =

σ2vj 0 0
0 γ˜2−1σ2b + γ˜
2
0σ
2
b γ˜−1γ˜0σ
2
b
0 γ˜−1γ˜0σ2b γ˜
2
0σ
2
b
 .
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Define βvj =
1
σ2vj
, C = βf + λ˜
2
2ψ, and D = [βf +βvj + λ˜
2
2ψ+(λ˜1− λ˜2τ˜)2ψ][βf + λ˜22ψ]− λ˜22ψ2(λ˜1−
λ˜2τ˜)
2. One can compute
Ejt ε
f
t+1 =
1
D
{
Cβvj (v
j
t − ρfft) + (λ˜1 − λ˜2τ)ψβf (s˜t − γ˜−2bt−2)
+ψ(Cλ˜2 − τ˜(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ)βf )(s˜t−1 − λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2 − γ˜−2bt−3)
}
,
and
Ejt ε
f
t+2 =
1
D
{
−λ˜2ψ(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)βvj (vjt − ρfft) + λ˜2ψ(C + βvj )(s˜t − γ˜−2bt−2)
+[−λ˜22ψ2(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)− (C + βvj )λ˜2ψτ˜ ][s˜t−1 − λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2 − γ˜−2bt−3]
}
Define a1 =
1
B [Aρf − ρfβvi − λ˜2ψ(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ)]βvi , a2 = 1BAβvi , a3 = 1B [(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)(A− λ˜22ψ)ψ −
λ˜2ψρfβvi ], a4 = −a3γ˜−2, a5 = −[a1ρ2f + a2ρf + a3λ˜0], a6 = 1B [(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)(λ˜22ψ − A)ψτ˜ + Aψλ˜2 +
ρfβvi λ˜2τ˜ψ]sˆt−1, where sˆt−1 = s˜t−1− λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2− γ˜−2bt−3, c1 = 1B [[−ρfβvi− λ˜2ψ(λ˜1− λ˜2τ)]ρf +
A+ ρ2fβvi + (λ˜1− λ˜2τ˜)2ψ]βvi , c2 = 1B [−ρfβvi − λ˜2ψ(λ˜1− λ˜2τ˜)]βvi , c3 = 1B [(A+ ρ2fβvi)λ˜2ψ−ψ(λ˜1−
λ˜2τ˜)ρfβvi ], c4 = −c3γ˜−2, c5 = −[c1ρ2f + c2ρf + c3λ˜0], c6 = 1B [ρfβviψ[τ˜(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)− λ˜2]−Aλ˜2τ˜ψ −
λ˜22ψ
2(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜) − ρ2fβvi λ˜2τ˜ψ], d1 = CDβvj , d3 =
ψβf (λ˜1−λ˜2τ˜)
D , d4 = −d3γ˜−2, d5 = −[d1ρf + d3λ˜0],
d6 =
ψ
D [Cλ˜2 − τ˜βf (λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)], e1 = − λ˜2ψD (λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜)βvj , e3 =
(C+βvj )λ˜2ψ
D , e4 = −e3γ˜−2, e5 =
−[e1ρf + e3λ˜0], e6 = − 1D [λ˜22ψ2(λ˜1 − λ˜2τ˜) + (C + βvj )λ˜2ψτ˜ ]. Therefore, I can write
Eitε
f
t+1 = a1v
i
t + a2v
i
t−1 + a3st + a4bt−2 + a5ft + a6sˆt−1
Eitε
f
t+2 = c1v
i
t + c2v
i
t−1 + c3st + c4bt−2 + c5ft + c6sˆt−1
Ejt ε
f
t+1 = d1v
j
t + d3st + d4bt−2 + d5ft + d6sˆt−1
Ejt ε
f
t+2 = e1v
j
t + e3st + e4bt−2 + e5ft + e6sˆt−1
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A.5 Expectation of εbt−1 and ε
b
t of Group i and j
Recall that exchange rate signal sˆt−1 = s˜t−1− λ˜1εft − γ˜−1εbt−2− γ˜−2bt−3 = λ˜2εft+1 + γ˜0εbt−1, then
I can write
Eitε
b
t−1 =
sˆt−1
γ˜0
− λ˜2
γ˜0
Eitε
f
t+1
=
sˆt−1
γ˜0
− λ˜2
γ˜0
[a1v
i
t + a2v
i
t−1 + a3st + a4bt−2 + a5ft + a6sˆt−1]
= g1v
i
t + g2v
i
t−1 + g3st + g4bt−2 + g5ft + g6sˆt−1,
where g1 = − λ˜2γ˜0 a1, g2 = − λ˜2γ˜0 a2, g3 = − λ˜2γ˜0 a3, g4 = − λ˜2γ˜0 a4, g5 = − λ˜2γ˜0 a5, and g6 =
[
1
γ˜0
− λ˜2γ˜0 a6
]
.
Repeat the same method for Ejt ε
b
t−1, this yields
Ejt ε
b
t−1 = h1v
j
t + h3st + h4bt−2 + h5ft + h6sˆt−1
where h1 = − λ˜2γ˜0 d1, h3 = − λ˜2γ˜0 d3, h4 = − λ˜2γ˜0 d4, h5 = − λ˜2γ˜0 d5, and h6 =
[
1
γ˜0
− λ˜2γ˜0 d6
]
.
I know that s˜t − γ˜−2bt−2 = λ˜1Eitεft+1 + λ˜2Eitεft+2 + γ˜0Eitεbt + γ˜−1Eitεbt−1. Then I can write
Eitε
b
t =
st
γ˜0
− λ˜0
γ˜0
ft − γ˜−2
γ˜0
bt−2 − λ˜1
γ˜0
Eitε
f
t+1 −
λ˜2
γ˜0
Eitε
f
t+2 −
γ˜−1
γ˜0
Eitε
b
t−1
= k1v
i
t + k2v
i
t−1 + k3st + k4bt−2 + k5ft + k6sˆt−1,
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where
k1 =
[
− λ˜1
γ˜0
a1 − λ˜2
γ˜0
c1 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
g1
]
,
k2 =
[
− λ˜1
γ˜0
a2 − λ˜2
γ˜0
c2 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
g2
]
,
k3 =
[
1
γ˜0
− λ˜1
γ˜0
a3 − λ˜2
γ˜0
c3 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
g3
]
,
k4 =
[
− γ˜−2
γ˜0
− λ˜1
γ˜0
a4 − λ˜2
γ˜0
c4 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
g4
]
,
k5 =
[
− λ˜0
γ˜0
− λ˜1
γ˜0
a5 − λ˜2
γ˜0
c5 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
g5
]
,
k6 =
[
− λ˜1
γ˜0
a6 − λ˜2
γ˜0
c6 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
g6
]
.
Also, I can write
Ejt ε
b
t = m1v
j
t +m3st +m4bt−2 +m5ft +m6sˆt−1,
where
m1 =
[
− λ˜1
γ˜0
d1 − λ˜2
γ˜0
e1 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
h1
]
,
m3 =
[
1
γ˜0
− λ˜1
γ˜0
d3 − λ˜2
γ˜0
e3 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
h3
]
,
m4 =
[
− γ˜−2
γ˜0
− λ˜1
γ˜0
d4 − λ˜2
γ˜0
e4 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
h4
]
,
m5 =
[
− λ˜0
γ˜0
− λ˜1
γ˜0
d5 − λ˜2
γ˜0
e5 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
h5
]
,
m6 =
[
− λ˜1
γ˜0
d6 − λ˜2
γ˜0
e6 − γ˜−1
γ˜0
h6
]
.
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APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX
B.1 Log-Linearized System
Interest Rate Firstly, I will show the log-linearized equation of the demand for home bond.
Let us begin with the home bond demand equation (2.3). Multiplying and dividing by R¯, C¯, and
P¯ leads to
1 =
Rt
R¯
EtβR¯
(
Ct+1/C¯
Ct/C¯
)−σ (
Pt/P¯
Pt+1/P¯
)
.
Taking log both sides of the equation yields
0 = (logRt−log R¯)+Et[−σ[(logCt+1−log C¯)−(logCt−log C¯)]+(logPt−log P¯ )−(logPt+1−log P¯ )].
Finally, I can write the log-linearized of home interest rate as
it = Et[σ∆ct+1 + ∆pt+1].
Repeat the same process on the households’ demand for foreign bond, equation (2.7), I will
have the log-linearized foreign bond as in equation (2.14).
Country Budget Constraint The linear deviation for the home budget constraint can be
computed by firstly multiplying R¯/Y¯ on both sides of equation (2.6).
R¯Bt+1
Y¯
− R¯Rt−1Bt
Y¯
=
R¯NXt
Y¯
bt+1
R¯
− Rt−1bt
R¯
= nxt
Since Rt−1R = e
logRt−1−log R¯ ≈ 1 + it−1, then the above equation becomes
βbt+1 − (1 + it−1)bt = nxt.
I drop the term it−1bt because it is small when comparing to the first term, bt. Hence, the
loglinearization of the home budget constraint is
βbt+1 − bt = nxt.
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For the foreign country budget constraint, I begin by multiplying R¯/Y¯ on both sides of equation
(2.10).
R¯B∗t+1
Y¯
− R¯Rt−1B
∗
t
Y¯
=
R¯NX∗t
Y¯
+
R¯R˜t(N
∗
t +D
∗
t )
Y¯
bt+1
R¯
− Rt−1bt
R¯
= nxt +
R˜t(N
∗
t +D
∗
t )
Y¯
Define n˜∗t = N∗t /Y¯ and d˜∗t = D∗t /Y¯ . I can show that R˜t(N∗t +D∗t )/Y¯ approximates as zero. Since
R˜t(N
∗
t +D
∗
t )
Y¯
=
[
R∗t−1 −Rt−1
St−1
St
]
(n˜∗t + d˜∗t),
the right hand side term is distributed to four terms, which are:
R∗t−1n˜
∗
t ≈
(1 + i∗t−1)n˜∗t
β
Rt−1
St−1
St
n˜∗t ≈
(1 + it−1 + st−1 − st)n˜∗t
β
R∗t−1d˜
∗
t ≈
(1 + i∗t−1)d˜∗t
β
Rt−1
St−1
St
d˜∗t ≈
(1 + it−1 + st−1 − st)d˜∗t
β
.
Thus,
R˜t(N
∗
t +D
∗
t )
Y¯
≈ (1 + i
∗
t−1)n˜∗t
β
− (1 + it−1 + st−1 − st)n˜
∗
t
β
+
(1 + i∗t−1)d˜∗t
β
− (1 + it−1 + st−1 − st)d˜
∗
t
β
I drop i∗t−1n˜∗t , (it−1 + st−1 − st)n˜∗t , i∗t−1d˜∗t , and (it−1 + st−1 − st)d˜∗t because their values are small.
Therefore,
R˜t(N∗t +D∗t )
Y¯
≈ 0.
The foreign country budget constraint is thus written as
βb∗t+1 − b∗t = nx∗t .
Real Exchange Rates and Prices The log real exchange rate and terms of trade are given
by
qt = p
∗
t + st − pt,
zt = pFt − p∗Ht − st.
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The law of one price can be written as QHt ≡ P
∗
HtSt
PHt
= Qαt , where Qt ≡ P
∗
t St
Pt
. Define the log of law
of one price deviations and its foreign counterpart as:
qHt ≡ p∗Ht + st − pHt = αqt,
qFt ≡ p∗Ft + st − pFt = αqt.
I rewrite the expression for zt as follows:
zt = pFt − p∗Ht − st
= (p∗Ft + st − αqt)− (αqt − st + pHt)− st
= p∗Ft + st − pHt − 2αqt.
The producer-price-based real exchange rate is qPt , defined as q
P
t = p
∗
Ft + st − pHt. Thus I obtain
zt = q
P
t − 2αqt.
The expression for qt can be written as
qt = p
∗
t + st − pt
= γp∗Ht + (1− γ)p∗Ft + st − (1− γ)pHt − γpFt
= (1− γ)qPt − γzt.
Thus, I can solve for qPt and zt as a funtion of qt:
qPt =
qt
1− γ +
γzt
1− γ
=
qt
1− γ +
γ
1− γ (q
P
t − 2αqt)
=
1− 2αγ
1− 2γ qt
zt = q
P
t − 2αqt
=
qt + γzt
1− γ − 2αqt
(1− γ)
(1− γ)
=
1− 2α(1− γ)
1− 2γ qt.
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Next, I use these results to solve for pHt − pt and p∗Ft − p∗t .
pHt − pt = pHt − (1− γ)pHt − γpFt
= γ(pHt − pFt)
= γ[−(pFt − p∗Ht − st)− (p∗Ht + st − pHt)]
= γ[−(zt + qHt)]
= −(1− α)γ
1− 2γ qt
p∗Ft − p∗t = γ(p∗Ft − p∗Ht) =
(1− α)γ
1− 2γ qt
Then I can solve for the price levels:
pt = (1− γ)pHt + γpFt = pHt − γ(pHt − pFt)
= wt +
1
1− φ
γ
1− 2γ qt,
p∗t = w
∗
t −
1
1− φ
γ
1− 2γ qt.
Assume wt = w
∗
t = 0. Using the price levels to solve for qt, I obtain:
qt =
1
1 + 11−φ
2γ
1−2γ
st.
Real Exchange Rates and Quantities I log-linearize labor supply and labor demand equa-
tion as:
σct +
1
ν
lt = wt − pt
lt = −φ(wt − pt) + yt.
Combine these two equations, I have:
νσct + yt = −ν + φ
1− φ
γ
1− 2γ qt.
The expression for foreign is:
νσc∗t + y
∗
t =
ν + φ
1− φ
γ
1− 2γ qt.
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For variable (xt, x
∗
t ), define x˜ ≡ (xt − x∗t )/2. I can derive
νσc˜t + y˜t = −ν + φ
1− φ
γ
1− 2γ qt.
The log linearization of the quantities system is as follows:
yt = (1− γ)yHt + γy∗Ht,
yHt = −θ(pHt − pt) + ζct + (1− ζ)[(1− φ)(wt − pt + yt)],
y∗Ht = −θ(p∗Ht − p∗t ) + ζc∗t + (1− ζ)[(1− φ)(w∗t − p∗t + y∗t )],
y∗t = (1− γ)y∗Ft + γyFt,
y∗Ft = −θ(p∗Ft − p∗t ) + ζc∗t + (1− ζ)[(1− φ)(w∗t − p∗t + y∗t )],
yFt = −θ(pFt − pt) + ζct + (1− ζ)[(1− φ)(wt − pt + yt)],
where ζ ≡ C¯/Y¯ . Replacing yHt and y∗Ht into yt, solving out for (wt − pt), (w∗t − p∗t ), pHt − pt, and
(p∗Ht − p∗t ), I derive
yt − (1− ζ)[yt − 2γy˜t]− ζ[ct − 2γc˜t] = γ
(
θ(1− α)2(1− γ)
1− 2γ − (1− ζ)
)
qt.
Subtracting the foreign counterpart, I obtain:
[1− (1− 2γ)(1− ζ)]y˜t − (1− 2γ)ζc˜t = γ
(
2θ(1− α) 1− γ
1− 2γ − (1− ζ)
)
qt.
I use (B.1) and (B.1) to solve for consumption and output:
ct − c∗t = −γκcqqt,
yt − y∗t = γκyqqt,
where κcq =
2θ(1−α)(1−γ)
1−2γ +ν+
ν+φ
1−φ
2γ
1−2γ
1+σν[1+ 1
1−φ
2γ
1−2γ ]
1
1−φ
2
1−2γ and κ
y
q = σνκcq − ν+φ1−φ 21−2γ .
The linearized expression for net exports is nxt = γ(y
∗
Ht − yFt − st). Substituting for st, y∗Ht,
and yFt, I derive:
nxt = γ
(
θ(1− α)2(1− γ)
1− 2γ + α−
1− α
1− 2γ +
2γ(1− ζ)
1− 2γ
)
qt − 2γ((1− φ)c˜t + φy˜t)
= γκnxq qt
= γλ2st,
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where λ2 =
κnxq
1+ 1
1−φ
2γ
1−2γ
, κnxq =
[
2θ(1− α) 1−γ1−2γ + 2(1− γ)α− 1− γκyq
]
1
1−2γ , and κ
y
q = σνκcq −
ν+φ
1−φ
2
1−2γ .
B.2 UIP Condition
To derive the UIP condistion, I start from market clearing condition:
Bt+1
St
= n(eψt − 1) + mEtR˜t+1
ωvartR˜t+1
Using the fact that
R˜t+1 = R
∗
t
(
1− Rt
R∗t
St
St+1
)
= R∗t (1− eit−i
∗
t−∆st+1)
I can rewrite the equation as:
R∗tBt+1
St
= R∗tn(e
ψt − 1) + mEt[1− e
it−i∗t−∆st+1 ]
ωvart[1− eit−i∗t−∆st+1 ]
Using log x ≈ x− 1, the equation becomes
R∗tBt+1
St
= R∗tnψt −
m(it − i∗t − Et∆st+1)
ωσ2s
,
where σ2s = vart(∆st+1). Rearrange the equation in terms of bt+1, I have
R∗t
R¯
P¯ Y¯ bt+1
St
=
R∗t
R¯
n
β
ψt − m
ωσ2s
(it − i∗t − Et∆st+1).
Since
R∗t
R¯St
≈ 1 + i∗t − st, and R
∗
t
R¯
≈ 1 + i∗t , I can write
(1 + i∗t − st)P¯ Y¯ bt+1 = (1 + i∗t )
n
β
ψ − m
ωσ2s
(it − i∗t − Et∆st+1).
Since (i∗t − st)P¯ Y¯ bt+1 and (i∗t )nβψ are very small comparing to the multiplication of the first term,
i.e., P¯ Y¯ bt+1, and
n
βψ, these terms are dropped out. I hence obtain the approximation as
P¯ Y¯ bt+1 =
n
β
ψt +
m
ωσ2s
(i∗t − it + Et∆st+1).
This leads to the uncovered parity condition as
i∗t − it + Et∆st+1 = χ1bt+1 − χ2ψt,
where χ1 =
P¯ Y¯
m/(ωσ2e)
, χ2 =
n/β
m/(ωσ2e)
.
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APPENDIX C. CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX
C.1 The Real Stochastic Discount Factor or the Real Pricing Kernel
I begin to work with an approximation of the real pricing kernel. Taking logarithms in equation
(3.9), I will have
mt+1 = log(β) + (ρ− 1)xt+1 + (α− ρ)(log(Wt+1)− log(µt(Wt+1)),
where Wt is the value function. First, I will approximate the term log(Wt+1)−log(µt(Wt+1). Define
the log wealth consumption ratio wct ≡ logWt/ct. It can be written as
wct = ρ
−1 log[(1− β) + β exp(ρgt)],
where gt ≡ log(µt(exp(wct+1) + xt+1)). Taking a linear approximation of the right-hand side as a
function of gt around the point m¯, I get
wct ≈ ρ−1 log[(1− β) + β exp(ρm¯)] +
[
β exp(ρm¯)
1− β + β exp(ρm¯)
]
(gt − m¯)
≡ k¯ + kgt.
Next, I conjecture a solution for the value function of the following form
wct = ω¯ + ωzzt + ωuut + ωwwt.
Thus, wct+1 + xt+1 = ω¯ + ωzzt+1 + ωuut+1 + ωwwt+1 + xt+1.
Using the lognormality property, gt can be expressed as Et(wct+1 +xt+1)+
α
2 vart(wct+1 +xt+1).
Using this fact, then the log-wealth consumption ratio becomes
wct = k¯ + k[ψ +
α
2
(ω2uσ
2
u + ω
2
wσ
2
w)] + k(ωzϕz + 1)zt + k(ωuϕu +
α
2
)ut + k(ωwϕw +
α
2
ω2z)wt,
where ψ = ω¯ + ωu(1− ϕu)θu + ωw(1− ϕw)θw + µ.
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I solve for the value function by matching coefficient with the conjecture form. I will have these
coefficents:
ωz =
k
1− kϕz
ωu =
α
2
k
1− kϕu
ωw =
α
2
ω2z
k
1− kϕw .
Substituting and collectecting terms, log(Wt+1)− log(µt(Wt+1) becomes
log(Wt+1)−log(µt(Wt+1) = ωz√wtεzt+1+ωuσuεut+1+ωwσwεwt+1+
√
utε
x
t+1−
α
2
(ω2zwt+ω
2
uσ
2
u+ω
2
wσ
2
w+ut).
Finally, the real pricing kernel can be expressed as
−mt+1 = δr + γrzzt + γruut + γRwwt + λrx
√
utε
x
t+1 + λ
r
z
√
wtε
z
t+1 + λ
r
uσuε
u
t+1 + λ
r
wσwε
w
t+1,
where δr = [− log(β)+(1−ρ)µ+ α2 (α−ρ)], γrz = 1−ρ, γru = α2 (α−ρ), γrw = α2 (α−ρ)ω2z , λrx = 1−α,
λrz = −(α− ρ)ωz, λru = −(α− ρ)ωu, λrw = −(α− ρ)ωw.
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C.2 The Coefficients
The coefficients of the conjecture solution for inflation can be shown as follows:
a1 =
(τ∗pi − ϕz − τ∗s )(γrz − τz)
(τpi − ϕz + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕz − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
, a∗1 =
−τ∗s (γrz − τz)
(τpi − ϕz + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕz − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
a2 =
τs(γ
∗r
z − τ∗z )
(τpi − ϕ∗z + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗z − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
, a∗2 =
(τpi − ϕ∗z + τs)(γ∗rz − τ∗z )
(τpi − ϕ∗z + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗z − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
a3 =
(τ∗pi − ϕu − τ∗s )(γru − (λ
r
x)
2
2 )
(τpi − ϕu + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕu − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
, a∗3 =
−τ∗s (γru − (λ
r
x)
2
2 )
(τpi − ϕu + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕu − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
a4 =
τs(γ
∗r
u − (λ
∗r
x )
2
2 )
(τpi − ϕ∗u + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗u − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
, a∗4 =
(τpi − ϕ∗u + τs)(γ∗ru − (λ
r
x)
2
2 )
(τpi − ϕ∗u + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗u − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
a5 =
(τ∗pi − ϕ∗w − τ∗s )(γrw − (λ
r
z+a1)
2
2 )−
τs(a∗1)
2
2
(τpi − ϕw + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗w − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
, a∗5 =
−τ∗s (γrw − (λ
r
z+a1)
2
2 )−
(τpi−ϕw+τs)(a∗1)2
2
(τpi − ϕw + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗w − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
a6 =
−(τ∗pi−ϕ∗w−τ∗s )a22
2 + τs(γ
∗r
w − (λ
∗r
z +a
∗
2)
2
2 )
(τpi − ϕ∗w + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗w − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
, a∗6 =
(τpi − ϕ∗w + τs)(γ∗rw − (λ
∗r
z +a
∗
2)
2
2 ) +
τ∗s (a2)2
2
(τpi − ϕ∗w + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗w − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
a7 =
−(τ∗pi − ϕv − τ∗s )
(τpi − ϕv + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕv − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
, a∗7 =
τ∗s
(τpi − ϕv + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕv − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
a8 =
−τs
(τpi − ϕ∗v + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗v − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
, a∗8 =
−(τpi − ϕ∗v + τ∗s )
(τpi − ϕ∗v + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗v − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
a9 =
−1
2 [(τ
∗
pi − ϕe − τ∗s )(a7)2 + τs(a∗7)2]
(τpi − ϕe + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕe − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
, a∗9 =
1
2 [τ
∗
s (a7)
2 − (τpi − ϕe + τs)(a∗7)2]
(τpi − ϕe + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕe − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
a10 =
−1
2 [(τ
∗
pi − ϕ∗e − τ∗s )(a8)2 + τs(a∗8)2]
(τpi − ϕ∗e + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗e − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
, a∗10 =
1
2 [τ
∗
s (a8)
2 − (τpi − ϕ∗e + τs)(a∗8)2]
(τpi − ϕ∗e + τs)(τ∗pi − ϕ∗e − τ∗s ) + τsτ∗s
